The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080201n1151 | RC EAST | 33.5322876 | 69.89555359 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-02-01 05:05 | Explosive Hazard | IED Explosion | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Following incident (2008-033-), RCP 9 responded to a second IED strike which damaged a jingle truck carrying building materials in route to OBJ NOW. Upon arrival, the Husky was used to search for metallic signatures, which had negative finds. After the Huskys search, the EOD Team dismounted and cleared the area for secondary devices and began their Post Blast Analysis. Components recovered at the scene were a PMR (Brand Name: Uniden), a Lithium Battery and white electrical wire. The Lithium Battery appeared to be a modified BA-5598/U, which may have been discarded by US Forces. While the team conducted the Post Blast of the RCIED, RCP 9s interpreter questioned locals and ANP that stated the driver of the vehicle sustained no injuries, but the passenger was killed in the blast. The driver, who was still on scene, stated he bypassed the initial IED explosion, but when he failed to stop for armed gunman south of Maktaab, his vehicle was struck by an IED. The crater left by the IEDs main charge was 84 in wide and 24 in deep. Based on the dimensions of the crater, lack of fragmentation, and frequent use of plastic anti-tank landmines in Khost, the main charge is suspected to be an Italian TC-6 AT, Landmine. Upon completion of the RCP mission and return to FOB Salerno, all components were turned over to CEXC for further exploitation.
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FM TF PALADIN
DEVICE CONSTRUCTION AND METHOD OF OPERATION
a. (S//REL) The PMR radio had been modified to act as an RCIED firing device through the addition of what is a probable a DTMF decoder board attached to the back of the PMR. The operator would activate the device by first connecting an additional power source (battery pack) to the probable UNIDEN PMR DTMF decoder board. At this time the operator would connect the blasting cap to the PMR output wires, and insert the blasting cap into the main charge. When
ready to initiate the device, the operator would transmit the arming and firing code from another UNIDEN PMR. The PMR provides the RC carrier wave, with the attached DTMF board providing the firing code DTMF decoding. On closing the firing relay, enough power output is exported from the attached battery pack, through the output wires, to the blasting cap, detonating the main charge.
b. (S//REL) The probable method of operation was for the INS to emplace this device in an effort to target ANSF personnel/vehicles. The device is connected to the main charge buried in the road with the PMR camouflaged from view along the side of the road. The device was detonated when the victim failed to stop his vehicle for armed men along the route. In this case the IED had been used as a probable INS cut off for an illegal vehicle check point.
INVESTIGATOR''S COMMENTS
a. (S//REL) The components and construction of this device are almost identical to those found in CEXC_A_1001_07, discovered immediately adjacent to the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border. No exploitation was performed on the components in that case, as they were turned over to the Pakistani military. Photographs taken shows that the PMR/modification as well as the power connector and wires appear to be of the same manufacture. The battery used in CEXC_1001_07
was a modified pack consisting of four (4x) individual cells contained in a plastic wrapper. Close examination of the 5598A/U battery recovered in this case reveals a very similar four (4x) cell construction contained inside the green plastic housing. The modified PMR recovered was considered well constructed and professionally made, especially with the added inclusion of a battery pack wire snap clip power connector. These similarities make it probable that these
devices were constructed by the same individual.
b. (S//REL) This PMR is similar to previously modified PMR radios recovered in the Paktya and Paktika Provinces covered in CEXC_AFG_786_07, 625, 417. While the same radio and similar DTMF modifications are found in those previously listed the components and construction of this device most closely resemble those found in CEXC_A_1001_07, found along the Pakistan border. Due to their lack of effectiveness on CF targets due to CM employed, limited numbers of PMR based devices are found in Khowst province. In this case it is probable that INS were specifically targeting ANSF personnel responding to another nearby IED detonation and those working in support of CF reconstruction projects. The victims of both attacks were transporting supplies for the construction of CF facilities.
c. (S//REL) The damage to the construction truck is relatively limited in comparison to the effects of a TC6 mine however, as it was an RCIED the bomber had no control where the vehicle was driving and he chose to function the device when it was closest to the IED. Therefore it is possible that the main charge was a TC6 mine which was not functioned in the optimum place as the construction driver did not drive directly over the main charge. For furhter details please see attached CEXC Reports. NFTR.
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Report key: 917B3848-9C2E-461D-BBA8-6B7DA05F22D3
Tracking number: 2008-033-111910-0515
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: 242ND EOD
Unit name: 242ND EOD
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWC8315410658
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED