The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080801n1366 | RC WEST | 32.48469162 | 63.55983734 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-08-01 11:11 | Explosive Hazard | IED Found/Cleared | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
TF 2/7 SIGACT 011500LAUG08 GOLF GOMPANY 1ST PLATOON FINDS IED IVO GULISTAN
UNIT GOLF 1ST PLATOON (AO PHILADELPHIA)
EVENT: ON 01 1500L AUG08, G1C WITH 3 VICS AND 15 PAXS WAS ON A MOUNTED PATROL TO SECURE BUJI BAST PASS, A KNOWN TB STRONG HOLD, AND IED CORRIDOR AND THEY CRESTED THE PASS IVO 41S NR 526 943 AND OBSERVED A MAN CLAD IN BLACK WORKING IN THE ROAD 500M SOUTH. HE WAS OVER TWO KM FROM ANY DWELLINGS AND CLEARLY WORKING IN THE ROAD. HE DID NOT OBSERVE US IMMEDIATELY, BUT WHEN HE DID, HE QUICKLY MOUNTED HIS MOTORCYCLE, AND BEGAN TO DRIVE SOUTH ON THE ROAD AWAY FROM US. AS WE OBSERVED HIM, HE DISMOUNTED AND THREW HIS BIKE IN A WASH 300M SOUTH OF HIS ORIGINAL POSITION. HE THEN BEGAN WALKING QUICKLY TO THE WEST TOWARD THE MOUNTAIN RANGE 2KM AWAY. AS G1C CLOSED TO CATCH HIM WE IDENTIFIED HIS MOTORCYCLE AND IT FIT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE BOLO VEHICLE WE HAVE SEEN IVO TWO OF THE LAST THREE IEDS IN THE VALLEY. THERE HAVE BEEN MULTIPLE SOURCES REPORTING THAT A MAN WITH A RED MOTORCYCLE HAS BEEN LAYING IEDS FOR AMERICAN CONVOYS. A LARGE WRAPPED BATTERY, LASHED WITH ELECTRICAL TAPE AND ELECTRICAL WIRES WERE FOUND IN HIS SADDLE BAGS. THE WIRES AND BATTERY WERE IDENTICAL TO THOSE OF THE ONES RECOVERED FROM ALL PREVIOUS IEDS IN THIS AREA OF THE VALLEY. HAVING ASSESSED A HOSTILE ACT, AND BASED ON OTHER AMPLIFYING KNOWLEDGE OF THE AO, G1 GAVE THE COMMAND TO ENGAGE THE IED LAYER. BY THIS TIME HE WAS OVER 1KM AWAY AND IN THE MOUNTAIN RANGE SEVERAL HUNDRED FEET ABOVE THE VALLEY FLOOR. AT THIS TIME MSOC-C HAD CONDUCTED LINK UP. G1 MARINES ENGAGED INDIVIDUAL WITH APPROXIMATELY 50 ROUNDS .50 CAL, 100 ROUNDS 7.62MM, AND 10 ROUNDS 5.56 LR. MSOC ENGAGED WITH 240B WITH UNKNOWN ROUNDS. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS WELL COVERED BY ROCKS AND BEGAN MOVING TACTICALLY, EGRESSING UP A STEEP DRAW MASKING HIS MOVEMENT. MSOC WAS TASKED WITH PUSHING SOUTH TO GAIN VISIBILITY INTO DRAW, WHILE G1 VICS PUSHED TO THE BASE OF THE MOUNTAIN TO THE EAST. DISMOUNTS FROM G1 BEGAN TO SCALE MOUNTAIN, WITH MSOC COVERING THEIR ADVANCE. AFTER NEARLY AN HOUR, DISMOUNTS REACHED THE TOP OF THE RIDGELINE 600FT ABOVE THE VALLEY FLOOR. THE INDIVIDUAL WAS AGAIN IDENTIFIED MOVING DOWN THE REVERSE SIDE TOWARDS THE VILLAGE OF DEH TANGAY 41S NR 513 945. (THIS WAS THE VILLAGE WAS THE ONE WHERE MEN WERE OBSERVED WITH CONCEALED WEAPONS IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING CBT TRAINS IED A WEEK AGO.) THE INDIVIDUAL WAS OBSERVED ENTERING A HOUSE ON THE EDGE OF TOWN. HE REMAINED THERE FOR 10 MIN AND THEN HEADED TOWARD THE RIVER BED 200M NW. HE WAS PICKED UP BY A CAR AND HEADED SOUTH, APPROXIMATELY 800M SOUTH IN THE RIVERBED HE TRANSFERRED TO A BLUE BONGO TRUCK AND HEADED NORTH. HE CHANGED VEHICLES SEVERAL TIMES, AS IF IN AN ATTEMPT TO CONFUSE ANY AIR OBSERVATION. AT THIS TIME PREDATOR WAS BACK ON STATION, BUT COMM. WITH G1 COC WAS BEING CONDUCTED THROUGH PRC 153 TRAFFIC. G1 ATTEMPTED TO TALK JTAC AND PREDATOR ONTO THE TARGET TO NO AVAIL. TARGET ATTEMPTED TO SWITCH VEHICLES SEVERAL MORE TIMES. MSOC C AND G1 VEHICLES PUSHED NORTH AROUND END OF RIDGELINE AND ATTEMPTED TO PUSH INTO THE VILLAGE FROM NORTH AND SWEEP THROUGH. THERE WERE NO TRAFFICABLE ROADS INTO THE VILLAGE, AND IT WAS IDENTIFIED THAT DISMOUNTS WERE OBSERVING THE SOUTHERN MOST PORTION OF MUCH LARGER VILLAGE MASKED BY TERRAIN 800M TO THE NORTH. MSOC C REPORTED AT LEAST 30 MALES CLAD IN DARK CLEARLY VISIBLE AND POSTURING IN THE NORTHERN END OF THE VILLAGE. THERE WAS NO WAY TO SET UP VEHICLES TO SUPPORT, AND DISMOUNTS WOULD HAVE HAD TO COVER 1KM OF OPEN FIELDS TO GET TO THE NORTHERN END OF TOWN. BASED ON LIGHT AND TIME CONSIDERATIONS, G1 MADE THE CALL TO PUSH BACK TO EASTERN SIDE OF RIDGELINE AND RTB. G1 VICS CONDUCTED LINK UP WITH DISMOUNTS, AND WE BEGAN SWEEPING FOR THE IED. WITH A METAL DETECTOR G1C DISCOVERED A PRESSURE PLACE CLEARLY VISIBLE WITH WIRES COMING OUT OF THE GROUND. THIS WAS AT THE EXACT LOCATION WHERE 1C HAD FIRST OBSERVED THE TARGET WORKING IN THE ROAD. (41S NR 52468 93994) MSOC C SET A SHAPED CHARGE, AND BLEW THE IED IN PLACE. A SECOND CHARGE WAS SET TO ENSURE IT WAS GONE. TARGETS BIKE WAS SSEed, AND DESTROYED BY SETTING IT ON FIRE. BATTERY AND WIRES WERE RECOVERED. G1 AND MSOC-C RTB TO COP GULISTAN (NO CAUSALITIES).
TIME 011500LAUG08
LOCATION: 41S NR 526 943
EFFECT ON OPS: DELAYED
ASSISTANCE NEEDED: NONE
Report key: 5F9DA49B-DF55-675A-2F5B165FC0B29092
Tracking number: 20080801110041SNR526943
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: J3 ORSA
Unit name: TF 2/7 / G CO 1st PLT
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: J3 ORSA
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 41SNR526943
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED