The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20091006n2235 | RC SOUTH | 31.59827042 | 65.4764328 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-10-06 07:07 | Enemy Action | Direct Fire | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TF 1-12 C/S D16 were conducting an independent framework patrol. FF observed how unknown number of INS engaged a PSC CONVOY with SAF and RPG.
A RPG round struck a jingle truck as part of PSG CONVOY. Convoy was heading WEST and the contact came from NORTH side of the road. FF engaged 1x white van moving NORTH in the desert with MK 48, resulting in several hits to the van. The vehicle stopped and 3 x LN dismounted. 1 x LN (female) was killed in the vehicle from the 7.62 fire. FF did not find the RPG launcher. A condolence payment was arranged to occur at FW JDCC on 071500D*.
UPDATE 2245D* (FIR)
FF were on a mounted patrol heading EAST towards COP SENJARAY along HWY 1 with 6 x MRAPs, 1 x LMTV, and 5 x jingle trucks with 40ft trailers. An unknown number of INS engaged the fifth vehicle in the OOM with 1 x RPG. C/S
observed the trace from the RPG and identified a vehicle that turned off of highway heading north. D16 instructed his gunner to engage the vehicle with a MK48 (7.62mm) resulting in 1 x LN killed and moderate damage to the vehicle. The deceased was identified as HALA SHARIF (woman from KC). The other 2 x LN were identified as MARVO (nephew of the deceased), and JANDEVEEVE (woman). MARVO appeared sad, but understood that it was an accident. C/S did not find a RPG launcher or anything suspicious in the van. The driver of the van, being a relative of the woman was upset about what happened but understood why CF engaged, as there was a lot of confusion during the INS ambush.
This (location of incident) is a known INS ambush point along HWY 1 that has resulted in numerous attacks on ISAF/ANSF and LN. This zone of HWY 1 between SENJARAY and FOB WILSON is also characterized by the combination of IEDs and Direct Fire Engagements, which are known as Complex Attacks. Since 1 September 09, there have been 15 IED incidents (6 strikes, 6 finds and 3 emplacers targeted while emplacing), and a total of 15 TIC/ambushes that have resulted in a total of 11 MEDEVACs in this high threat area. It is a common TTP for out of area fighters that are typically better trained and are capable of emplacing IEDs while concurrently engaging from ambush positions. In addition, the INS will break contact when faced with overwhelming fire power from ISAF convoys. On 4 Oct, TF 1-12 responded to an ambush where they found photos of ANSF and PSC vehicles and LN contractors trucks in an INS firing position which they quickly abandoned after ambushing a COMPASS Convoy. It was in this context that the patrol from TF 1-12 understood their tactical scenario and thus directed the engagement on what was perceived to be an INS vehicle conducting battlefield manuever.
UPDATE 080441D*
NFTR.
BDA: 1 x LN (female) killed
***Event closed at 080441* OCT20091 Killed afghan(AFG) Local Civilian
Report key: 5736C72B-F3F8-4022-990F-00369AC81EF6
Tracking number: 41RQQ34960985702009-10#0526
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: A SIGACTS MANAGER
Unit name: TF 1-12
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: RC (S)
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 41RQQ3496098570
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED