The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20090716n1208 | RC SOUTH | 30.93581009 | 64.16014099 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-07-16 06:06 | Explosive Hazard | IED Found/Cleared | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
** DELAYED REPORTING **
REPORT DERIVED FROM USMC EOD REPORT
While RTB from previous IED (AFG-DELI-011-IED), EOD was notified from passing convoy (CAAT Blue) that there was disturbed earth and PIED on a culvert located on Redskins East. Unit on scene was able to have a southern cordonestablished and eyes on the northern and western sides of the road. EOD immediately responded.
Upon arrival, EOD made contact with OSC and was directed to where the disturbed earth was located. EOD established safe area and conducted 5/25's. EOD TL began to sweep wide west toward the edge of the canal and north to the opposite side of PIED for command wire, finding nothing at this time. EOD TL requested additional security dismounts to follow the safe path and establish security on the northern and eastern side of PIED site. EOD TL swept along a mud wall that provided cover and concealment from possible observation and cleared a path to the northern side of PIED where a 4' wall gave EOD TL a good vantage point to see PIED. EOD TL immediately noticed a bundle of copper colored command wire next to a 1.5' X 1.5' square hole in the center of the road, just east of the culvert. EOD TL also noticed a yellow jug that was placed under the culvert in the water. EOD TL quickly moved back and took cover, at the same time, EOD TL was notified by CAAT Blue that SCAN EAGLE observed a individual on the east side of the canal lying in the field. Right next to the field, where the individual was lying CAAT Blue said there was a motorcycle parked, and at the base of the canal were a pair of sandals. EOD TL requested permission to have security fire a warning shot at the canal berm in order to have the individual stand and be apprehended, because no interpreter was available at this time. Due to lack of communications EOD TL continued with exploitation of IED. Ground troops were dispatched to cross the canal and find the individual. EOD team moved back to IED site, and EOD TL moved forward with HAL kit and remotely separated the bundle of command wire. EOD TL then attempted to drag the site remotely with no results. At this time dismounted troops on the west side of canal said that the individual on the ground had crawled out and avoided detention. EOD TL at this time dropped all gear except gloves, helmet and eye pro, and climbed down into the residential irrigation canal and moved through the water to the culvert. During this time, EOD TL had complete cover and concealment from all directions. EOD TL then approached the culvert and proceeded to pull himself into the culvert to tie a line to the jug as there was no remote way of moving the jug without detection. TL returned to TM and EOD team pulled the jug from a distance of 75-100 meters while taking cover around the corner of local building. Remote move was successful and TL was able to clearly see that the jug had been separated from command wire. TL then utilized the MiniMD to cross the 4' wall and search for any other hazards. TL discovered (2) sets of wire heading strait into the ground and TL then put a 1 block TNT excavation charge to clear the site. Upon detonation, TL returned to site, and found a second jug of HME, and noticed that the cap wires leading to this jug were separated from previous excavation charge. TL placed a second excavation charge to break up the hard packed dirt. The jug was then remotely moved with a MRAP after several unsuccessful attempts were made remotely. Upon clearing the site of any additional explosive hazards, TL continued to sweep for an initiator when dismounted security on the ground brought to L's attention a possible ant trail. TL confirmed ant trail discovering command wire running from the canal at water level to the
IED site. Dismounted troops on the west side of canal also discovered that the motorcycle they seized had multiple battery pack's that were constructed for the purposes of IED power sources. Also on the motorcycle was packing tape, electrical tape, white lamp cord, and a test light. With all the evidence collected, EOD believes that the individual in the field was in fact the trigger man for the IED and was unable to complete emplacement. EOD TL cleared the scene of any additional hazards and the unit on scene was briefed. HME was disposed of and EOD RTB. All individuals were wearing proper PPE and utilized ECM. (2) ~50lb jug of HME was disposed of by detonation on scene on the edge of the canal in order to mitigate damage to the local area.
EVENT CLOSED
Report key: 15343EC6-1372-51C0-5940BF525F26C05E
Tracking number: 20090716063541RPQ1083223065
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: 2ND MEB / J3 ORSA
Unit name: 2/8 ECHO CO
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: J3 ORSA
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 41RPQ1083223065
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED