The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080321n1099 | RC EAST | 34.85652161 | 69.63990784 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-03-21 14:02 | Non-Combat Event | Supporting CF | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(U) FROM 201030ZMAR08 211030ZMAR08
(U) FROM: ABLE COMPANY, 1-506IN, TF GLADIATOR
(U) TO: TF GLADIUS
1. (S//REL USA, CAN, AUS, GBR) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Day nine of the RIP continued today. Able has continued TOC operations and 100% of security manning. 3rd PLT conducted live fire and platoon security training at FB MF which ended at approximately 1230Z 20Mar. At FB KB, 2nd platoon on forcepro conducted small arms ranges until 1317Z. Vehicle maintenance and patrol AARs took place afterwards. At 1536Z, the guard tower reported SAF from east of the ANA compound, coming from WD 596 566. Able company received radio confirmation from the French that they and their ANA counterparts were in a TIC, and were returning direct fire. Able 120mm mortars immediately fired illumination rounds in support of the TIC. The French forces provided corrections and 28 illumination rounds were fired in total. The French reported receiving 8 RPGs and the ANA returned fire with 12 RPGs. The SAF consisted of AK 7.62 and PKM 7.62. A French QRF consisting of 2 vehicles and unknown number of PAX rolled out shortly after the firing began, and the QRF returned shortly after the firing ended at approximately 1823Z. At that time no more information was available from the French.
This morning at 0437Z 3rd platoon escorted a convoy of 2 jingle trucks carrying LRS-Ds SI containers, slant 6/27/1. At 0455Z two French liaisons visited Ables TOC and discussed the prior nights events with the OPSO and S2, and collected the notes found above. We also discussed how to improve radio communications in both ways to increase overall situational awareness of coalition forces. At 0649Z the French finished a 3-man dismounted patrol to the west mountain range vic WD 585 565 to inspect an area they suspected some SAF came from last night, but found nothing. It was concluded that some of the rounds from the south east landed in the mountains, and no fire was actually received from the west. At 0908Z 1st platoon conducted a security patrol accompanied by Able 6 to FB MF to conducted platoon training and engage local leadership, including the incoming ANA components that will work with coalition forces in Tag Ab valley.
In the next 24 hours 2nd platoon will maintain force protection while 3rd platoon conducts a mounted security patrol to Daram to identify routes of travel, LZs, and collect PIR. 1st platoon will conduct a mounted patrol to Bedrau bazaar to identify routes and collect PIR.. Further mortar registration will continue and an Able liaison element is interfacing with the French/ANA compound to develop joint fire support SOPs between our mortars and their D30 122mm howitzers. A French/US LNO has been designated within Able company to facilitate the efficiency of joint operations and improve communications and mutual support. An Air Force representative will be visiting to install weather measurement systems to allow for a better localized weather report. Ideally this improved weather data can be integrated or used in conjunction with our IGRADS field artillery weather data to improve our indirect fires even further. This data, along with IGRADS unclassified products will be shared with French and ANA indirect fires elements to improve their accuracy as well.
2. (U) MISSION SUPPORT ASSESSMENT.
a. (U//FOUO) SYSTEM STATUS.
Crew Served O/H FMC NMC Remarks
M2 .50cal 15 15 0
MK-19 10 10 0
M240B 5 5 0
Vehicles O/H FMC NMC Remarks
M1114 0 0 0
M1151 14 14 0
M1117 2 2 0
Communications Status Remarks
TACSAT Green
FM Green
BFT Green
SIPR Green
NIPR Green
b. (S//REL USA, CAN, AUS, GBR) ASSET LOCATIONS / STATUS
ASSET LOCATION PERS
(O/W/E) SUPPLY SYSTEM COMMS READY LEVEL
ABLE HQ FB Pathfinder 3/0/24 G G G
1
1st Platoon FB Pathfinder 1/0/27 G G G 1
2nd Platoon FB Pathfinder 1/0/30 G G G 1
3rd Platoon FB Pathfinder 1/0/17 G G G 1
Attachments FB Pathfinder 1/0/13 G G G 1
ALOC Bagram 0/0/7 G G G 1
Green = Fully Mission Capable for over 24 hours.
Amber = Operating with limited constraints. Support required within 48hrs.
Red = Operating with severe constraints. Support required within 24hrs.
Black = Non Mission Capable for over 24 hours.
ABLE CO Afghanistan - - - -
Detached Personnel 0/0/0 - - - -
In Transit 0/0/7 - - - -
Pass 0/0/0 - - - -
Ordinary Leave Out of CJOA 0/0/0 - - - -
Medical Out of CJOA 0/0/0 - - - -
Emergency Leave Out of CJOA 0/0/0 - - - -
ABLE TOTAL TOTAL 6/0/112
3. (U) OPERATIONS SUMMARY.
a. LAST 24 HRS/CURRENT.
1st Platoon: Convoy to FB MF and ANA leader engagement
2nd Platoon: QRF / Force Protection
3rd Platoon: Convoy to BAF to deliver LRS-D SI containers
DET HQ(-): C2 operations
3rd Kandak: Conduct RIP with 1st Kandak vic. Alisay Valley
a) 3rd Kandak intends to push further into the Ashkin sub-valley
b) 3rd Kandak will hold ANP checkpoints until constructed and secured by ANP personnel.
c) Able Company will provide x 1PLT for connectivity of information/CP security, x1 120mm mortar & X 1 60mm mortar w/ x 3 11C and x 1JFO vic. Alisay District Center where the OMLT/ANA CP will be located. Able will rotate and continue to do so until 3rd Kandak is relieved.
b. NEXT 48 HRS.
1st Platoon: Conducted mounted Bedrau bazaar patrol, mounted patrol to Ala Say district center
2nd Platoon: QRF/Force Protection
3rd Platoon: Conduct mounted patrol to Daram, mounted patrol to Landyhkel
4. (S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO) INTELLIGENCE HIGHLIGHTS: NSTR
5. (U//FOUO) LOGISTIC READINESS. NSTR
6. (C) KEY FUTURE DATES, MEETINGS, and VIP VISITS: 22 March 2008: 6 PAX move to BAF via rotary wing; ;23 March 2008: chaplain visit via rotary wing to conduct nondenominational service
7. (U) INCIDENT REPORT. NSTR.
8. (S) COMMANDERS COMMENTS.
9. (U) RFIs:
Report key: 087FDEFF-E770-466C-A766-5740B9BA8346
Tracking number: 2008-081-144552-0515
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF GLADIUS (DSTB)
Unit name: TF GLADIUS
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWD5849557319
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN