The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080401n1219 | RC EAST | 32.12470245 | 68.51278687 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-04-01 07:07 | Explosive Hazard | IED Explosion | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
(S//REL)755/A EOD Team was notified of an IED Strike on an Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) element conducting a patrol from Wazi Khwa district to Warma May Province, traveling South on Route Nova. The first vehicle in the OOM struck a Pressure Plate IED (RC Armed). The main charge was placed in the center of the route. Detonation occurred directly under the ABP vehicle. Main charge was probably one (x1) Landmine, AT, model and country unknown. The pressure plate was placed to the West of the main charge, in the existing tire tracks. When EOD arrived on site the Pressure Plate, RC Receiver and Power Source had been removed from the scene. Team did not recover any components on site, components were brought to EOD 020700ZAPR08 on FOB Waza Khawa by THT or HCT. EOD received x1 Pressure Plate, x1 MOD 5 Receiver, x2 6v Batteries, and misc. electrical wiring.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
29361 0020 011200D* APR2008 No TF WHITE EAGLE RC (E) OFFENSIVE ENGAGEMENT
TF WHITE EAGLE reported that a ABP patrol struck an IED. IED Strike 42SVA567548
Afghanistan/Paktika/Wor Mamay
18.4 km SE of FOB WAZI KHAWA. Personnel:
1 KIA ANP
2 WIA ANP
Actions:
MM(E)-04-01D
SUMMARY OF EVENTS
7. (S//REL)755/A EOD Team was notified of an IED Strike on an Afghan Border Patrol (ABP) element conducting a patrol from Wazi Khwa district to Warma May Province, traveling South on Route Nova. The first vehicle in the OOM struck a Pressure Plate IED (RC Armed). The main charge was placed in the center of the route. Detonation occurred directly under the ABP vehicle. Main charge was probably one (x1) Landmine, AT, model and country unknown. The pressure plate was placed to the West of the main charge, in the existing tire tracks. When EOD arrived on site the Pressure Plate, RC Receiver and Power Source had been removed from the scene. Team did not recover any components on site, components were brought to EOD 020700ZAPR08 on FOB Waza Khawa by THT or HCT. EOD received x1 Pressure Plate, x1 MOD 5 Receiver, x2 6v Batteries, and misc. electrical wiring.
DEVICE CONSTRUCTION AND METHOD OF OPERATION
9. (S//REL) In this case it is probable that the bomber used a Mod 5 to arm the pressure plate. The bomber connected the power supply to the Mod 5, which has a 15 minute 45 second safe-to-arm period. During this time, an LED flashes green and red signaling it is safe to attach the Mod 5 to the pressure plate. Using a transmitter set to the frequency of the Mod 5 receiver, the bomber can send dual tone multi frequency (DTMF) tones to the device in order to arm the pressure plate. The bomber must be within range for the receiver to detect the signal. The range varies depending on the power of his transmitter and whether or not he has a clear line of sight for the signal to travel. When the nails come into contact with each other, from the pressure of a vehicle running over it, the circuit would be completed and fire the blasting cap then initiating the main charge buried in the middle of the road.
INVESTIGATOR'S COMMENTS
10. (S//REL) The comments will brief due to the fact that the investigator was not present. This is the first IED report this investigator has received from the Waza Khawa area. It is probable that the RCP was targeted however; the ABP may have been a secondary target of interest and approached the contact point before a CF target. The pressure plate was of good design and construction; it is possible that the weight of an average male would close the PP switch. The use of a PP armed by RC provides the INS with target discrimination and provides the possibility to defeat ECM
End of duplicate summary
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report key: 767E27ED-D004-0731-C89BA07E83400533
Tracking number: 20080401073042SVA5404254362
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack:
Reporting unit: CEXC Managers
Unit name: ABP
Type of unit: ANSF
Originator group: CEXC Managers
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SVA5404254362
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED