The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20090801n1973 | RC SOUTH | 31.65323067 | 65.61203003 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-08-01 04:04 | Explosive Hazard | IED Found/Cleared | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
FF reported that while conducting NFO patrol, they found an IED. IED consisted of 1 x 107mm artillery shell with wires attached. ANA cordoned the area.
At 0413Z FF found a 2nd 107mm shell, booby trapped with wires and an electrical system (41RQR 4763 0494).
No casualties or damage reported.
UPDATE 2000Z*
Device was BIP. NFTR.
***Event closed at 2230Z*
Update: Task Force Kandahar Counter-IED Tactical Exploitation Report assessed 1 x VOIED (Anti-Pull IED) found/cleared. (See attached Media)
Summary from TFK Counter - IED Tactical Exploitation Report: (S//REL ISAF, NATO) At approx 010630D* Aug 09, an ANA patrol with OMLT element left SP ARGHANDAB in order to patrol the KUHAC village area. At approx 0820D* while traveling SOUTH on an unnamed rte an AUP came to inform them that there was an IED in the KUHAC mosque. The OMLT went to investigate the site and at 0830D* when at GR 41R QR 47683 04964 he found what he suspected was an IED tight to the gate of the mosque. ANA set up a cordon and they requested assistance from the CF. QRF with CIED assets was deployed from CAMP NATHAN SMITH (CNS). QRF arrived on site at approx 1053D* and CIED began the exploitation. One BK-5 HEAT round was found two meters away from the gate. The main charge was hidden inside the garden with an anti-pull switch tight to the fence of the mosque. It appears that if somebody would pull on the fence, this would activate the IED and strike the main charge. With the evidences found on site it is suspected that the INS emplaced this IED in order to target any LOCAL NATIONAL (LN) who would open the fence of the mosque. When doing his investigation, TET member saw an ANA OP 300m SOUTH of the mosque with a good line of sight. It appears that the OP didnt see the INS when emplacing the IED. QRF and CIED ended his task at approx 1139D* and were back to CNS at 1235D*.
Report key: D48019BC-1372-51C0-598302EE68D59248
Tracking number: 20090801041041RQR4606
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF K / TF South JOC Watch
Unit name: ANA (1/1/205) w/ CAN OMLT
Type of unit: ANSF
Originator group: TF South JOC Watch
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 41RQR4768304964
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED