The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20080101n1106 | RC EAST | 34.92657852 | 70.94603729 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2008-01-01 05:05 | Enemy Action | Ambush | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
At 0508z, Sapper 16 (RCP), performing route clearance in the northern Korengale reported taking small arms and RPG fire from enemy at XD 7890 6665. The RCP returned fire with crew-served weapons and received 81mm indirect support from FOB Michigan. CAS (1x B-1) came on station in support of the contact and received a CAS 9-Line from the Rock JTAC.
0538z: Sapper 16 reported that the enemy had been effectively fixed and suppressed at the above location, and that CAS was prepping to engage the enemy position with a GBU strike.
0544z: Able Company dispatched a squad-sized QRF from Michigan to reinforce the Sapper element.
0555z: CAS engaged the identified enemy fighting position with 1x GBU-31 - Sapper observed the impact safe an on-target, and reported it to be "very effective." At that time the enemy, suppressed and disrupted, attempted to exfil from the contact area.
0600z: QRF arrived at Sapper''s position.
0609z: Enemy attempting to exfil fixed again at XD 7697 6683, and CAS prepared to strike with a second GBU. As it did so, Sapper 16 continued to push forward to the KOP, where he arrived safely at 0618z.
0631z: The B-1 had to check off station, and was replaced by 2x A-10s. They received an updated target grid to the enemy at XD 76887 66787. This target they engaged with 1x GBU-12 - Sapper, observing from the KOP, reported the impact safe and on target, and confirmed 3x Enemy KIA in the strike. Enemy fire ceased after this strike - BDA on the event was three EKIA; all contact was directed away from populated areas and there was no collateral damage.
Upon arrival at the KOP, Sapper reported that one vehicle had been deadlined - an ACM bullet had knocked out the vehicle''s Duke System.
Event closed.
ISAF Tracking # 01-002
(UPDATE FROM TF BAYONET INTREP)
On 010508ZJAN08, TF ROCK reported an RCP element located IVO the village of Omar in the Korengal Valley IVO grid 42S XD 7775 6663 were engaged with effective small arms and RPG fire from 12-15 enemy personnel located east IVO grid 42S XD 7828 6590 and west IVO grid 42S XD 7697 6683. In response, BONE 11 (B-1) dropped one GBU-31 on target 42S XD 7890 6665 and HAWG 01 (A-10) dropped one GBU-12 on target 42S XD 76887 66787. At approximately 0540Z, TF ROCK sent a squad sized element and ANP to the TIC site to reinforce the RCP element. BDA: three EKIA confirmed by HAWG 01 after ordinance drop. The contact ended with no further injuries or damages to equipment reported. NFI. (TF ROCK)
(from AC MISREP)
Bone11 dropped one GBU-31 on enemy position. Hg01 checked on and performed SOF for TIC; pushed north and dropped one GBU-12 on second enemy location in Korengal Valley. Observed 3 EKIA from strike. Mission was successful. All bombs were safe and on target. At 0550, friendly forces pushing through the Chowkay Valley were ambushed from the east. Hg01 was on station to support. HG 01 performed SOFover suspected ambush site. At 0643 DUDE01 dropped 2x GBU-38 on target. Mission was successful. All bombs were safe and on target.
Report key: F17EA699-AB49-4DC2-9AAB-33C43129D59C
Tracking number: 2008-001-053046-0659
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Unit name: TF ROCK 2-503 IN
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD7775066630
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED