The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20091007n2122 | RC EAST | 35.12281036 | 71.38246918 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-10-07 10:10 | Enemy Action | SAFIRE | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TF PALEHORSE Reports MINOR SAFIRE (SAF) IVO OP Bari Ali, Konar
071040ZOCT09
42SYD1710089260
ISAF # 10-XXXX
Friendly Mission/Operation Task and Purpose:
MSN: NLT 07 0600 OCT 09 TF PALEHORSE conducts reconnaissance operations in Dangum and Asmar districts to locate and disrupt AAF activity and enhance TF CHOSIN FOM.
Narrative of Major Events: 1018- SWT arrived ABAD, linked up with FLEX 65 (CH-47) to escort to FOB Bostic. 1024- Notified by FLAWLESS (UH-60) that OP Bari Alai was in a TIC and was firing mortars on GTL 244 DEG. 1038- Arrived VIC Bari Alai. They informed SWT that they were no longer guns hot. 1040- As the SWT was crossing the ridgeline se of Bari Alai in escort of FLEX 65, SWT received sustained machine gun fire from the NW face of the ridge VIC YD 1752 8918 el.1432m. SWT instructed FLEX 65 to continue north toward Bostic to stay out of the engagement area and immediately broke away from the fire and reported to Bari Alai. 1040-1100- Engaged area VIC YD 1752 8918 with .50 cal and rockets. fired one hellfire at YD 1674 8925 el.1361m at a suspected fighting position, and a second at YD 1758 8863 el.1625 at a cave along the ridgeline. 1104- COLDBLOOD 6 reported that the predator UAV reported 2 PAX hiding and evading as SWT reconed and suppressed the area at YD 1728 8883 el.1625m.
1104-1123- SWT continued to suppress the area they received fire from as well as VIC Bari Alai TRP 7-8 where they were taking sustained small arms/machine gun fire. DUDE 03 (F-15) also conducted one gun run on the area SWT received fire from at YD 1728 8883. SWT fired a second hellfire at YD 1758 8863 el. 1140m. DESTROYER informed the SWT that Bari Alai was again receiving fire from their NW as well as their south along the ridgeline between Bari Alai and the villages of Gewi and Bar Gham. 1145- Arrived back on station at Bari Alai. Bari Alai passed the SWT three grids where they were taking fire from; YD 1580 9260, yd 1660 9240, and YD 1610 935. By this time, Bari Alai was reporting that they were taking fire from all cardinal directions, and the SWT obtained clearance to fire, confirming that all friendly forces were inside the wire, and suppressed all areas surrounding Bari Alai. SWT engaged one cave with hellfire at YD 1625 9254 el.1491, where Bari Alai reported they were taking DShK fire from. 1224- Arrived back on station at Bari Alai, continued to recon and suppress threats surrounding Bari Alai. Bari Alai updated the grid where they were receiving DShK fire from to YD 1650 9330, and HAWG (A-10) dropped one GBU on that grid. HAWG did not have the station time to drop a second bomb, so Bari Alai requested that the SWT engage that area with 2x k2a hellfire missiles- good effect.
TF PALEHORSE S2 Assessment: HUMINT reporting suggested that Dost Mohammad, the overall AAF commander in Nuristan and a northern Konar Province, wanted to increase AAF activity in the Northern Konar in order to draw CF air and ground assets away from Nuristan, specifically the Kamdesh Valley. LLVI over the last 4 days has indicated that AAF were planning large scale attacks on OP Bari Alai, COP Pirtle King and OP Lion's Den. These attacks are similar to the ones that took place on COP Pirtle-King yesterday. AAF are continuing to engage armed A/C only as a defensive measure in the Gehazi Abad area.
Report key: 42DE4108-9833-540D-FCB38068C6757430
Tracking number: 20091007091142SYD1710089260
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Unit name: TF PALEHORSE
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 42SYD1710089260
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED