The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20091003n2093 | RC EAST | 35.375103 | 71.31391907 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-10-03 09:09 | Enemy Action | SAFIRE | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TF PALEHORSE Reports SIGNIFICANT SAFIRE (RPG/SAF) IVO COP Keating, Nuristan
030900ZOCT09
42SYE1020017100
ISAF# 10-XXXX
Friendly Mission/Operation Task and Purpose:To Provide QRF for TF Mountain Warrior
Narrative of Major Events:The flight departed Bostick with three UH-60s and two AH-64s and flew via the BK Pass and then through a pass at YE 122 176. The lead UH-60 received small arms fire from 270 degrees from approx. grid YE 102 171. As the flight was turned north inbound for Fritche, the UHs received fire from YE 102 171, YE 117 183 and YE 114 180. All aircraft were able to reach OP Fritche to infil troops. The AWT engaged the area of enemy fire. All UH-60s lifted off LZ and took fire from the same position. Door gunners on all UH-60s returned fire with 7.62mm. AWT suppressed the area again. All three UHs received fire from these positions on first four turns in and out. On the last (5th) turn an RPG was fired at rear AH-64 and SAF on last UH-60 came from YE 122 176. Returned to JAF with no damage to A/C or crew. MC
TF PALEHORSE S2 Assessment: After the CF retrograde of Barge Matal, it is likely that AAF adjusted their focus to the Kamdesh Valley, specifically COP Keating and OP Fritche. Immediately after the retrograde occurred on 18 SEP 09 it was expected that kinetic activity would increase IVO COP Keating . However, the activity vic the COP had remained low until the complex attack on 03 OCT 09. This is an indicator that AAF most likely planned extensively, as well as cached supplies and ammunition for this attack. HUMINT reporting has indicated AAF commanders that were operating in Barge Matal and in the Kamdesh came together in the Mandagal Valley in order to coordinate and plan this attack. The report further indicated that the commanders who were present at this meeting had forces coming from all four cardinal directions of COP Keating. AAF commanders may have also met with the ANP in Urmul village, which is just west of Keating- and one of the main AAF attack position for this engagement- and made an agreement with them not to attack each other. The ANP station itself was used as an AAF attack position. SIGINT collected during the attack has confirmed many of the AAF C2 locations mentioned in the HUMINT reports. (IIR 6-405-4081-09, IIR 6-405-3234-09, IIR 6-405-4039-09, TD-314/064826-09).Multiple DShKs were reported to be positioned at high elevations (7000-7500 ft. MSL). These positions were likely emplaced specifically to engage responding A/C. It is possible that AAF tested some of these positions during the MINOR SAFIRE conducted on 22 SEP 09, just east of COP Keating, and then adjusted them to be level with the likely elevation of A/C. This is the first time in the Kamdesh Valley multiple DShK positions have been used at such a high elevation. It is unknown whether or not AAF noticed the success they had engaging A/C, forcing numerous AH-64s to RTB with damages.
SIGINT and pilot observations confirm that AAF suffered a crippling amount of casualties throughout today's events. Consequently, fighters are likely to egress back to hide positions and not engage CF elements that air assaulted into the area. AAF will likely conduct radio broadcasts stating that they were able to overrun the COP as an IO campaign, which may help in their recruitment efforts. The threat in the western Kamdesh will likely increase as these cells recover. However, this IO campaign will likely embolden cells in the central and western Kamdesh, as well as in the northern Konar Districts, to increase engagements against CF ground and air forces. If CF retrograde from the Kamdesh Valley, the C2 elements from this area will likely carry their successful TTPs to the Gehazi Abad and Nari Districts. The TTP of targeting A/C from high elevation, at flight level, is likely to spread through the Kamdesh Valley and Northern Konar where the narrow valleys and high ridges allow for such tactics.
Report key: 42EB9207-0362-F3B7-695FA1EA08750195
Tracking number: 20091003090042SYE1020017100
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: TRUE
Reporting unit: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Unit name: TF PALEHORSE
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 42SYE1020017100
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED