The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080925n1349 | RC EAST | 33.11819839 | 69.92375946 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-09-25 08:08 | Friendly Fire | Green-Blue | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISAF #09-1232
At 0820Z: The ACID RAIN (AR) 30/33 departed FOB Salerno
At 0852Z: While providing aerial security for WARDEN 406 at 42S WB 8540 6406, AR 33 was flying north 100 meters from the convoy and 450 meters from the border when they began a left turn away from the border. AR 30 informed AR 33 they were taking DShK fire from the north PAKMIL CP (identified by flags). The DShK rounds passed 50 meters behind AR 33 as they continued their left turn as WARDEN 406 fired MK19 rounds to suppress the north PAKMIL CP so ACID RAIN 33 could depart the area. The north PAKMIL CP continued to fire at WARDEN 406 and AR 33 as the aircraft flew away from the border and once the aircraft was out of the area ceased firing. WARDEN 406 convoy then began their move back to BSP 4 and SWT provided aerial security with NFTR. *There were two PAKMIL CPs on either side of a wadi with the north PAKMIL CP (42S WB 8618 6477) firing at the aircraft and the south PAKMIL CP (42S WB 8635 6342) not firing.
At 1140Z: SWT landed at FOB Salerno with no injuries or damage to aircraft.
FRIENDLY MISSION/OPERATION
TF NO MERCY Scout Weapons Team (SWT) ACID RAIN (AR) 30/33 (2 x OH-58) were conducting aerial security of a convoy IVO BSP 4 along the AFG/PAK border in Tani District, Khowst Province.
ENEMY SITUATION
TF NO MERCY Assessment: There has been no SAFIREs within 10NM in the last 30 days. Due to recent events involving aircraft along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, there is an increased possibility of SAFIREs originating from PAKMIL locations.
Report key: 9B53E34A-FD80-63FD-299C70F90AF90341
Tracking number: 20080925085242SWB86186477
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF Destiny SIGACTS Staff
Unit name: TF NO MERCY
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF Destiny SIGACTS Staff
Updated by group: A SIGACTS MANAGER
MGRS: 42SWB86186477
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE