The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080530n1211 | RC SOUTH | 31.07171822 | 64.1725769 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-05-30 12:12 | Friendly Action | Cache Found/Cleared | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
7. a. (S//REL) On 30 MAY 08 at 18:00 local, 24 MEU/24 CLB EOD Team 3 was dispatched to a cache found by 1BN 6th Charlie Co. at 17:00 local. The weapons/IED cache was found inside a house on the outside of Jugrom Fort. EOD team arrived, collected evidence and disposed of explosive hazards. Team departed the scene at 19:00 local. Evidence was shipped to CEXC KAF for level one investigation.
ITEMS RECOVERED
8. a. (C//REL) One (1x) tan plastic box 14.9cm (L) x 4.8cm (W) x 2.8cm (H) Containing MOD 5 DTMF Spider vice.
(1) (C//REL) Exterior: The green sticker normally present is partially removed with green sticker and white residue left. There is a seal sticker that is normally found wrapped around both halves of the box on the device. It reads WARNING (unintelligible) case of damage seal will be not accepted fo (unintelligible). The top has the typical hole melted in it 3cm from end and 1.5 cm in from edge to view the LED. The top also has 157775 and 8*-4 handwritten with a white paint pen on the outside under where the sticker usually is. A hole is made on one end where two multi-strand steel core power in wires, one red and the other black, protrude. The opposite side has two openings cut in it with one black dual conductor wire multi-strand steel core wire that is 15 cm long. The other opening has a flat grey multi-strand steel core antenna wire that is twisted back onto itself. This wire was not measured to preserve biometric evidence.
(2) (C//REL) Interior: The inside has two tan with white screening circuit boards. The receiver board has the metal shield typically found covering the board and has 14 handwritten with white paint pen. The 4.3cm X 6.3cm decoder board has two LEDs on the board as well as an SCR and two chips. The PIC chip has ATMEL 0543 AT 89C 2051-24PI printed in tan on it. This chip has 8*-4 handwritten in white paint pen. The other chip has MT 8870DE 0639C SB printed on it. Both boards were hot glued in place and connected with a jumper block connection that was reinforced with hot glue.
b. (C//REL) Two (2x) black RC Fob Trigger (RFT) receiver cases 8cm (L) x 5.4cm (W) x 2.1cm (H). The RFT receiver boxes have Gray Sony Car Door Lock and Sony Electronics stickers that normally disguise them. They both have 993 handwritten in white paint pen on the end opposite where the wires exit the box. One end of each box acts as an opening to the boxes. Both have 5 outlets formed into the lid. The first outlet has a red and a white wire exiting the lid. The second outlet has a yellow LED in the hole. The third outlet has a green LED in the hole. The fourth outlet has two white wires exiting the lid. The fifth outlet has a black with white stripe single-strand wire exiting the lid. The lids have the standard tabs that insert into the sides of the black box. The interior is not noted due to preservation of biometric evidence
c. (C//REL) One (1x) 19.5 cm x 7.9 cm x 4 cm black plastic battery pack with a slide top and grate opening on the bottom. External terminals are constructed into the box.
d. (C//REL) One (1x) possible timer or counter device that measures 8.2 cm x 5.5 cm x 3.1. The base is black plastic with a cutout for four wires to exit the case. This black base has two half round tabs on opposite corners. The top is a clear plastic that has a step down in size on one end. This low end has a round hole made to accommodate a round potentiometer knob protruding the case and a rectangular hole to accommodate a vertical mounted slide switch. The end furthest from the high side has a hole cut to accommodate a horizontal mounted slide switch. The internal circuit board is tan with a factory built trace side. Front side has no screening or nomenclature. There are two relays with clear top and sides mounted under the tall side of the clear top. LM JZC-20F (4088) 5ADC12V is printed in black on the top of these relays. In between these relays are three LEDs. There are two chips mounted onto the board. One has HCF4060BE RR540GAZ ST VW CK IDN printed in tan. The other has M SIA Q616WC TC4011BP printed in tan. There are two slide switches, one mounted vertical the other mounted horizontal. One potentiometer is mounted vertically. The board has four multi-strand copper core wires exiting the board near the LEDs. The two outside wires are blue and the inside wires are red and black. These wires are all attached to four separate multi-strand copper core wires. All of these wires connect under black electrical tape and are yellow with red stripes.
e. (C//REL) One (1x) 9v battery cap with red and black wires leading from terminal connector.
f. (C//REL) One (1x) pair of clear plastic food handlers style gloves.
g. (C//REL) One (1x) strip of black electrical tape.
h. (C//REL) Two (2x) samples of suspected HME ingredients. One sample was tested on the HAZMAT ID and had the following results: Ammonia Nitrate with a .90043 confidence factor. The investigator visually compared the resulting graphs and agrees with this result as no spikes were missing or added to the results. The other sample was a fine metal powder similar to aluminum, but not confirmed.
Report key: 1D668183-FE7B-047A-ACAC7E05B392ADD9
Tracking number: 20080530123041RPQ1186138141
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: JTF Paladin SIGACT Manager
Unit name:
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: JTF Paladin SIGACT Manager
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 41RPQ1186138141
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE