The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070925n907 | RC EAST | 35.02547836 | 71.15936279 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-09-25 07:07 | Air Mission | Air Assault | UNKNOWN | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
SAFEHAVEN. ONCE OBJs SECURE, ASSLT ELEMENTs CONDUCT SSE. DTG EXECUTION: 252100Z 261830ZSEP07
TASK ORGANIZATION: 16 X ANP, 41 X CDO; 41 X USSF; 3 X THT, 2 X JTAC, 2 x DOG TM, 13 X TERP; 3X SOT-A, 2 X CRD, 1 X SOURCE. TOTAL: 124 PAX
MISSION: ANA COMMANDOS, COMBAT ADVISED AND ASSISTED BY AOB 740, CLEAR OBJECTIVES TORONTO AND RALEIGH IOT KILL/CAPTURE HABIBULAH O/A 252100ZSEP07 TO REMOVE KEY TALIBAN LEADERSHIP, INCREASE SECURITY IN THE KONAR PROVINCE, AND PROMOTE THE LEGITIMACY OF THE IROA.
KEY TASKS:
RAPID ASSAULT IOT ISOLATE THE OBJ
CONDUCT CORDON AND SEARCH OF TARGET AREA
CONDUCT THOROUGH SSE
CONDUCT STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS
END STATE:
TALIBAN KEY LEADERSHIP KILLED/ CAPTURED; SSE CONDUCTED
ANA PRECISION STRIKE CAPABILITY VALIDATED
IROA GOVERNANCE IS EMPOWERED BY ANSF PRESENCE
CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION:
PHASE I: INFIL NEAR SIMULTANEOUS AIR ASSAULT ON HABIBULAH SAFE HOUSE COMPOUNDS (OBJS RALEIGH AND TORONTO) AND OVERWATCH POSITIONS.
PHASE II: ACTIONS ON THE OBJ ANA COMMANDOS AND ANP, COMBAT ADVISED BY ODA 763, 746, AND 743, AND ABLE COMPANY (TF ROCK), WILL CLEAR OBJS RALEIGH, TORONTO, AND RENO, IOT KILL / CAPTURE HABIBULAH AND DENY AREAS OF DECISIVE POINT OF THE OPERATION IS THE ISOLATION OF OBJECTIVES. THE ASSAULT ELEMENTS WILL THEN EXFIL. THE PURPOSE OF CAS IS BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE FIRES IN SUPPORT OF THE GROUND FORCE.
PHASE III: EXFIL UPON COMPLETION OF SSE, THE ASLT FORCE WILL POSTURE FOR AIR EXFIL, THEN AIR EXFIL TO BASE TO PROVIDE QRF SUPPORT.
PHASE IV: STAY BEHIND TF ROCK WILL CONTINUE SEARCH AND EXPLOITATION OPERATIONS VIC OBJ RENO WHILE OVERWATCH ELEMENTS CONDUCT STAY BEHIND OPERATIONS TO MAINTAIN OVERWATCH OF THE TARGET AREA AND TARGET TALIBAN ELEMENTS AS THEY REOCCUPY NEARBY VILLAGES. TALIBAN WILL BE TARGETED BY IDF AND QRF ELEMENTS.
PHASE V: FINAL EXFIL AFTER TF ROCK COMPLETES VILLAGE MEET AND SEARCH OPERATIONS AND THE STAY BEHIND ELEMENTS MAINTAIN OBSERVATION THEY WILL EXFIL THE FOLLOWING PERIOD OF DARKNESS.
NEAREST REINFORCEMENTS:
FOB FENTY ODA 745 AND ANP
FREQ: SAT 102 SERPENT 45 (APPROX 30 MIN BY AIR)
EXTERNAL ASSETS:
INDIRECT:
FB BLESSING 2 X 155MM ARTY
FREQ: 5Khz TACSAT: Ch 999 C/S BULLS
FOB ASADABAD: 155MM ARTY
FREQ: 5Khz TACSAT: Ch 999 C/S BIGGUNS
EW BURN: NONE REQUESTED
ISR (PREDATOR) 252000ZSEP07 260100ZSEP07
1 X AC-130 252030ZSEP07 262230ZSEP07
3 X CH-47 252030ZSEP07 260030ZSEP07
6 X UH-60 252030ZSEP07 260030ZSEP07
3 X AH-64 252030ZSEP07 260030ZSEP07
TASK ORG: 4XUH(B), 1xARF (A), 1XC2(A), 3XCH(F), 3XAH, 1 UH(MED)
AMC: LTC CHRONIS
PZs: JAF, ABAD, ABLE MAIN
LZs: CH: HLZ VIRGINIA (INFIL) HLZ KENTUCKY (EXFIL)
UH: HLZ VERMONT (INFIL), HLZ MICHIGAN (EXFIL)
CONCEPT: AIR ASSAULT
TIME LINE:
1500 SHOW
1645 COMMO CHECK
1700 ARF / C2 / GM 3-3 DEP JAF
1715 ARF / C2 / GM 3-3 ARR ABAD
1729 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP JAF
1730 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP JAF
1735 UH SPARE / MED DEP JAF
1754 C2 / ARF DEP ABAD FOR ROZS
1759 ARF EST IN ROZ
1759 C2 EST IN ROZ
1800 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR OBJ RALIEGH
1801 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR OBJ TORONTO
1801 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP OBJ RALIEGH
1801 (+30) L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP TORONTO
1806 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABLE MAIN
1807 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR ABAD P/U OVERWATCH
1812 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) DEP ABAD
1818 FLIPPER 2-1 ARR AZORES
1820 FLIPPER 2-2 ARR MAINE
1824 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP ABLE MAIN
1832 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR LZ PROPOSED
1833 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP LZ PROPOSED
1836 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABLE MAIN
1840 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP ABLE MAIN
1847 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR LZ REDSKINS
1848 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) DEP LZ REDSKINS
1852 L1S1 (CAVEMEN) ARR ABAD, S/D REFUEL
1855 L1S2 (FLIPPERS) ARR JAF S/D REFUEL
1942 ARF ARR ABLE MAIN
EOM
Flight Time: CH: 1+25 UH: 1+23 C2/ARF/AH: 2+42
Duty Day: 12+00
Report key: 27018718-3881-4B30-AA7A-8A8CB4C65DD6
Tracking number: 2007-275-070921-0427
Attack on: UNKNOWN
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: CJTF-82
Unit name: CJTF-82
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD9700078000
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN