The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080108n1251 | RC CAPITAL | 34.52841568 | 69.16835022 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-01-08 07:07 | Explosive Hazard | Interdiction | ENEMY | 1 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
a. (S//REL) On Monday, November 19, 2007 at approximately 0630L hours, MOHAMMAD SHAFIQ (hereafter SHAFIQ), a citizen of Pakistan, approximately 20 years old, attempted to board an Afghan National Army (ANA) bus at a designated bus stop located within Zone 8, Kabul City, Kabul Province Afghanistan. As SHAFIQ boarded the ANA bus wearing civilian clothes with a concealed suicide vest containing explosives, he was confronted by an unidentified ANA soldier at the door. At this time, SHAFIQ tried to detonate the IED using a detonator switch in his hand. The ANA soldier realized SHAFIQ was a suicide bomber and kicked SHAFIQ in the chest forcing him from the doorway of the bus onto the curb. SHAFIQ was then confronted by two Afghan civilian pedestrians in close proximity to the bus stop. The pedestrians struggled with SHAFIQ grabbing his arms in an effort to prevent him from detonating the device. Subsequently, an Afghan National Police Officer in the vicinity of the incident arrived at the scene and arrested SHAFIQ. SHAFIQ was immediately transported to the Kabul City Police Department with the IED. At this time, it is uncertain if the IED failed to function properly or if SHAFIQ was unable to detonate it due to the efforts of the ANA soldier and the two pedestrians.
b. (S//REL) CEXC was notified of the incident and arrived at the Kabul City Police Department at approximately 0940L hours. Upon arriving at the scene, the IED was observed on the lawn in the front courtyard area. An FBI Bomb Technician assessed the device and determined it had not been rendered safe. French Bomb Technicians assigned to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) were notified and responded to the scene. Upon arriving at the scene, a French Bomb Technician rendered the device safe. Upon being rendered safe, the IED was photographed, however officials from the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior (MOI) insisted on retaining custody of the vest.
c. (S//REL) Subsequently, FBI agents were allowed to fingerprint, photograph and take DNA samples from SHAFIQ. MOI officials also allowed FBI agents a short interview of SHAFIQ. SHAFIQ was further identified as being the son of MOHAMMAD TAHER. SHAFIQ indicated he is from the City of Sader of Peshawer, Pakistan. SHAFIQ claimed he was drugged by unknown individuals who forcibly placed the vest on him. These unknown individuals then drove SHAFIQ to the vicinity of the ANA bus stop and dropped him off. SHAFIQ refused to provide any further details. At this time, SHAFIQ will remain in Ministry of Interior custody, however SHAFIQ may be made available to the FBI in the future for a more in depth interview.
ITEMS RECOVERED:
a. (C//REL) Two strands of detonation cord measuring 33cm in length bound together by black and red electrical tape removed from suicide vest. The detonation cord connected the explosives in front and back of the vest together.
b. (C//REL) Two strands of detonation cord measuring 34.925cm in length bound together by black electrical tape removed from a suicide vest. The detonation cord connected the explosives in front and back of the vest together.
CEXC_AFG_08_0035
Report key: 751BCBFE-7FF3-43C9-AD77-240D23F2C2DC
Tracking number: 2008-013-150845-0953
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: CEXC
Unit name: CEXC
Type of unit: ANSF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWD1545020761
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED