The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080101n1109 | RC EAST | 34.72766876 | 70.89572144 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-01-01 05:05 | Enemy Action | Direct Fire | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
At 0538z, Destined Company reported that Lima 12 (ETT), while on patrol with the ANA in the Chowkay Valley at XD 7357 4448, had been attacked by ACM at XD 739 440 with small arms and indirect fire. The patrol returned fire with crew-served weapons and received 120mm indirect fire support from the Fortress.
0611z: Destined reported 1x ANA KIA and 1x ANA WIA as a result of the ongoing contact. One ANA vehicle carrying a DSHKA was also destroyed in the fighting - ETTs reported that neither the truck nor the weapon was recoverable.
0645z: CAS (Dude01) checked on station in support of the ongoing contact, and received a CAS 9-Line to strike identified enemy positions at XD 74980 46050.
0654z: CAS engaged the above fighting position with 2x GBU-38s - Destined elements observed from the Chowkay VPB and reported the impacts safe and on-target. Enemy contact ceased, allowing the MEDEVAC aircraft to enter the valley safely.
(from AC MISREP) Dude01 dropped 2x GUB-38 on the ACM firing position; Vino22 confirmed the munition hit the intended target and the ACM firing position was destroyed. ACM broke contact at that point - terrain restrictions prevented an on-site BDA, and enemy casualties could not be confirmed. All contact was directed away from populated areas and there was no collateral damage.
Event closed.
ISAF Tracking # 01-003
(UPDATE FROM TF BAYONET INTREP)
On 010535ZJAN08, TF ROCK reported ETT elements conducting
patrol to RIP with the COP SERAY personnel were ambushed IVO grid 42S XD 7355 4455, two km south of COP SERAY. The convoy received effective SAF and mortars from four different attack positions located IVO grids
XD 734 448, 42S XD 737 449, 42S XD 737 444 and 42S XD 737 442. At 0540Z, TF ROCK elements fired mortars on targets KE2611 (42S XD 7418 4486) and KE2617 (42S XD 7399 4400) ISO the ANA TIC. DUDE 01 (F-15E) engaged ACM located IVO grid 42S XD 7498 4605 with two GBU-38s. The contact ended at 0642Z. TF ROCK elements launched from FOB FORTRESS to support the ANA/ETT as a QRF at the known ambush site but the contact ceased by the time the element arrived. The ANA and the ETT pushed their element to the COP CHOWKAY to MEDEVAC the one ANA WIA and one ANA KIA. An ANA and ETT QRF element also launched from the COP to assist TF ROCK elements at the site. The ANA had left a burning Ranger vehicle at the site with a DSHKA weapon system still on the vehicle. The ETT destroyed the communications package on the ANA Ranger with a thermite grenade and TF ROCK elements escorted the ANA and ETT element back to the COP where repairs were made to their Ranger and the ANA RIP was conducted. While returning back to FOB FORTRESS, TF ROCK elements stopped at the ambush site again and moved the burning vehicle off of the road into the ravine. BDA: one ANA KIA and one ANA WIA, one ANA RANGER destroyed and one ANA DSHKA destroyed. TF ROCK elements will conduct deliberate recovery tomorrow. NFI.
Report key: E4CB29C1-0383-4E79-9C10-F2CF13DF7F9E
Tracking number: 2008-001-054454-0967
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: TRUE
Reporting unit: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Unit name: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD7357044480
CCIR: (SIR IMMEDIATE 11) WIA or serious injury to coalition soldier
Sigact: CJTF-82
DColor: RED