The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070701n800 | RC EAST | 35.26195145 | 69.48262787 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-07-01 06:06 | Non-Combat Event | Natural Disaster | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Panjshir PRT continues its response to the recent flash flooding. IRoA and Panjshiri govt response continues to be impressive. Emergency Response Committee is now wrestling with coordinating/organizing HA distribution to most needed. As initial crisis mode passes, officials now are focusing on providing an organized response and looking at long term issues/requirements. Again, while not perfect and cumbersome, GoA response has exceeded expectations. PRT continues to monitor all critical meetings and response to prevent any critical breakdown and to advise where appropriate. HA influx from PRT, WFP, and IRC have enabled sufficient stocks to be readied for distribution. PRT is advising on a systematic approach to HA distribution which will catalogue needs and ensure support to the most needed. Natl Security Dept (Kabul) sent 12 water trucks and USAID/ARD provided 6 water trucks to provide potable water in most critical areas. CERP funding has been approved to support road/debris clearing. Addl funding request pending for significant stores of cement, gabions, shovels, etc. that are critical to repair damaged irrigation channels that are vital to subsistence agriculture. Intent is to provide critical resources for self-help repairUSAID is pursuing cash for work program to pay locals to clean/repair community infrastructure. Gov Bahlul returned from USEMB visit the previous day and spoke of passing his thanks to AA6 at the event for CJTF-82 support (Helo support for aerial assessment provided the day before).
PRT lead wheelbarrow-drop to most critically hit area in Rokha and site of most counter-PRT tensions. Engagement coincided with recovery of two sets of human remains at the same location. This visit tested PRT-Rokhan relations at the same time it expressed genuine PRT concerns for their recovery. Wheelbarrows were provided to aid locals in their recovery efforts as they dig out from tons of debris and mud. The engagement went well with positive comments expressed by locals at ground-zero. No aggressive/negative comments, gestures, or actions occurred.
PRT worked with Gov Bahlul to counter beliefs by many in Panjshir/Kabul that the USAID road/bridge construction caused the disasters in the hardest hit areas of Rokha and Shast. This was clearly a 100-yr flood and uphill debris field and damage indicate that no road/bridge construction would have survived the deluge of debris. Additionally, uncontrolled building in the flood plain above the road/bridge/culvert contributed to the debris field, to include a two story brick restaurant that was under construction right next to the bridge. The Governor laid down his stern expectations at the Emergency Response Meeting to ensure that Panjshiri officials counter the misplaced arguments counter to the bridge and USAID. He warned the Rokha DM and Police Chief to keep control in the area so that recovery can prosper (the area is secure, but the Governor wanted to make sure nothing negative happens). Traffic police finally reported to the most hard hit bridge areas to direct traffic flow (after PRT prodding).
Provincial CoP (Gen Waliullah) finally showed in the province today, he has not been in the province throughout the crisis. ANP have been visible throughout the crisis.
PRT Engineers traveled to Dara to assess further flooding damage to roads/irrigation/PRT construction projects. Damage continued to represent steady-state flooding that is common in the area.
Report key: 9BD6E933-8D88-4C69-A6AF-2A537180B67C
Tracking number: 2007-183-102842-0448
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: PRT PANJSHIR
Unit name: PRT PANJSHIR
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWE4390002200
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN