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170500z TF 3 Fury Reports Afghan/PAKMIL Border Flag Meeting IVO 42R VA 73904 05904

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070517n743 UNKNOWN 31.68815994 68.72464752
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-05-17 05:05 Friendly Action Border Ops FRIEND 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Border Flag Meeting attended by:

PAKMIL:LTC Amer, 1LT Usman, 2LTJaved,          
2LT Murtaza, 2LT Hikmat,  Sergeant (Havildar) Khair 
Zaman
CF:  LTC Woods, LTC Strek (PBG CDR), MAJ Wronka 
(PBG S3) , MAJ Biedziak (PBG DCO), CPT Kowalewski 
(PGB AS2), CPT Bolton (A TRP CDR), CPT Norman 
(SQDN S2), 1LT Karwowski (PBG CMIC), 1LT Bell 
(SQDN FSO), 2LT Fallon (A TRP FO)
ABP:  COL Abdul Zakhar
Issues Discussed:

Disputed Border
-LTC Amer stated that while the location of the border is disputed both sides know what they are restricted by and any previous violations have been intentional

-He offered to show both with a map and the GPS that the previous incident occurred on Pakistan soil (Grid to meeting was IVO 42S VA 73904 05905 approximately 700m within Pakistan of CF recognized border)

-The Doa Chine ABP CDR) stated this meeting with help both sides further understand the border and he looks forward to continued cooperation with the PAKMIL (Referred to as friends/family)

-LTC also wanted to thank LTC Amer for the PAKMILs help during the Soviet Invansion
9 FEB 07 Border Crossing by Amanullahs relatives

-LTC Amer stated the issues they are having is this area are not ACM related but are tribal in nature

-The Sulayman Khel tribe which controls most of Paktika and which because of tribal and not international borders flows into Pakistan

-The tribe on this side was blamed for the deaths of Amanullahs (Former ABP CDR) son

-The tribe on this side fled Afghanistan during the Soviet Invasion because they were being persecuted from within their tribe

Enemy operations in this region

-LTC Amer stated this area was not like up north (most likely referring to Bermel/Gayan) and they were doing their best to keep it this way

Improved communications
-LTC Amer stated the current communications plan does not work when we try to coordinate between CF/PAKMIL

-LTC Amer referenced the 041508z MAY 07 SAF ATK against a combined CF/ABP patrol

-LTC Amer stated the call made to him went to the headquarters in Quetta, Pakistan and then had to be routed to LTC Amer who called his soldiers to move to the requested blocking position

-LTC Amer stated the delay was most likely responsible for ACM to escape

-LTC Woods suggested that we provide the PAKMIL with a Harris radio to be kept at this PAKMIL CP and at FOB Wazi Kwah so those elements can communicate

Turmoil within Pakistan
-LTC Amer briefly stated that his country was currently having internal issues but did not mention the 14 MAY 07 Ambush north of Chamkani

Agreement to have future meetings
-LTC Woods offered that both parties meet twice a month, once on the CPT/CO CDR Level and then once at the LTC/BN CDR level

-LTC Amer said it would be nice to meet without a incident being the cause but made no promises of future meetings until he spoke to his superiors

-LTC Amer stated that the last meeting after Amanullahs family/tribe crossed the border to get vengence was hijacked by the ABP representative

-LTC Amer stated numerous accusations were raised against the PAKMIL at that meeting but he was happy with the mood and setting of this meeting

Coordinated patrols
-LTC Woods asked about the possibility of coordinating patrols so that both sides know what the other was doing
  
-LTC Amer stated that would be good and if a weekly schedule could be produced then it would alleviate some of the issues but notice as short as 24 hours would be sufficient

Analyst Comments:
-The topic of the 14 MAY 07 PAKMIL meeting was noticeably not mentioned by LTC Amer who attempted to keep all topics of discussion confined to his AOR

-It appeared that there were multiple rings of security with the inner most two being unarmed and no body armor

-There was an increase in overall security for the PAKMIL today with leaders often checking their own men multiple times and sending those that were not needed for the meeting away

-Following the end of the meeting and the gift presentation the PAKMIL clandestinely posed as additional security guards escorting LTC Woods to his vehicle

-LTC Amer did not leave LTC Woods side until LTC Woods had his IBA/ACH donned and was inside the vehicle

-LTC Amer yelled at a PAKMIL soldier that was nearby who was carelessly but innocently waving around an RPG
 
-The atmosphere in the tented area was very relaxed, no PAKMIL that were part of this meeting wore body armor and body armor on PAKMIL near the area were limited as well

-LTC Woods introduced the idea of sharing intelligence and stated that he brought his intelligence officer to the meeting for this reason

-LTC Amer was not prepared nor seemed interested in sharing intelligence, my presence changed his mood

-LTC Amer later stated he would be willing to share information but because PAKMIL intelligence officers at his level are of junior grade their English skills were poor we would share information with the wing commander.
Report key: E322A8DE-F267-4D58-B374-C286BBCAF996
Tracking number: 2007-216-195214-0102
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF 3FURY (4-73)
Unit name: 4-73 CAV / SHARONA
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42RVA7390405904
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE