The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070606n922 | RC CAPITAL | 34.46197128 | 69.20904541 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-06-06 17:05 | Explosive Hazard | Interdiction | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
(S//REL) On 06 June 2007, National Directorate of Security (NDS) apprehended an individual in
the act of emplacing an RCIED on the side of the road. This individual was detained and allegedly
identified as one M. ZARJAN coming from SORKHROD district in JALALABAD province.
ZARJAN is alleged to reside in the CHAHAR ASIAB district.
(S//REL) ARTEC gained access to the device on 11 June and were provided by NDS the
opportunity to examine it. The investigators were not able to obtain the device from agency. No
components will be sent to CEXC-A for further exploitation.
ITEMS RECOVERED:
a. (S//REL) One (1) Remote Fob Trigger (RFT) contained within a black plastic housing. The
dimensions of the housing are unknown. On the exterior of the housing there is a sticker with
the following data: SONY CAR DOOR LOCK, SONY ELECTR---CS and a picture of a
vehicle (sports car). A portion of the label could not be read due to the fact that the sticker
showed signs of wear. The housing has five outlets that are in line with each other with a
number of wires emerging from the device. The dimensions of the outlets are unknown. One
(1) outlet has a red and black insulated single stand wire routed through the outlet which is the
power in (PI). The lengths of the wires are unknown. One (1) outlet has a black insulated dual
stranded wire routed through the outlet which is the power out (PO). The length of the wire is
unknown. One (1) outlet has a brown insulated dual stranded wire routed through the outlet
which is the antenna. The length of the wire is unknown. The two (2) remaining outlets have a
green and yellow LED installed within. The following were attached to the circuit board: One
(1) 18 pin IC with the following data: PT2272-M4 PTC Princeton Technology Corp. 0618Z.
One (1) 14 pin IC with the following data: TC4001BP. Internet search conducted on the chip
number and came up with Toshiba. A receiver board with the following data: RX-3. Also
attached are various electronic components. On the back of the circuit board the following data:
99 in white marker which was hand written.
b. (S//REL) One (1) Transceiver Trigger; color brown with the following data: 799 hand
written in black marker on the back of the unit.
c. (S//REL) One (1) pressure cooker main charge; filler and Net Explosive Weight (NEW)
unknown.
d. (S//REL) One (1) detonator; with yellow leg wires. The length of the wire is unknown.
e. (S//REL) One (1) motorcycle battery; with the following data: JINGWEI 12N7B-3A 12V
7AH manufacture labeling.
f. (S//REL) White wire; with the following data: MOGHAN CABLE CO 2Y1 SAMM MADE IN
IRAN The characters in italic are illegible. The length and gauge of the wire is unknown.
g. (S//REL) One (1) roll electric tape; with the following data: ATOM Plastic Tape
manufactures labeling.
h. (S//REL) One (1) roll packing tape.
CEXC_AFG_07_0440
Report key: 34969C51-8E01-4823-B369-48AD5498883E
Tracking number: 2008-044-161046-0515
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: CEXC
Unit name: CEXC
Type of unit: ANSF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SWD1920013400
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED