The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070521n722 | RC EAST | 32.92361069 | 69.42888641 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-05-21 16:04 | Friendly Action | Vehicle Interdiction | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Task and Purpose of Patrol: 1st Platoon A. CO 1-503 conducts a VCP vic WB 401 429 IOT detain any suspects associated with the found AT mine RCIED.
Disposition of routes used: RTE BMW/RTE FERRARI posed no limitations to maneuverability.
Summary: The elders and children of Marbeka that were standing by for questioning said they are in no way affiliated with the Taliban. They said that they knew of no IED activity in the area. They said that the IED suspects usually put in IEDs at night so they would not be able to identify IED suspects.
Local Nationals Encountered:
Name: Marbeka elders and children
Position: Various
Location: Marbeka, vic GN 60 (WB 401 429)
General Information: These people were open to speaking with CF although they never provided any actionable intelligence.
Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): MISSION ACCOMPLISHED: 1st Platoon A. CO 1-503 collected 1 AT mine RCIED, battery pack, and detonation device. 1st Platoon also collected 1 IED marker, blasting cap, and cell phone. The cell phone was confiscated at the southeastern VCP along RTE Ferrari vic WB 404 430. Two suspects were detained for further questioning.
Two squads and two gun teams dismounted vic WB 408 426, one squad and one gun team skirting RTE Ferrari to the south and one squad and one gun team skirting RTE Ferrari to the north. The squad to the south set up an OP vic WB 391 430 and the squad to the north set up an OP vic WB 405 434 to over watch the VCP. The remainder of the mounted element continued to travel along RTE Ferrari to vic WB 401 429 to establish the VCP along with the ASG. When the mounted element arrived at the VCP site the ASG provided the US forces with the AT mine RCIED, battery, and firing device. They had also told US forces that they had detained two suspects. Those who the ASG detained were questioned and then detained by US forces for further questioning at FOB Tillman.
Report key: 4F6D8F66-79C1-4A3A-BAB6-0370EE978CD7
Tracking number: 2007-143-024756-0122
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB4010042900
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE