The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080520n1154 | RC EAST | 34.95155716 | 69.62657166 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-05-20 17:05 | Enemy Action | SAFIRE | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
WHO: GUNBOW 74/77 (2 x AH-47) (ISO TIC IVO FOB MORALES FRAISER)
WHEN: 201750ZMAY2008
WHERE: 42S WD 57210 67850 (400-500FT AGL, HDG 180-300, SPD 100KTS)
WHAT: At 172Z Gunbow 74/77 left BAF IOT respond to a CCA request for a TIC event IVO FOB Morales-Fraiser, Nijrab District, Kapisa Province. GB 74/77 arrived at the TIC site (IVO 42S WD 5522 6819) at approximately 1730Z. GB elements tuned into a given frequency from the ground forces (CF convoy of 4x vehicles) and heard ATTACK 6 (one of the friendly vehicles) on the radio saying they were receiving effective RPG and SAF fire from 2x ridgelines (IVO 42S WD 5489 6920 and 42S WD 5721 6785) and from INS forces close to the friendly force location in a wadi. At 1750Z ,while supporting a TIC event in Nijrab District, GB 77 saw muzzle flashes originating from a compound IVO 42S WD 5721 6785 directed at the A/C but, at the time GB 77 was already in a right turn to do another suppressive fire sweep of the area. GB 74 responded to the SAF on GB 77 with 4x 2.75 PD rockets at the suspected POO. As soon as the GB elements crested the ridgeline they were able to see a high amount of tracer fire from the friendly forces and possibly 30+ muzzle flashes from both ridgelines firing at the convoy (Enemy did not use tracers). Due to the high amount of muzzle flashes the GB elements were unable to see the friendly IR strobes and took a bit of time to get situated to where friendly and enemy forces were. Once GB elements were situated GB 74 noticed a steady flash from 900m north of the friendly position (IVO 42S WD 5489 6920). GB 74 reported that the steady flash was characteristic of an crew served weapon such as a PKM or RPK light machine gun. GB 74 engaged the site and after that there was no more fire from the area. GB elements descended to 400-500 ft AGL and did suppressive fire sweeps of the area in an east to west pattern with the friendly forces under them. GB elements also did suppressive fire sweeps at tree lines 300m north and south of the friendly elements. At 1750Z n the initial pass GB 77 saw muzzle flashes originating from a compound, IVO 42 S WD 5721 6785, directed at the A/C but at the time GB 77 was already in a right turn to do another suppressive fire sweep of the area. GB 74 responded to the fire on GB 77 with 4x 2.75 PD rockets at the suspected POO. GB elements continued to lay more suppressive fire and after the 4th turn the enemy forces ceased firing at the friendly forces. GB elements then began to conduct a search and destroy/convoy escort back to MSR Vermont. ATTACK 5 and 6 were escorted by GB 74 to FOB Morales-Fraiser with wounded friendlies and GB 77 escorted Death Dealer 36 to FB Kutschbach. After the escort mission was completed GB elements joined up halfway to FB Kutschbach and looked at historical POO sites and then went back to the engagement area. At the engagement area GB 74 saw 2x MAMs acting suspiciously and then 3 more MAMs came to the area located at 42S WD 5537 6781. The MAMs noticed they were being observed when one of the GB A/C descended and the MAMs took cover behind a wall but were still visible because they hid on the side where the other GB A/C was located. One of the MAMs had a hot object in his hands with the FLIR (At debrief pilots concluded it might have been a hot spare barrel from a light crew served weapon) and all then ran to a tree at 42S WD 5543 6778. Other MAMs ran under the cover of the tree and then after a few minutes they ran into a local village and disappeared from view. After the GB elements lost the MAMs in the village they returned to BAF at 1920Z. NFTR. TF SHADOW ASSESSMENT: We believe that the SAFIRE was a TOO using SAF. Engaging the AH-64 while turning was a good opportunity for the INS to engage the A/C but the AAF on the ground were not able to hit the A/C. However, the most interesting aspect of these events was the ambush of the convoy. Recently, there have been two reports concerning 30x AAF planning to ambush a CF convoy IVO Joybar and Tamir in Kapisa. Additionally, reports of additional fighters and foreigners into the district and the establishment of night time surveillance in Tagab are of particular concern. The pilots who responded to this CCA request said they had never seen a fire fight so intense in Kapisa before and the organization of the ambush was new to them. It is possible that the 30x AAF were the same AAF reported in two separate reports and that the use of night time surveillance teams by AAF could be true. The aspect of foreign fighters involved in this fight can not be ruled out due to the reported better organization of this ambush compared to others in the pilots recent memory. It can be reasonably expected that AAF activity in Kapisa will not just increase but see a new level of sophistication and intensity in their attacks.
Report key: 0AC04F39-DB77-770B-FD06EE3825AC7853
Tracking number: 20080520175042SWD5721067850
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: TF Destiny SIGACTS MGR
Unit name: TF DESTINY
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF Destiny SIGACTS MGR
Updated by group: 101 Bridge SIGACTS Manager
MGRS: 42SWD5721067850
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED