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010330Z TF Cincinnatus Bagram PRT QA/QC of of Chardeh Girls School

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20080101n1100 RC EAST 34.92335129 68.64801025
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2008-01-01 03:03 Non-Combat Event QA/QC Project NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
1 Jan 2008:
   The team started the mission on 1 Jan and quickly encountered the contractor widening the Ghorband Pass road at Pule-matak (IVO 42S WD 1880 6300).  The contractor was working in many areas from Pule-matak through the Shinwari District to Dahan-e-Shaweh (IVO 42S VD 97031 75442).  Some areas have been widened to 9-11m while others are being worked.  There are two concrete wash areas that were previously damaged and they have been repaired.  There was one section in Shinwari District that was carved through the rock on the side of the mountain.  The contractor is currently carving another lane through this section and the team had to wait up to 30 minutes while the rock breaking excavators did their work.
   The teams first stop was at Chardeh Girls School (IVO 42S VD 7750 7269) in Sia Gird District to perform a warranty inspection on the new facility and to meet with the District Sub-Governor, Hamid Khan.  Governor Taqwa reported recently that the ceiling collapsed and he was glad that no children were injured.  When we walked through the facility with the headmaster, he showed us the ceiling in question and we found that it was in the guard room and that all ceilings in the main facility were still in place and performing well.  It is surmised that the heating and cooling of the ceiling by the room heater along with an improper mixture of the concrete in the ceiling resulted in the pre-mature collapse.  Additionally the concrete surfaces on the second floor and especially on the exterior stairs and the north interior staircase were crumbling causing tripping hazards.  These surfaces need to be replaced before someone is injured.  Other deficiencies include the lack of a water reservoir, some of the doors are warped and do not lock and the south entry double door is missing security latches which hold the second door closed.
   We meet with the Sub-governor Khan at the end of the facility walk-through.  We discussed Chardeh School and what we would do upon return to the office.  We also discussed the possible construction of permanent facilities for Basic Health Clinics (BHCs) that are currently in rental facilities and permanent facilities for childrens education.  Specifically we asked if they had sites already set aside for the construction projects and if we could see the sites on our return trip on 3 Jan 08.  We specifically asked about the following clinics:  Qamcheq, Frenjal, Findaqistan, and Dara Saidan.  The potential school facilities included: Deh Naw Girls School and Dashtack Girls School.  They said that most had sites already picked and the land was owned by the Government.  They looked forward to taking us to the sites on the 3rd.
   While in the Chardeh area, the teams medical technician performed a medical assessment of the Chardeh BHC.  Her assessment is under a separate medical report.
   The team moved on and found the Frenjal BHC where the Teams Medical technician assessed this clinics medical capabilities.  This BHC is in a rental facility which is a mud building that is in poor condition.  Her assessment is under a separate medical report.
   Following the assessment, the team travelled up to Surkh Parsa District Center in Lolenge, Surkh Parsa (IVO 42S VD 67819 64738).  The team met with the District Sub-governor Sayed Mustafawi that evening.  The team discussed the snow and ice clearing contract procedures and what we will be clearing.  We then discussed the clinics and schools we were looking at for replacement.  Sub-governor Mustafawi stated that land was available for the two schools and two clinics.  We arranged to take the District Administrative officer with our convoy the next day to view the sites.  Sub-governor Mustafawi provided us a room inside the new district center building with a heater with wood and coal.  This was a great help as the outdoor temperatures dropped. 2 Jan 2008:
  
2 Jan 08  The team broke into two 2-vehicle convoys to maximize effectiveness. The first convoy proceeded to the project sites in Surkh Parsa.  The second convoy travel to Shaikh Ali District center to meet with the District Sub-governor Jalalludin.
   The Surkh Parsa (SP) team departed with the district administrator for the sites in the Turkman Valley (Dara Turkman).  The first stop was at the future location for the Safrah Shaheed Girls School.  The site (IVO 42S VD 59336 48882) was excellent for construction of the school.  It was a fairly flat farm plot along the main road with no history of flooding.  The site was adequately sized for the facility to be built.
   The next stop for the SP Team was the Dara-e-Turkman BHC (IVO 42S VD 56696 48450).  The teams medical technician completed a medical assessment of the care-providers while the engineering staff evaluated the project location.  The medical assessment is in a separate report.  The district administrator and the clinic doctor stated that the new location was the same as the old.  They requested that we demolish the existing structure and build the new clinic in this site.  The team chief questioned them about the current property owners desire for the facility.  The current owner, Abdul Husain, spoke up and stated that he wanted to donate the land and the facility to the government.  The team chief stated that a legal real estate transfer document would need to be prepared before we could begin work on the site.  They all agreed that they would get it done.  The site is on the side of the mountain, but the size of the existing facility is similar to the BHC plans we have, so the site should work well.  Some asked if we would build a building for the sub-clinic at Dahan-e-Parandaz.  The team chief explained that the sub-clinics were by design of the ministry of Public Health to be in rented home-style facilities.  One asked if we could build the new BHC at their site near Dahan-e-Parandaz and they could move the sub-clinic to the current site of the Dara-e-Turkman BHC.  The team chief stated that the decision to make the change would need to be made by the MoPH.
   The team stopped at the site of the Adil Water Culvert (IVO 42S VD 60195 49251) to inspect the latest work on the culvert.  The contractor expanded and corrected the upstream side of the culvert as well as the downstream outlets.  However, the locals pointed out that the contractor did not expand the whole culvert so the center section is constricted.  We will address this issue with the contractor.
   The SP team transferred to the Surkh Valley (Dara Surkh) to visit the Quam-e-Baqi clinic and the Nasheed Shaheed Girls School site.  When the team arrived at the turning point (IVO 42S VD 69007 53730) to the Quam-e-Baqi clinic, it was obvious that the HMMWVs would not be able to cross the old wooden bridge just after the turn.  The locals stated it was a 15-minute walk to the clinic on the hill.  It was determined that it was un-wise to walk to the clinic as we needed to move on to the school.
   The
Report key: 818CCFF9-79E0-41E5-83A9-93EC2598CB0B
Tracking number: 2008-009-123359-0656
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: PRT BAGRAM
Unit name: PRT BAGRAM
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVD6785064600
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN