The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070530n656 | RC EAST | 33.29265594 | 68.60797882 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-05-30 17:05 | Explosive Hazard | Interdiction | ENEMY | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
301730Z MAY 07 2/B/4-73, ACM Movement Observed
1. 1730Z, 2/B/4-73 CAV reported 5 x pax, 2 x motorcycles, 1 x pax on foot carrying 2 x AK-47s; all pax were reported to be armed.
2. 1804Z, 2/B reports suspected IED IVO 42S VB 635 838.
3. 1811Z, 2/B reports suspected IED confirmed to be a hole in the ground with no mine present.
4. 1817Z, 3 Fury 3 reports observing 5 x pax on foot moving west IVO 42S VB 624 836.
5. 1843Z, 3 Fury 3 observed a flare at 270 degrees from his position IVO 42S VB 614 830.
6. 1843Z, C/4-73 CAV reported a total of 3 x flares IVO of enemy pax IVO 42S VB 611 689 (no azimuth provided).
7. 1857Z, 3 Fury 3 reported ACM updated location IVO 42S VB 614 830.
8. 1918Z, 2 x pax observed south, remaining 3 x pax continued moving west on 3 x motorcycles approx. 4km west of former position IVO 42S VB 605 826.
9. 1936Z, 2 x pax on foot linked up with 1 x individual on a motorcycle; all exfilled the area on the motorcycle in an unknown direction.
10. 1945Z, 3 Fury 3 reported losing contact with all pax.
11. 2000Z, 3 Fury 3 reported that 2 x motorcycles were discovered IVO 42S VB 6321 8294 with saddle bags containing 2 x mines and IED making material: electrical tools, wire strippers, possible remote detonating device, and components for pressure plate wrapped in plastic.
Analysis: It is possible that ACM were attempting to emplace an IED when they were alerted with flares of CF presence. Flares have been used in the past as an early warning system for ACM. The motorcycle being left behind indicates that the ACM were caught off guard by CF presence and were in a hurry to exfill the area. It is likely that the ACM were members of an IED cell, which usually consist of at least 5 to 6 pax
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CEXC report
Mod 5 DTMF and other items were captured by the 2/B/4-73 CAV at the above grid coordinates. US Forces believe that an IED cell was attempting to place IEDs in anticipation of CF/ANSF moving through the area. US Forces believe that the emplacers may have been alerted to Coalition Forces presence and fled the area. A total of six individuals were believed to have fled the area. Two motorcycles used by the emplacers were left in the area and several IED related items were recovered. In addition to the items listed below, two mines (of unknown origin) were recovered on scene. ITEMS RECOVERED: a. One (1) DTMF Mod 5 device. The Mod 5 is housed in a grey plastic box. b. One (1) green plastic wrapped battery pack containing four (4) SUPER CELL D Cell batteries. c. Six (6) AA batteries, red in color.
d. Six (6) AA batteries with EXTRA HEAVY DUTY EVERBRIGHT BATTERIES written on them. e. One (1) roll of black electrical tape. f. Three (3) thin pieces of wood g. One (1) piece of white, multi-strand copper wire, lamp cord with clear tape on some of the copper wire.h. One (1) red and black tire pump, one (1) tire repair kit with two (2) screwdrivers with one (1) piece of rubber inner tube measuring 545mm (L) x 12mm (W). One (1) cardboard box and one (1) green plastic bag.i., One (1) CSB motorcycle battery measuring 90mm (L) x 100mm (H) x 7mm (H) with black electrical tape covering the terminals. j. Six (6) AA RAYOVAC batteries.
CEXC REPORT: CEXC_AFG_398_07
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Report key: 2B8B95B8-087F-4777-96D9-8252DB3170FA
Tracking number: 2007-151-080745-0474
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: CF
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: J3 ORSA
MGRS: 42SVB6350083800
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: RED