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(EXPLOSIVE HAZARD) IED EXPLOSION RPT (VOIED) 242ND EOD : 0 INJ/DAM

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20080201n1175 RC EAST 33.52670288 69.8948822
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-02-01 09:09 Explosive Hazard IED Explosion ENEMY 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
While conducting Route Clearance Operations, RCP 9s lead Husky initiated a Trip Wire IED in the vicinity of Maktaab.  The IEDs main charge was a rocket, which fired from the east side of the road and flew past the back end of the Husky, detonating harmlessly out of range of the convoy.  Upon the rockets detonation, RCP 9 established security and the EOD team cleared the area for secondary devices.  Once the area was deemed clear, EOD conducted a Post Blast analysis of the site and collected components of the IED:  2ea grey clothespins, a black trip wire, a power source (6ea D Cell batteries), and white electrical wire.  The trip wire ran across the road from the West, where it was anchored by two nails, to the positive block in the clothespin.  The clothespin was located on top of the berm to the east of the road.  (Although two clothespins were found, only one was used to initiate the attack).  The IEDs main charge is suspected to be a 107mm Chinese Rocket due to its increased use in Khowst by ACM.  The POO for the rocket was on the East side of the road on top of a berm, approximately four feet above ground level and offset eight feet from the clothespin.   Upon completion of the post blast analysis, RCP 9 returned to FOB Salerno where all evidence was turned over to CEXC for further exploitation.

ISAF # 02-013

***
FM TF PALADIN
DEVICE CONSTRUCTION AND METHOD OF OPERATION
a. (S//REL) Unlike most VOIED Tripwire events, this device consisted of a dual modified clothes pin initiation system, which allows it to be set up to actuate from either direction of travel. The clothes pins were secured on one side of the road with the tripwire line, connected to the insulator, secured on the other side of the road with an anchor point. The power source linked to a blasting caps and the main charge are connected into the parallel switching circuits. When the target vehicle drives over the trip line, it would pull the insulator from between the two contacts on the clothes pin allowing current to flow to the initiator inserted in to the rocket motor, which causes initiation of the propellant. The rocket would then fly towards the target area and detonate if the fuze was struck outside of the arming distance.
b. (S//REL) The assessed method of operation for the insurgents is to emplace the VOIED tripwire on a main route to target CF security patrols and/or RCP, or Afghani National Security Forces (ANSF). It is likely the insurgents employ a spotter and emplacer to identify when and where the target convoy is approaching the IED site. The emplacer would then set up the tripwire being used to initiate the device based on the direction of the approaching target, leaving the other clothes pin with the insulator unused. The tripwire line is likely placed slack across the road to avoid an accidental pre-detonation during set up. The trip wire would have been taught prior to the target vehicles approach.

INVESTIGATOR''S COMMENTS
a. (S//REL) ) The components recovered from this incident and method of operation are similar to CEXC Profile 2.1.3.2 and specific incidents outlined in CEXC_AFG_0004_08, 0023, 0028, 0029, 0036, 0041, 0042, 0052, 0053 and 0059 since the beginning of the year. The use of a dual clothes pin circuit is similar to that found in CEXC_A_0036_08 with the alternate clothes pin switch in both devices being placed inside a small clear plastic bag. The modified battery
pack recovered is commonly used as a power source and the nylon line is the same type as most other events involving tripwire. This is the second time in a week that an off route, direct fired rocket was used as a main charge. There are several technical issues that the INS has to solve before making this form of attack successful. It cannot be positively determined what effect the probable107mm rocket would have in this configuration as it would likely depend on the fuzing
installed, distance/angle from target as well as the targeted vehicle. It is possible that the fuze would not have armed before striking the vehicle and/or depending on fuze type that the graze function may not have operated. However, the kinetic energy of the rocket would be significant and probably cause significant damage to lightly armored vehicles and exposed personnel. Due to the improvised nature of initiation, the probable poor quality of the rockets storage it is
probable that the rockets dwell time would be variable. This alone would make targeting a moving vehicle with a Probable 107 mm Rocket difficult. The use of a dual clothes pin system possibly demonstrates the INS attempt at a flexible IED system, capable of targeting convoy traffic from either direction with minimum setup time required.
b. (S//REL) Limited CF activity has occurred North of the 11 Grid Line before OP DEADWOOD and MATOON was executed, therefore historical IED incidents in the northwestern part of Jaberi District have been minimal. It appears that INS in the area have regrouped and continue to increase the frequency and complexity of IED attacks. The INS are
demonstrating the ability to test various methods of attack with rockets in a direct fire method of attack. There has been recent success by CF in recovering buried main charges, it is possible this new INS TTPs is a response to this factor, it is also possible that they do not have sufficient main charges suitable for being buried as a main charge. It is probable that they have been monitoring CF convoy activity and coordinate their IED emplacement based on route timing and
direction. IED activity continues to increase with a high concentration in the wadi system between the Jaberi DC and the Zanbar DC. For furhter details please see attached CEXC Report. NFTR.
***
Report key: F579AE96-023F-44C5-B622-77ADA4F56D18
Tracking number: 2008-032-183804-0000
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: 242ND EOD
Unit name: 242ND EOD
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWC8309710038
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED