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120430Z TF CINCINNATUS Report of Air Strike IVO Tag Ab, Kapisa

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20080112n1105 RC EAST 34.81916046 69.6763916
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-01-12 04:04 Air Mission CCA UNKNOWN 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
LINKS OF AIRSTIKE AND PICTURES OF SSE ARE ATTACHED


On 11 January 2008, numerous reports were received regarding the location sand movement of several HVTs in the Tagab Valley.

At approximately 0700Z, Qari ((Baryal)) (CJTF-82 Tier 3 High Value Individual, RTAF0532) is located in Ahmad Zai , Tagab District, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan.  Baryal  traveling on foot with 30 to 40 Taliban members east through Seh Padar Village MGRS: 42S WD 6073653776, Tagab District; through Koorghal Village MGRS: 42S WD 6189455766, Tagab District; through the desert west of the Badrab Mosque located at MGRS: 42S WD 6307655335, Badrab Valley, Tagab district.  Baryals destination is the Badrab Mosque, and will arrive at approximately 0730Z.  
At approximately 0845Z, Qari ((Baryal)) is located in the Badrab Mosque located at MGRS: 42S WD 6307655335, Badrab Valley, Tagab District.  Baryal is currently preaching to the villagers within the mosque.   
At approximately 0855Z, Mawlawi ((Saferaz)) (CJTF-82 Tier 3 High Value Individual, RTAF0884) is located in the Nawruzkheyl Mosque located at //MGRS: 42S WD 6004951798//, Nawruzkheyl Village, Tagab District, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan. 

At approximately 0945Z, Mawlawi ((Saferaz)) is traveling from the Nawruzkheyl Mosque located at //MGRS: 42S WD 6004951798//, Nawruzkheyl Village, Tagab District, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan; and traveling to Mirakheyl Village//MGRS: 42S WD 6211160778//, Badrab Valley, Tagab District.  Saferaz is has personal security detachment of 20 to 25 men, armed with five rocket propelled grenade launchers, three PK-series 7.62 millimeter general purpose machine guns, and AK-47s.  Saferaz began traveling at 0942Z.  There were no other Taliban leaders with Saferaz because they were with a man named Qari who is currently preaching at the Badrab Mosque located at //MGRS: 42S WD 6307655335//, Badrab Valley, Tagab District (field comment-this is most likely Qari ((Baryal)); reference BAFCI-SPOT36-08).  

At approximately 0930Z, Qari ((Baryal)) is traveling from the Badrab Mosque located at  //MGRS: 42S WD 6307655335//, Badrab valley, Tagab District, Kapisa Province, Afghanistan; toward Bahdurkheyl Village //MGRS: 42S WD 6130453984 //, Badrab Valley, Tagab District.  Baryal is traveling with 60 men, including Mawlawi ((Saleem)) (CJTF-82 high value individual, RTAF0836), Qari ((Ezmarai)) (CJTF-82 Tier 4 High Value Individual, RTAF1042), Qari Allah ((Nazar)) (CJTF-82 Tier 4 High Value Individual, RTAF1136), and Haji ((Shukoor)), a Taliban financier.  
At approximately 1137Z, Qari ((Baryal)) is located in the area of Bahdurkheyl Village //MGRS: 42S WD 6130453984 //, Badrab Valley, Tagab District.  A portion of the 60 men who were with him earlier in the day have departed for Pashakari //MGRS: 42S WD 6114652841//, Tagab District.  Taliban leaders Mawlawi ((Saleem)), Qari ((Ezmarai)), Qari Allah ((Nazar)), and Haji ((Shukoor)), a Taliban financier, are still with Baryal.  Baryal still has approximately 30 to 40 men with him.  

On 12 January 2008, at approximately 0430Z TB and HIG will hold a meeting in Pashakari this morning.  The following individuals are supposed to be present at the meeting.  Qari Baryal, Mawlawi Saferaz, Mawlawi Saleem, Qari Ezmarai, Qari Allah Nazar, Nezami, Haji Ahmadi, Shir Agha, Ghafar, Mawlawi Hafiz.  Qari Nejat and Mahmood are not going to be present.

At approximately 0500Z TF Gladius was notified that source PID Baryal and Sarfraz at compound grid 42S WD 61858 53198.  Source PID Baryals PSD outside the compound. The PSD consists of 15 men staged outside the compound.
At approximately 0550Z  ISR was on station viewing compound.  ISR had eyes on the objective monitoring activity.  Source confirmed Baryal and Sarfraz were still in the compound ATT.  The PSD was still observed loitering outside compound armed with rifles.

Monitoring of the compound continued for approximately 3 hours.  Only 10-12 males were seen leaving the compound and few were observed entering during this time.  

At approximately 0810Z, approval received to drop ordinance on the compound.

At approximately 0903Z, ordinance was dropped on the compound.  2xF-15 dropped 6xGBU38 and conducted 5xStrafing runs to engage those attempting to flee.

At approximately 0936Z, ISR observed 15-20 pax entered the impact site from the west and began, what appeared to be, digging.  For the next 30 minutes, pax continued to approach the compound.  At 0959Z, approximately 70+ pax observed at location.

At 0920Z, Gladius 6 notified Kapisa Governor and NDS and let them know that ordinance was dropped on a compound in Tagab and he would update him with details later.

At 1031Z, ODA/PF/ANA elements are wheels down at the objective to conduct SSE.  There were no indicators of residence, ie. clothing, cooking utensils.  Pools of blood were observed at 42S WD 6181 5238.  Pathfinder 6 observed 3 potential impact points.  2xMAMs located near the objective were entered into the HIIDE.  Pathfinder 6 conducted an assessment within a 200m radius of the compound.  No CDE was noted.  BDA is unknown at this time.  We are receiving HUMINT reports that Bayral and his brother, Ezmarai, were killed in that strike, but this is not confirmed.

At 1203Z hours local all elements EXFIL back to FB Pathfinder.

SEE ATTACHED FOR COMPLETE RELEASE

FM TF PALADIN
Team was requested for an air assault mission to verify presence/absence of ordnance and or a cache after the air strike.  Team landed and verified that there were no explosive hazards. NSTR
Report key: D94642A2-1772-4FB1-A002-649A11402A58
Tracking number: 2008-012-152201-0578
Attack on: UNKNOWN
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF GLADIUS (DSTB)
Unit name: TF GLADIUS
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWD6185853197
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN