The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070702n741 | RC EAST | 33.43104935 | 69.99848938 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-07-02 03:03 | Enemy Action | Assassination | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF EDUCATION WAS ASSASINATED APPROX ONE HOUR AGO IN THE SABARI DISTRICT AT VIC GRID WB 9282 9952 NEAR THE VILLAGE OF KHONI KANDOW. THE DEPUTY CHIEF NAME WAS SAID OSMAN SON OF QASIM. THERE WAS A DOCTOR TRAVELING WITH HIM AT THE TIME AND HIS NAME IS MAMOOR SON OF WAZIR. HE WAS FOUND ALIVE AND WAS TRANSPORTED TO KWOST HOSPITAL. THEY WERE ATTACKED BY SMALL ARMS FIRE AS THEY WERE MOVING SOUTH FROM THE ROADSIDE. NFTR ATT. ANP AND NDS ARE ON SITE AND INVESTIGATING.
Excerpt from TF Professional INTUM 02 JUL 07 (S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO) At approx 02 0230Z JUL 07 Said Osman s/o Qasim, the Deputy Chief of Education, was assassinated near the village Khoni Kandow (WB 9282 9952), Sabari District. Mamoor s/o Wazir, a local doctor, was traveling with him at the time. Mamoor was wounded and transported to Khowst Hospital and is reportedly stable. ANP questioned Mamoor however he does not remember much, only that an unknown number of ACM attacked them from the right side of the road. He also said that he believes that they were attacked from the mountains vic WB 9282 9952. The two personnel were traveling in a car south, towards Khowst City, when they received small arms fire from the roadside.
Headquarters
International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan
________________________________________
NEWS RELEASE [2007-XXX: Draft]
________________________________________
Prominent educator murdered
FORWARD OPERATING BASE SALERNO, Afghanistan (2 July) The deputy chief of education for Khowst province was shot and killed by a gunman near the village of Khoni Kandow in the Sabari District, Khowst Province, around 7 a.m., today.
SEE ATTACHMENTS FOR COMPLETE RELEASE
EXCERPT FROM INTSUM DATED 05 JUL 07: FIVE AL QAEDA OPERATIVES IN A WHITE TOYOTA COROLLA ASSASSINATED SARAN ((WAL)), DIRECTOR OF SABARI HIGH SCHOOL//MGRS: 42SWC9272602807//, SABARI DISTRICT, KHOST PROVINCE, AFGHANISTAN (AF) ON 02 JULY 2007. ANOTHER MAN WAS KILLED IN THE SAME ATTACK. (SOURCE COMMENT-I THINK THE SECOND MAN WAS SARAN WALS BODYGUARD.) THE AL QAEDA MEMBERS STAY IN THE MOUNTAINS OF THE SABARI DISTRICT, AND USE RADIOS TO COMMUNICATE WITH ONE ANOTHER. (SOURCE COMMENT-I DONT KNOW IN WHICH MOUNTAINS THE AL QAEDA MEMBERS HIDE.) THE AL QAEDA MEMBERS RECEIVED 30,000 PAKISTANI RUPPEES (500 USD) FOR THE ASSASSINATION FROM THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT. (SOURCE COMMENT-THE PAKISTAN GOVERNMENT WANTS THE CHILDREN OF AF TO BE UNEDUCATED SO THAT THEY ARE MORE SUSCEPTIBLE TO AL QAEDA INFLUENCE.)
(FIELD COMMENT-ASSASSINATION CONFIRMED IN TF PROFESSIONAL INTSUM, DATED 03 JULY 2007.)
(DOI: 20070702)
Report key: 95845381-C8C6-4A87-A56F-3F5D282B048E
Tracking number: 2007-183-043942-0470
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF PROFESSIONAL (2-321)
Unit name: 2-321 AFAR / SALERNO
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB9282099521
CCIR: (FNIR 2b) WHERE DOES THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN HAVE THE ABILITY TO EXTEND GOVERNANCE IN THE FATA? (DP 8)
Sigact: CJTF-82
DColor: RED