The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080502n1245 | RC EAST | 34.44501877 | 68.80344391 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-05-02 08:08 | Explosive Hazard | IED Ambush | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
ISAF # 05-048
UNIT: D/1-506 (TM GHAZNI)
TYPE: IED/SAF
TIMELINE:
AT 0850HRS, DOG 6 (D/1-506 CDR), REPORTS THAT HIS PATROL CAME INTO CONTACT WITH IED AND SAF ON RTE MONTANA. NO CASUALTIES REPORTED AT THIS TIME.
CALL SIGN: DOG 6
FREQ: 49.425
UPDATE:
AT 1006HRS, DOG 6 WITH WARDAK TAC ARE STILL IN CONTACT WITH UNK # OF AAF.
UPDATE:
AT 1015HRS, HAWG 53 (A-10) WILL CONDUCT A GUN RUN IN SUPPORT THEN WILL CLEAR AIRSPACE THEN RED CURRAHEE GUNS WILL CONDUCT FIRE MISSION AT VD 82058 11655. WARDAK TAC REPORTS THAT HAWG 53 IS TAKING SAF ATT.
UPDATE:
HAWG 53 REPORTED TO RED CURRAHEE THAT THEY HAVE SPOTTED AN ADDITIONAL AMBUSH LOCATION, GRID UNK ATT.
UPDATE:
AT 1134HRS, A FRENCH VEHICLE STRUCK AN IED IS CURRENTLY BEING RECOVERED AND TAKEN BACK TO FOB AIRBORNE. THIS WAS A JOINT PATROL CONDUCTING A RECON.
UPDATE:
AT 1230HRS, ALL RED CURRAHEE ELEMENTS HAVE RETURNED TO FOB AIRBORNE.
SUMMARY:
IED/SAF
FRENCH VEHICLE - INOP
EVENT CLOSED AT 1245Z
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary from duplicate report involving SAFIRE incident mentioned above
WHO: HAWG 53 (A-10) (CAOC, USAF)
WHEN: 020850ZMAY08
WHERE: 42S VD 82058 11655 (UNK AGL, UNK HDG, UNK SPD)
WHAT: At 02 MAY 08, TEAM GHAZNI reported that DOG 6 struck an IED and received SAF from an unknown number of AAF at 42S VD 81944 11518, 7.6km northwest of Camp Airborne, Maydan Shahr District, Wardak Province. At 1006Z, DOG 6, with Wardak TAC reported that they were still in contact with an unknown number of AAF. At 1015Z, HAWG 53 (A-10) came on station, and conducted a gun run ISO the TIC. WARDAK TAC then reported that HAWG 53 began to take SAF. The TIC was declared closed at 1245Z, NFTR.
TF DESTINY ASSESSMENT: There have been 0 SAFIREs within 10NM in the past 30 days. The last SAFIRE was a Minor SAFIRE (RPG) 54.1km northeast (42S WD 20000 53000) on 01 FEB 08. This engagement was a Target of Opportunity (TOO) Minor SAFIRE (SAF). There was also another Minor SAFIRE (RPG) that occurred at 1015Z on 02 MAY08.
End SAFIRE summary
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report key: ABC2156A-04BF-488D-A9B1BBA5DDFD98B7
Tracking number: 20080502085042SVD8194411518
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: TRUE
Reporting unit: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Unit name:
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: TF Currahee SIGACT Manager S-3
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SVD8194411518
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED