The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20071201n1085 | RC EAST | 34.95381165 | 70.38764191 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-12-01 09:09 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Executive Summary from 01 December 2007 Security Shura with the following:
LTC Maranian (Task Force King Commander)
LCDR Ashby (PRT XO)
MAJ Hall (CMO)
CPT Richardson (Task Force King S2)
CPT Donatelle (Task Force King HHB Commander)
CPT Hathorne (PRT CA)
LT Lam (PRT Engineer)
PO Bernhard (PRT S2)
Wulaswal Ali Nurgaram (Nurguram District Sub-Governor)
Mulam Nabi (Chief Construction Engineer of Amerifa)
Elders and corresponding villages
Malak Sabir (Nengarach)
Gul Nabi (Zeyart)
Mohammad Karim (Mamum)
Mohammad Karim (Nengrach)
Amir mohammad (Nengrach)
Mohammad Nadder (Shakut)
Mohammad Ali Khan (Pandu)
Shahe Khan (Malile)
Mhrab Khan (Malile)
Abdul Ghafar (Mashpa)
Qare Abdul Wahab (Mashpa)
Amir (Damgal)
Malem Nabi (Buzarkheal)
Abdul Majeed (Daba)
Sher Ali (Shemgal)
Pacha Khan (Shemgal)
Mir Azam (Shemgal)
Saber Abdullh (Pashagar)
Abdul Rouf (Balik)
Ubadullah (Dusto)
Shamsudin (Namka)
Shah Gul (Nakara)
Abdurahman (Peayana)
Mawlawe Sakhi (Malakya)
Mohammad Naiem (Pashagar)
Gul Mohammad (Mashpa)
Shah Gul (Buzarkheal)
Gull Mohammad (Mashpa)
At 0930Z today (01 DEC 07) Wulaswal Ali, the Nurguram District Sub-Governor, 25 Maliks from the Shok, Shemgal, Titin, Malil, Mashpa, and Wadawu valleys, as well as Elders from Nangaresh, the senior W. Nuristan Amerifa representative, the ANP attended a Shura on FOB Kalagush. .
Wulaswal Ali opened the meeting with an introduction of all present and discussed the purpose of the meeting which was to come up with a plan for security in the District. LTC Maranian then thanked everyone for attending the meeting and addressed the village elders about the following points:
? Abdulla Jan is dead; he was afforded every opportunity to reconcile with IRoA but chose to attack ANSF and CF
? Other insurgents operate in the AO, we must do all that we can to get them onto our side or they will meet a similar fate
? The air strike against Abdullah Jan was the first coalition air strike in western Nuristan in over 6 months.
? This operation is the first and to date only coalition operation in western Nuristan of an offensive nature.
? The information that coalition forces received regarding Abdullah Jans location was very accurate and the information provided indicated his intent to attack coalition forces.
? The village elders were reminded that both the coalition forces and government of Afghanistan have offered a reward for information that would lead to the kill or capture of Abdullah Jan. No one to date had stepped forward to offer information, therefore coalition forces had no choice but to act in this manner.
? Americans are peaceful people and do not condone violence. However, we have to stop the insurgents before they bring harm to coalition forces or the people of Afghanistan.
? Coalition forces are here to provide assistance to the people of Afghanistan.
? We have an opportunity to use the event of Abdulla Jans demise to rededicate ourselves to collective security, peaceful partnership, and development.
? Our focus over the coming winter will be ANP training and the PRTs focus will be on bringing projects to the valleys and towns using local contractors as prioritized by the Wulaswal
? Finally, it was stressed that The PRT and Task Force King have over $50,000 for projects that will benefit the people of Nurgaram.
PRT then talked about project nomination, bringing nominated contractors to the Wulaswal so that we can keep money in the community, etc.
Mulam Nabi, Chief Construction Engineer of Amerifa, was the voice of the village elders. He stated the following:
? In the name of Allah most merciful and benevolent that we the people of Nurgaram are happy to have the opportunity to talk today. (He was very positive and supportive of CF with many references to operating to the same objectives).
? We are thankful for the Sub-Governor Wulaswal Ali and the work that he has done with coalition forces and the people of Nurgaram.
? He is sorry and sad that coalition forces have not gone up to Dow Ab or Mandol because of security.
? Coalition forces should continue to host special shuras with the village elders of Nurgaram to address important issues.
? 80% to 90% of the Afghan people support the coalition forces and the 10% support the insurgents.
? Abdullah Jan was an insurgent opposed to coalition forces and the Government of Afghanistan and that he was a man that refused to reconcile with the Government of Afghanistan and what happened to him was what he deserved (NOTE: Nobody disputed Abdullah Jans death or the validity of the strike).
? Stated that we all must work for security and safety and the elders must not abet those that would attack CF.
? Continue development and the use of local contractors.
? The need to provide farmers alternate crops to plant instead of poppies.
The Malik from Titin brought up the fact that two Afghan women were injured and one killed during the attack on FOB Kalagush. He stated that missiles were fired by the enemy and coalition forces rightfully fired back. However he stressed the need to be more accurate. LTC Maranian stated it is a great tragedy when innocents are harmed in the crossfire and that when it happens it is important that the situation be made right with the family. LTC Maranian stated that the two women came to FOB Kalagush and were treated by our medical personnel and that the females were evacuated to a hospital for additional care and will be back soon. It was also stated that at this time it is not known if the explosion that hurt the women was a result of fire from coalition forces or from enemy, but that we believed it to be enemy fire. LTC Maranian also stated that all rounds were observed in the high ground, not down by the river where they were washing for prayer. LTC Maranian then stated that we are conducting a joint investigation with Wulaswal Alis assistance and if we find that that the women were innocents, we will make the situation right with the family regardless of whose explosion hurt the women. (Note: All in attendance nodded and accepted LTC Maranians reply). Wulaswal Ali, the Nurgaram District Sub-Governor, addressed the village elders and stated that if the enemy is coming from Dow Ab and hiding in the villages, it is the responsibility of the people to not let them stay amongst us.
At the conclusion of the meeting, which lasted approximately two hours, LTC Maranian closed by stating his three priorities: First, training the police officers, focus on projects for PRT, and to have a peaceful Afghanistan so we can work together. Wulaswal Ali stated that we are here to work together. You are with us and we respect you for being here. We respect you for being here for the people and for our country. LTC Maranian agreed and closed the meeting.
Report key: 87C0C51F-72FA-422A-889A-484220D1D332
Tracking number: 2007-336-044432-0687
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF KING 4-319 FA BN
Unit name: TF KING 4-319 FA BN
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD2670068800
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN