The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080207n1234 | RC EAST | 34.89576721 | 70.91295624 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-02-07 08:08 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Face to Face/Shura Report
CF Leaders Name: CPT Kearney, LT Winn, CDR Ahman Zai, SSG Coulter
Company: Battle Platoon: HQ Position: N/A
District: PECH Date: 07 FEB 08 At (Location):KOP
Group''s Name: Korengal Valley Elders
Individual''s Name: Haji Zarwa Khan (HZK), Md Kareem, Abdul Wakil, Haji Mir abzel, Md Zaire, Md Jan, Mir Jan, Bismullah, Gul Md, Nizam Hadin, Amid Jan, Sham Shir Khan (SSK), Md Katar, Sayed a Jan, Md Zarin, Haji Hohaman, Md Rafic
Individual''s Title: Korengal Valley Elders
PRT Meeting Objective/Goals: Obtaining more L/N for road construction and the construction of a community center
Was Objective Met? Elders seemed reluctant to provide more personnel
Items of Discussion: ANP, ACM shooting from inside the villages at CF, RIP with new ANA, lumber issues, Korengal taxi service
Problem Mitigation Before Next Meeting: N/A
Other Meeting Attendees (Name, Title): N/A
Media Interest? Describe Media Presence, Interest, Coverage: No media coverage
PRT Assessment: N/A
Grade: N/A
Line(s) of Operation Affected Negative/Neutral/Positive
Counter Insurgency Operations:
ANA Commander Amid Zai asked the elders that if they can see the CF inside their villages but not the people that shoot at them, how can they not tell the CF where the ACM are at. He told them not to let the ACM fight from inside their villages for it is putting their women and children in grave danger. The elders want the CF to stop shooting into their village, but Amid Zai explained that this cannot happen if they keep getting shot at from inside the villages. CPT Kearney stated that we have had three months of peace and now we are receiving contact from inside the villages. Amid Zai stated that we know the villagers have poor, women, and children. Haji Matin also knows this, but still he and his men shoot from inside the villages, and it is not Muslim to do that
Development of ANSF Capabilities
Village elders still seem reluctant to provide their own ANP; CPT Kearney explained that outsiders will be put in place and the reasons why this would not be good. If they provide the ANP then they will know who is shooting from the villages and which personnel to apprehend. CF are looking for the elders to provide 50 men that will be paid, clothed, and armed as ANP.
Develop/Demonstrate GoA Capabilities
ANA Commander Amid Zai told the elders about the taxi service that the GoA has planned but it can not go into effect unless the people of the Korengal provide the drivers and the shooting stops from inside the villages. He also told them about the construction of the community center and a scholarship program that the GoA has for students to earn degrees and come back to the community to help the Korengal. Amid Zai asked again for names for the scholarships so he can give them to Governor Wahidi. CPT Kearney let them know that we would not be able to keep bringing food into Ali Bad and Darbart if we are shot at from inside the villages. Amid Zai let the elders know that they still need 40 to 60 more men for the road construction.
Promote Reconstruction and Seek Economic Development
Amid Zai told the elders that the taxis in the Korengal would generate jobs and income for the Korengalies. He wants to get business loans for LN to start shops in Babeyal since the elders wont provide any. The bazaar, the taxi service, work in the clinic, and other developments will all help boost the economic levels of the Korengal.
Interesting Notes
Amid Zai let the elders know that this might be his last shura, CPT Kearney also let them know that he would be home to see his wife and kids for a while so the XO will be taking over for him. The elders said that will hold a shura with the villages to address all the issues and topics that were part of todays shura. The elders will talk to the CF about the outcome of the shura the day after tomorrow.
Report key: AD443219-194A-4654-AB10-C34DA5266E54
Tracking number: 2008-039-165928-0354
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Unit name: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD7479363154
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN