The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20090609n1274 | RC EAST | 34.49544907 | 70.55513 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2009-06-09 15:03 | Enemy Action | SAFIRE | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TF PALEHORSE Reports SIGNIFICANT SAFIRE (SAF) IVO JBAD PRT, Nangarhar
091530ZJUN09
42S XD 42780 18190
ISAF # 06-XXXX
Narrative of major events: On 9 JUN 09 at approximately 2000L a flight of two UH-60s departed JAF to Asadabad on a PAX movement mission. As the flight approached the North Test Fire Area, the left crew chief observed approximately 20-30 rounds of HMG fire. The first burst consisted of between 8-10 tracers and nearly paralleled the direction of travel. The second burst consisted of 5-8 tracers and was oriented more perpendicular to the flight, passing between the two aircraft. The point of origin was approximately 500-700 meters West of the route of flight, at nearly a 45 degree angle up toward the aircraft. The aircraft were at approximately 600 feet AGL and had just initiated a climb. Chalk 2 announced to Chalk 1 that the flight was taking fire, and the flight continued a climbing right turn towards the test fire range. The crew determined that the aircraft was not hit and continued on to Asadabad. Prior to landing at Asadabad, the crew sent a message to the Palehorse TOC informing them of the engagement and provided a grid location of the point of origin. Upon landing at Asadabad, the crew verified that there was no damage to the aircraft and continued on with the mission.
TF PALEHORSE S2 Assessment: Since mid-March 2009 there have been several reports from aircraft northwest of Jalalabad of tracer fire directed skyward after sundown. These previous reports were irregular in both frequency and POO, and were previously assessed as celebratory fire. This incident is the first confirmed SAFIRE incident in Nangarhar province north of Jalalabad City. Based on the pilots report of the characteristics of the fire this system is likely an LMG or HMG. Based on proliferation within the AO, a PKM would be the most likely LMG. However, given the characteristics of a steady stream of fire, quick traversing adjustment to the fire as the A/C passed, and pilot reports of large bright tracers, this system may have been an HMG such as a DShK. This area of the Konar river is well trafficked by R/W flights heading north into Konar and Nuristan Provinces. This traffic has likely provided AAF innumerable opportunities to observe CF flight paths and prepare a pre-sighted position to target passing A/C. However, it is unclear why AAF would engage the aircraft on a night of poor illumination rather than waiting for daytime or a high illumination night. This area has had very little coalition force ground activity, and consequently lacks clear reporting on cells or personalities that may be related to this incident. There has been no follow-on intelligence reporting of AAF taking claim for engaging a helicopter in this area. Due to the few attacks in this area and little reporting we assess that this activity is unlikely to continue. To further reduce this risk A/C should vary flight routes, particularly in this high traffic area with flat terrain that allows for such variability.
Report key: FB80F69C-1517-911C-C5FC95A35B63BEB3
Tracking number: 20090609153042SXD4278018190
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Unit name: TF PALEHORSE
Type of unit:
Originator group: TF THUNDER SIGACTS Staff
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 42SXD4278018190
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED