The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070717n383 | RC EAST | 34.28239822 | 70.81607056 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-07-17 04:04 | Non-Combat Event | OTHER | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
PRT Jalalabad
APO AE 09354
17 July 2007
MEMORANDUM THRU
Civil Affairs OIC, PRT Jalalabad, APO AE 09354
Commander, PRT Jalalabad, APO AE 09354
SUBJECT: Trip Report for Anikhanekhel HA Drop ( 42S XC 67164 94961), and Charedeh Retaining wall assessment with Dr. Allah Dad (42S XC 62150 99296)
1. SUMMARY. Civil Affairs (CA) and Civil Engineering (CE) conducted two separate missions with great success today. First, CA conducted an HA drop in Anikhanekhel to assist with poverty and to affect the local Mullahs previous anti-coalition sentiments. Today, the mullah (Mulawai Paienda) was very appreciative and attentive to the message of the PRT. We spoke for about 20 minutes about security and reconstruction and then he passed along some information to TF North personnel (defer to Chief Clincscales). The effort of the PRT was well received and CA trusts that our status as friends of the Afghans was built upon today to refute any negative remarks. The mullah invited us for tea and wanted to discuss future progress. CE assessed local area for potential foot bridge and we discussed its importance to the community. PRT completed the HA drop and proceeded to Charedeh village to meet local Provincial Shura leader (Dr. Allah Dad) of the village to assess a retaining wall project. This visit also went very well. CA/CE were able to sustain excellent relations with him and the elders and CEs assessment of the site was positive and we discussed the impact of it as a cash for work project.
2. BACKGROUND
a. General. CA has visited Anikhanekhel on two prior occasions in the past 30 days. Upon our first visit to assess a Mosque there, the Mullah (Mulawia Paienda) was not receptive and asked not to be photographed and asked us to move along and that he really did not want any Coalition assistance with his Mosque. This behavior targeted his village as a focal point for CA. CA returned several weeks later with THT with the objective of understanding what the situation was with respect to Anti- Coalition remarks. When we arrived, the Mullah was not present and local elders told CA that the previous PRT had not delivered on promises made and that the Mullah was very unhappy. CA then discussed strategy for rebuilding the relationship and decided to take another trip to the area to discuss the future with an HA drop to assist with the systemic poverty. Upon this most recent visit, CA took HA and actually met with the former belligerent Mullah and began to repair relationship. The Mullah invited us for tea, was complimentary of the PRT, however, he did dump intel to TF North and discussed recent movement with CA about Taliban in the area and appeared very nervous throughout the duration. Nonetheless, the Mullah was welcoming and supportive to our faces.
b. Mission Specifics.
(1) Defer Footbridge and retaining wall to CE
(2) S2, THT, TF North have been debriefed on intel.
(3) CA considers today a major success in that we have gained access to an area previously thought to be Anti Coalition. CA recommends that we follow up with solid footbridge consideration. Continue to develop discussion with Mullah and see where we can impact his tinge of negativity or those who are pressuring him to be negative.
3. Point of Contact for this memorandum is CPT Noce at DSN 231-7341.
Paul A. Noce
CPT, CA
CAT-A Team Leader
Report key: 193498C3-6481-4BD7-BE3D-F0A296F83D03
Tracking number: 2007-198-132208-0628
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: PRT JALALABAD
Unit name: PRT JALALABAD
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXC6716394961
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN