The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20090916n2139 | RC EAST | 33.17069244 | 70.01293182 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-09-16 04:04 | Friendly Action | Vehicle Interdiction | FRIEND | 3 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
UNIT 2-377TH PFAR
TYPE: INSURGENT VEHICLE
WHO: WARDEN 37 (ABP PLT.)
WHERE: 42 S WB 94443 70667
*******OCCP SALTR********
S- 1 X INSURGENT VEHICLE
A- TRUCK WITH EXPLOSIVES INSIDE BEING TRANSPORTED
L- WB 94443 70667
T- 0256Z 16SEPT09
R- OCCP RELAYS FOR ABP WHOM REPORTS THAT CUSTOMS HAD STOPPED A VEHICLE WITH 2x MAMs, THE PAX RAN AWAY. WHEN CUSTOMS SEARCHED THE VEHICLE THEY FOUND SUICIDE VEST AND EXPLOSIVES, THEY CURRENTLY HAVE THE TRUCK IN POSSESSION AT THE ABOVE GRID
0432Z- UPDATE TO POSSIBLE SUICIDE VEST: WARDEN 46 REPORTS THAT THEY ARE ON SITE AND ARE CURRENTLY TRYING TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE FROM THE ABP TO CONFIRM THAT THERE IS A SUICIDE VEST AT THAT LOCATION. IT IS NOT CONFIRMED AS OF YET THAT THERE IS A SUICIDE VEST ATT.
0446Z- WARDEN 46 REPORTS THEY HAVE BEEN TOLD AND SHOWN 1x TOYOTA FLAT BED AND CONTAINS; 1x SUICIDE VEST, MINES AND A REMOTE/RECEIVER TYPE DEVICE. WARDEN 46 IS UNABLE TO GET EYES ON BECAUSE THEY ARE KEEPING THEIR DISTANCE DUE TO TRUCK COULD POSSIBLY BE RIGGED AS WELL
0459Z-
WARDEN 37 9 LINE UXO
1.) 16 SEPT 2009 0900L
2.) ABP, GRID WB 9444 7057
3.) CALL SIGN: WARDEN 37, FREQ. 53.825
4.) PLACED, 9X MINES, 1X SUICIDE VEST, and POSS. RIGGED VIC. TO DETONATE
5.) UNK
6.) U.S. COALITION FORCES AND ABP/KPF
7.) UNABLE TO CONTINUE MISSION, VEHICLE CORDON 300M 360'
8.) 8 VEHICLE CORDONED 360' SECURITY, AWAITING EOD SUPPORT
9.) IMMEDIATE
0513Z- UPDATE TO SUICIDE VEST INCIDENT: WARDEN 46 REPORT THAT THEY HAVE 3 X DETAINEES FROM TWO VEHICLES THEY STOPPED THAT WERE CARRYING WEAPONS CACHES. THEY ARE CURRENTLY BATS/HIIDE INDIVIDUALS. THEY ARE CURRENTLY COUNTING THE ITEMS IN THE CACHES
0519Z-UPDATE TO CACHE: THERE ARE 29 X AK-47 AND 2 X CHEST RACKS.
0820Z KPF WILL CTRL DET THE MINES AND VESTS OGA IS INSTRUCTING KPF ON THIS TASK. CTRL DET COMPLETE SAPPER 16 AND WARDEN 47 WILL DO SWAP ON DET'S AND AK-47'S AND SP BACK TO SALERNO/
0850Z TF STEEL IS WORKING WITH ABP CMDR TO GET DETAINEES.
0943Z KPF WILL NOT GIVE UP THE VEHICLE TO EOD, THE VEHICLE HAS 200 LBS OF UBE AND IS DETERMINED BY EOD TO BE A VBIED
1044Z KPF WILL NOT GIVE UP THE VEHICLE TF STEEL IS STILL WORKING TO GET THESE ITEMS BACK TO SALERNO
1108Z WOLF PACK 6 WILL GO TO BSP 3 AND PICKUP VEHICLE. SAPPER 16 AND WOLF PACK WITH EOD WILL CONVOY BACK TO SALERNO WITH VEHICLE. SAPPERS 16 WILL RTB GORBUZ WHEN THEY REACH THAT POINT.
SUMMARY:
0X INJ
0 X DMG
3 X DETAINEES
27 X AK-47'S
2 X CHEST RACKS
1 X SUICIDE VEST CTRL DET
9 X MINES CTRL DET
1 X 200 LBS UBE
OPEN
-------------------------------------------------------------------
CPooF Summary of Events (from duplicate report)
Event Title:Info VBIED/WPN CAPTURE
Zone:null
Placename:ISAF#09-1710
Outcome:Ineffective
On 16 SEP 2009, at approx 0710, TF Steel was notified via OCCP that ABP at BCP 3, IVO WB 94752 70405, interdicted a vehicle crossing the border from Pakistan. The evening prior, the ABP at BCP 3 had been in a small firefight with "Al Qaeda", who fled, leaving the vehicle in the wadi. Upon daylight, the ABP went to inspect the vehicle and discovered approx. 2500lbs of explosives (4x containers of 500lbs UBE each, and 1x 500lb General Purpose bomb), and 1x suicide vest.
The truck was identified as a VBIED, and KPF was notified, along with the OCCP. KPF responded and was establishing the cordon around the vehicle when the ABP ETT with additional ABP forces arrived on scene. The ETT was redirected from their Bori Tana mission.
1/A/425 (SAPPER 16) responded from COP Gorbuz. Sapper moved to FOB Salerno to pick up EOD with the follow on mission to BCP 3.
As Sapper was arriving on the scene with EOD, the KPF had the vehicle cordoned and would not allow anyone to approach. They had already begun clearing out the explosives and preparing for their disposal.
Shortly after Sappers' arrival, KPF conducted a controlled detonation of the 4x containers of UBE and the 500lb bomb. The suicide vest was taken back to KPF HQ at FOB Chapman.
As ETT was securing the site, ABP in conjunction with the ETT stopped two vehicles (a van followed by a station wagon) coming across the border. The lead vehicle had only a driver, while the trail vehicle had a driver and passenger.
Upon investigation, 29x brand new AK-47s and 2x Chest Racks were found in the trail vehicle. Through tactical questioning, it was determined the two vehicles were traveling together.
ABP and ETT detained the individuals and secured the weapons. All items were brought back to SAL for further processing by the Law Enforcement Personnel. The detainees were taken to the detention facility on FOB Salerno.
Commander's Assessment
The ABP interdiction of these two vehicles is a huge success for ANSF in Khowst. No doubt the capture of the 29x AK-47s will be a hindrance to AAF operations. Countless lives were saved by the AAFs capture of the VBIED.to AAF operations. Countless lives were saved by the AAFs capture of the VBIED.
Report key: C21E8DBE-1517-911C-C5F1A4768DA46F40
Tracking number: 20090916041142SWD3817955948
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: 2-377 PFAR / TF East JOC Watch
Unit name: ABP
Type of unit: ANSF
Originator group: TF East JOC Watch
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 42SWB9444370667
CCIR: (ISAF) FFIR 13. - SIGNIFICANT EVENT ILLUSTRATING ANSF EFFECTIVENESS INCLUDING CONFIRMED DEATH / DETENTION / RELEASE OF MEDIUM / HIGH VALUE TARGETS
Sigact: A SIGACTS MANAGER
DColor: BLUE