The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20071213n1060 | RC EAST | 33.41684341 | 69.02698517 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-12-13 05:05 | Explosive Hazard | IED Explosion | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 |
On 130500zDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV SPD FOB ZORMAT AND CONTINUED STEADY STATE OPERATIONS OVER THE NEXT FIVE DAYS IN THE ZORMAT AREA, SPECIFICALLY ALONG RTE IDAHO AND THE ZORMAT BAZAAR. AT 130730Z2007 1/B/473 WAS PROVIDING SECURITY AND ENGAGED IN TALKS WITH THE SUB-GOVERNOR AND THE CHIEF OF POLICE WHEN SHOTS WERE HEARD IN THE DC. THE ANP WERE IN DISPUTE OF MONEY LENT AND WAS NOT BEING REPAID. THE SITUATION ESCALTED TO THE POINT WERE THE GUARD IN THE TOWER WAS BEING SHOT AT FROM WITHIN THE DC AND HE TURNED AND FIRED BACK AT THE ANP FIRING AT HIM. ETTs FROM ZORMAT MAIN WERE ON THE GROUND AT THE TIME AND MOVED QUICKLY TO DEESCALATE THE SITUATION. 1/B/473 CAV ASSISTED IN DISARMING EVERY ANP AND ANCOP WITHIN THE DC AND MAINTAIN SECURITY. AFTER LENGHTY TALKS THE ETTs WERE ABLE TO GET RESOLUTION AND 1/B/473 CAV RE-ESTABLISHED ORDER.
ON 131400ZDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV WAS CALLED TO RESPOND TO AN IED ATTACK ON RTE IDAHO THAT KILLED ONE ANP AND WOUNDED TWO OTHERS SEVERLY. BY THE TIME 1/B/473 CAV ARRIVED ON THE SCENCE FROM GULDAHKHEL THE ANP HAD ALREADY EVACD THE WOUNDED AND DEAD TO FOB ZORMAT. 1/B/473 CAV ESTABLISHED SECURITY AT THE SITE FOR APPROXIMATELY 40 MINUTES WHEN 1/B.473 CAV TOOK SAF AND A FUEL TRUCK WAS DESTROYED WITH AN RPG 350M NORTH ON IDAHO. 1/B/473 CAV MOUNTED AND BEGAN A MOVE TO CONTACT BEFORE BEING PULLED AWAY WHEN F15s BEGAN TRACKING 7 DISMOUNTED INDIVIDUALS WITH WEAPONS HEADING NW.
AT 131600ZDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV CONDUCTED A BATTLEFIELD HANDOFF WITH REGULATOR (MP UNIT) TO SECURE THE IED SITE AND 1/B/473 CAV MOVED NEAR THE TRAGET SITE AND AT 140215ZDEC2007 DISMOUNTED TO SECURE AND ASSESS BDA AFTER TWO GBU-12s WERE DROPPED BY F15s KILLING 5 OF THE 7 ACM SUSPECTED IN ATTACKING COALITION FORCES. COLLATERAL DAMAGE FROM THE BOMBING RESULTED IN BROKEN WINDOWS. 1/B/473 CAV CONDUCTED BATTLEIELD HANDOFF WITH A SECTION OF 2/B/473 CAV AND RETURNED WITH EOD, WHICH DESTROYED 3 RPGS, A RPG LAUNCHER, AND 3 GRENADES AT THE SITE AND ANP WHICH HANDLED THE BODIES. 1/B/473 CAV DISTRIBUTED HCA FOR THE BROKEN WINDOWS OF THE KHALATS AND ASSURED REPAIRS WHOULD BE CONDCTED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
ON 140945ZDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV MOVED TO VIC WC 04444 02079 TO CONFIRM OR DENY IF WEAPONS WERE DROPPED IN THAT AREA B THE ACM THE REVIOUS EVENING. DISMOUNTED SEARCH OF THE AREA WAS NEGATIVE FOR WEAPONS. ON 141130ZDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV MOVED WITH EOD TO SECURE AND EXPLOIT IED SITE THAT PRE-DETONATED ON 2/B/473 CAV. EXPLOSIVE ACCORDING TO EOD WAS HOME MADE, 20LBS OF C4 COMPOSITE, HASTLY IMPLACED, AND PRE-DETONATED DUE TO THE METAL CONNECTION BEING BENT. NO CASUALTIES RESULTED THE PRE-DETONATION NOR EQUIPMENT DAMAGED.
1/B/473 CAV SPD FROM THE LOCATION WITH EOD AND CONDUCTED ANOTHER BATTLEFIELD HANDOFF WITH 2/B/473 CAV AT THE DISTRICT CENTER TURNING OVER THE BODIES AND THREE REMAINING WEAPONS, WHICH CONSISTED OF TWO AK 47s AND ONE PKM RECOVERED BY THE ANP TO BE SECURED AND HELD FOR SHURA MEETING ON 150900LDEC2007. EOD WAS ESCORTED BACK TO FOB ZORMAT WITH 2/B/473 CAV AND 1/B/473 CAV ESTABLISHED SECURITY.
ON 161400ZDEC2007 1/B/473 CAV SPD FOB ZORMAT AND CONDUCTED DISMOUNTED PATROL IN VIC WC 058 026. THE PATROL HAD NEGATIVE CONTACT WITH ACM AND CONTINUED MISSION ONTO THE SHOGON ANP CHECK POINT AND PROVIDED MUTUAL SUPPORT AND SECURITY UNTIL 170130ZDEC2007. 1/B/473 CAV ON 170900LDEC2007 PROVIDED SECURITY FOR MEETINGS AT EH DISTRICT CENTER AND GROUND BREAKING CEREMONY BEFORE RTB
Report key: 0D3CB47E-93D6-4C22-97DA-31305DB141D7
Tracking number: 2007-355-103848-0260
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWB0250997500
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED