WikiLeaks logo

Browse by Type

air mission (431) counter insurgency (4) counter-insurgency (39) criminal event (480) detainee operations (1208) enemy (13) enemy action (27078) explosive hazard (23082) friendly action (13734) friendly fire (148) non-combat event (7719) other (2752) suspicious incident (208) unknown initiated action (12)

Browse by Category

accident (836) air assault (3) air movement (8) ambush (538) amf-on-ana (2) amnesty (1) ana-on-anp (6) anp training (283) arrest (50) arson (41) arty (77) assassination (48) attack (2283) black list (1) blue-blue (18) blue-green (10) blue-on-white (2) blue-white (6) border ops (11) breaching (2) cache found/cleared (2742) carjacking (33) cas (123) casevac (14) cca (5) checkpoint run (37) close air support (95) convoy (53) cordon/search (80) counter insurgency (8) counter mortar fire (41) counter mortar patrol (7) counter narcotic (6) counter terrorism (1) criminal activity (27) defecting (5) deliberate attack (69) demonstration (237) detain (185) detained (683) detainee release (60) detainee transfer (517) direct fire (16293) downed aircraft (13) drug operation (6) drug vehicle (2) elicitation (1) enemy action (13) equipment failure (81) erw recovered (24) erw/turn-in (58) escalation of force (2271) evidence turn-in/received (50) extortion (5) finance (3) food distribution (4) frago (404) graffiti (1) green-blue (16) green-green (72) green-white (6) hard landing (9) idf counter fire (5) idf interdiction (137) ied ambush (350) ied explosion (7202) ied false (550) ied found/cleared (8581) ied hoax (185) ied suspected (895) ied threat (10) indirect fire (7237) insurgent vehicle (9) interdiction (488) internal security forces (2) kidnapping (110) looting (11) medcap (160) medevac (3301) medevac (local national) (428) medevac (other) (64) medevac patient transfer (162) meeting (1405) meeting - development (988) meeting - security (753) mine found/cleared (396) mine strike (321) movement to contact (4) mugging (1) murder (100) narcotics (1) natural disaster (55) nbc (1) negligent discharge (19) none selected (2) other (4693) other (hostile action) (418) other defensive (30) other offensive (132) patrol (365) planned event (404) poisoning (1) police actions (24) police internal (3) premature detonation (259) project closeout (81) project start (88) propaganda (100) psyop (190) psyop (tv/radio) (2) psyop (written) (4) qa/qc project (400) raid (44) recon (33) reconnaissance (169) recruitment (willing) (1) refugees (12) released (110) repetitive activities (8) reported location (1) resupply (7) rpg (76) sabotage (6) safire (1697) search and attack (7) sectarian violence (30) security breach (1) sermon (5) show of force (2) small unit actions (32) smuggling (23) sniper ops (154) snow and ice removal (49) supporting aif (4) supporting cf (15) surrendering (4) surveillance (369) tcp (3) tests of security (22) theft (40) threat (1) transfer (399) tribal (7) tribal feud (12) turn in (840) uav (16) unexploded ordnance (2770) unknown explosion (156) vandalism (11) vehicle interdiction (11) vetcap (13) voge (29)

Browse by Region

none selected (19) rc capital (3191) rc east (38003) rc north (2143) rc south (30234) rc west (2934) unknown (359)

Browse by Affiliation

NATO (1342) enemy (50887) friend (13882) neutral (10471) unknown (1671)

Browse by Date

2004-01 (138) 2004-02 (101) 2004-03 (105) 2004-04 (89) 2004-05 (194) 2004-06 (175) 2004-07 (189) 2004-08 (191) 2004-09 (192) 2004-10 (232) 2004-11 (203) 2004-12 (178) 2005-01 (136) 2005-02 (143) 2005-03 (201) 2005-04 (221) 2005-05 (387) 2005-06 (432) 2005-07 (451) 2005-08 (435) 2005-09 (558) 2005-10 (413) 2005-11 (279) 2005-12 (314) 2006-01 (305) 2006-02 (403) 2006-03 (494) 2006-04 (713) 2006-05 (700) 2006-06 (663) 2006-07 (759) 2006-08 (936) 2006-09 (1050) 2006-10 (1248) 2006-11 (1145) 2006-12 (1020) 2007-01 (1416) 2007-02 (1251) 2007-03 (1263) 2007-04 (1514) 2007-05 (1777) 2007-06 (1788) 2007-07 (1833) 2007-08 (1784) 2007-09 (1902) 2007-10 (1694) 2007-11 (1536) 2007-12 (1362) 2008-01 (1222) 2008-02 (1040) 2008-03 (1230) 2008-04 (864) 2008-05 (885) 2008-06 (869) 2008-07 (930) 2008-08 (1244) 2008-09 (1076) 2008-10 (1529) 2008-11 (1676) 2008-12 (1418) 2009-01 (1290) 2009-02 (1164) 2009-03 (1453) 2009-04 (1436) 2009-05 (2004) 2009-06 (2429) 2009-07 (3078) 2009-08 (3645) 2009-09 (3123) 2009-10 (3282) 2009-11 (2938) 2009-12 (2573)

Browse by Severity

High (76911) Low (76911)

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter Check our Reddit Twitter this Digg this page

25-26 SEP 2007 TF Bushmaster OP Snake Tooth Level II CONOP

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070925n907 RC EAST 35.02547836 71.15936279
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-09-25 07:07 Air Mission Air Assault UNKNOWN 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
SAFEHAVEN. ONCE OBJs SECURE,  ASSLT ELEMENTs CONDUCT SSE. DTG EXECUTION:  252100Z  261830ZSEP07
TASK ORGANIZATION:  16 X ANP, 41 X CDO; 41 X USSF; 3 X THT, 2 X JTAC, 2 x DOG TM, 13 X TERP; 3X SOT-A, 2 X CRD,  1 X SOURCE.  TOTAL: 124 PAX
MISSION:  ANA COMMANDOS, COMBAT ADVISED AND ASSISTED BY AOB 740, CLEAR OBJECTIVES TORONTO AND RALEIGH IOT KILL/CAPTURE HABIBULAH O/A 252100ZSEP07 TO REMOVE KEY TALIBAN LEADERSHIP, INCREASE SECURITY IN THE KONAR PROVINCE, AND PROMOTE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IROA. 
KEY TASKS: 
 RAPID ASSAULT IOT ISOLATE THE OBJ 
 CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF TARGET AREA
 CONDUCT THOROUGH SSE
 CONDUCT STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS
END STATE:
 TALIBAN KEY LEADERSHIP KILLED/ CAPTURED; SSE CONDUCTED
 ANA PRECISION STRIKE CAPABILITY VALIDATED
 IROA GOVERNANCE IS EMPOWERED BY ANSF PRESENCE
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION:  
PHASE I: INFIL  NEAR SIMULTANEOUS AIR ASSAULT ON HABIBULAH SAFE HOUSE COMPOUNDS (OBJS RALEIGH AND TORONTO) AND OVERWATCH POSITIONS. 
PHASE II: ACTIONS ON THE OBJ  ANA COMMANDOS AND ANP, COMBAT ADVISED BY ODA 763, 746, AND 743, AND ABLE COMPANY (TF ROCK), WILL CLEAR OBJS RALEIGH, TORONTO, AND RENO, IOT  KILL / CAPTURE HABIBULAH AND DENY AREAS OF DECISIVE POINT OF THE OPERATION IS THE ISOLATION OF OBJECTIVES.  THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS WILL THEN EXFIL.  THE PURPOSE OF CAS IS BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCE.   
PHASE III: EXFIL  UPON COMPLETION OF SSE, THE ASLT FORCE WILL POSTURE FOR AIR EXFIL, THEN AIR EXFIL TO BASE TO PROVIDE QRF SUPPORT.
PHASE IV: STAY BEHIND  TF ROCK WILL CONTINUE SEARCH AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS VIC OBJ RENO WHILE OVERWATCH ELEMENTS CONDUCT STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN OVERWATCH OF THE TARGET AREA AND TARGET TALIBAN ELEMENTS AS THEY REOCCUPY NEARBY VILLAGES.  TALIBAN WILL BE TARGETED BY IDF AND QRF ELEMENTS.
PHASE V: FINAL EXFIL  AFTER TF ROCK COMPLETES VILLAGE MEET AND SEARCH OPERATIONS AND THE STAY BEHIND ELEMENTS MAINTAIN OBSERVATION THEY WILL EXFIL THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF DARKNESS.
NEAREST REINFORCEMENTS:  
FOB FENTY ODA 745 AND ANP
FREQ: SAT 102   SERPENT 45 (APPROX 30 MIN BY AIR)
EXTERNAL ASSETS:
INDIRECT: 
FB BLESSING 2 X 155MM ARTY
FREQ:  5Khz TACSAT: Ch 999   C/S BULLS 
FOB ASADABAD: 155MM ARTY
FREQ:  5Khz TACSAT: Ch 999   C/S BIGGUNS 
EW BURN:  		NONE REQUESTED 
ISR (PREDATOR) 	252000ZSEP07  260100ZSEP07
1 X AC-130		252030ZSEP07  262230ZSEP07
3 X CH-47  		252030ZSEP07  260030ZSEP07
6 X UH-60  		252030ZSEP07  260030ZSEP07
3 X AH-64   		252030ZSEP07  260030ZSEP07

TASK ORG:  4XUH(B), 1xARF (A), 1XC2(A), 3XCH(F), 3XAH, 1 UH(MED)
AMC:  LTC CHRONIS
PZs:  JAF, ABAD, ABLE MAIN
LZs:  CH: HLZ VIRGINIA (INFIL) HLZ KENTUCKY (EXFIL)
UH:  HLZ VERMONT (INFIL),  HLZ MICHIGAN (EXFIL)
CONCEPT:  AIR ASSAULT 

TIME LINE:
1500 SHOW
1645 COMMO CHECK
1700 ARF / C2 / GM 3-3 DEP JAF
1715 ARF / C2 / GM 3-3 ARR ABAD
1729 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP JAF
1730 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP JAF
1735 UH SPARE / MED DEP JAF
1754 C2 / ARF DEP ABAD FOR ROZS
1759 ARF EST IN ROZ
1759 C2 EST IN ROZ
1800 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR OBJ RALIEGH 
1801 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR OBJ TORONTO
1801 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP OBJ RALIEGH
1801 (+30) L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP TORONTO
1806 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABLE MAIN
1807 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR ABAD P/U OVERWATCH
1812 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP ABAD
1818 FLIPPER 2-1 ARR AZORES
1820 FLIPPER 2-2 ARR MAINE
1824 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP ABLE MAIN
1832 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR LZ PROPOSED
1833 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP LZ PROPOSED
1836 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABLE MAIN
1840 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP ABLE MAIN
1847 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR LZ REDSKINS
1848 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP LZ REDSKINS
1852 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABAD, S/D REFUEL
1855 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR JAF S/D REFUEL
1942 ARF ARR ABLE MAIN
EOM
Flight Time: CH: 1+25  UH: 1+23  C2/ARF/AH: 2+42
Duty Day:  12+00
Report key: 27018718-3881-4B30-AA7A-8A8CB4C65DD6
Tracking number: 2007-275-070921-0427
Attack on: UNKNOWN
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: CJTF-82
Unit name: CJTF-82
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD9700078000
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN