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220400Z TF CATAMOUNT MEDCAP IN KHARKOLAY (ARIF KHAN)(mod)

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070422n166 RC EAST 32.807621 69.30016327
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-04-22 04:04 Non-Combat Event MEDCAP NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Size and Composition of Patrol:  SCT/2-87, 1/D/2-87 (-), 3/D/2-87 (-), MEDCAP 17 PAX

A.	Type of patrol:		Mounted	Dismounted	Both	

B.	Task and Purpose of Patrol: TM HEADHUNTER CONDUCTS MEDCAP IN KHARKOLAY (ARIF KHAN) IOT INCREASE SUPPORT FOR IROA AND CONSOLIDATE IROA GOVERNACE

C.	Time of Return: 1030z (all times Zulu)

D.	Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
			 	       		     
From Grid/FOB	To Grid/FOB	Route	Travel
FOB BERMEL	KHARKOLAY WB281300 	AXIS REBELS TO RTE EXCEL	10-15 km/h

E.	Disposition of routes used: ALL ROUTES ARE TRAFFICABLE
 	     
K.	Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: ALL TM HEADHUNTER FORCE RTB TO FOB BERMEL AND PREPARING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS

L.	Equipment status: no equipment damaged.

M.	Summary:  VILLAGE IS SEIFELI SUB-TRIBE, SUB TRIBE KOMKUMKHEL.  THEY INTERACT WITH THE LOCALS FROM THE MARGAH AREA AND TRAVEL TO THE MARGAH AND BERMEL BAZAARS HOWEVER BASED ON INTERACTION IT SEEMS AS THOUGH THEY TRAVEL TO ORGUN VIA PIR KOWTI OR SAROBI AND ARE MORE COMFORTABLE WITH THAT COURSE OF ACTION.  THIS SEEMS TO BE WHY THEY ARE FAR MORE SUPPORTIVE THAT NEIGHBORING VILLAGES IN THE IMMEDIATE COP AREA.  THIS VILLAGE SITS AT THE SITE WHERE THE BERMEL VALLEY, TOWAH WREY VALLEY, AND PIR KOWTI VALLEY CONVERGE AND GIVES EASY TRAFFICABILITY TO ALL LOCATIONS. 

N.	Local Nationals encountered:  

A. 
Position: MASON
Location: KHARKOLAY
General Information:
	MASON THAT WORKS THROUGHOUT EASTERN PAKTIKA PROVINCE AND WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL SETTING UP THE MEDCAP.  HE AND HIS BROTHERS BUILD KALATS AND KALAT WALLS THROUGHOUT THE AREA AND HAVE RECENTLY BEEN WORKING IN ORGUN.  HE WAS VERY WILLING TO INTERACT AND ANSWER QUESTIONS WITH CF.  HE DESCRIBED THE AREA ALONG RTE VOLKSWAGEN CLAIMING THAT IT WAS DANGEROUS (DID NOT ELABORATE EVEN WHEN ASKED, POSSIBLY REFERING TO HISTORICAL DANGERS NOT NECESSARILY PRESENT SITUATION).  HE CLAIMED THAT HE NORMALLY TRAVELED THROUGH PIR KOWTI TO ORGUN AND HE WAS MORE WILLING TO GO TO ORGUN TO THE BAZAAR THAN MARGAH.

B. 
Location: KHARKOLAY
General Information:
	VERY WILLING TO INTERACT WITH CF AND WAS VERY ADAMANT ABOUT EDUCATION FOR THE CHILDREN OF THE VILLAGE.  HE EXPLAINED WHY THE VILLAGE IS KNOWN BY TWO NAMES.  KHAR WAS HIS UNCLE AND WAS AS BRAVE AS GEORGE BUSH AND WAS THE PREVIOUS SR ELDER THEREFORE THE VILLAGE WAS KNOWN BY THAT NAME. HE BROUGHT A DOCTOR FROM A CLINIC IN THE AREA WE WERE NOT AWARE OF TO THE MEDCAP AND INTRODUCED HIM TO THE MEDCAP PERSONNEL.  THIS CLINIC IS LOCATED IN SAROBI DISTRICT (WE WILL ATTEMPT TO LOCATE THIS CLINIC IN THE FUTURE). HE CLEARLY IS PROUD OF HIS CHILDRENS KNOWLEDGE AND WISHES TO CONTINUE THEIR EDUCATION AND YOU CAN SENSE REGRETS OF HIS NOT BEING AS EDUCATED AS THEY ARE.  SEEMS EXTREMELY PRO-IROA AND VERY WILLING TO INTERACT WITH CF/ANSF.  .
	 
O.	Disposition of local security: THERE IS NO LOCAL SECURITY BESIDES RESIDENTIAL MALES.  ANSF WITH THE PATROL WERE 15 ABP.  THEY ACTED IN AN EXTREMELY PROFESSIONAL MANNER AND WERE VERY HELPFUL SECURING THE MEDCAP AND EXPLAINING THINGS TO THE VILLAGERS WHICH MADE THE ENTIRE OPERATION RUN SMOOTHER.  

P.	HCA Products Distributed: 2 BUNDLES OF TEA, 100 X HYGEINE KITS, 20 X FLAGS, 24 X UNITS OF BABY FORMULA, 8 X WATER JUGS, 30 X BAGS OF RICE, 24 X JUGS OF OIL, 24 X TOWELS, 4 X BOOK BAGS, 5 X STOVES, 10 X TARPS, AND 15 X T-SHIRTS.

Q.	Products Distributed: N/A

R.	Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc): THIS VILLAGE IS EXTREMELY WILLING TO INTERACT WITH CF/ANSF AS PREVIOUSLY STATED.  THEY ARE ALL VERY THANKFUL FOR HCA/MEDICAL OPERATIONS IN THE VILLAGE.  THIS VILLAGE SEEMS MUCH LESS CONSERVATIVE THAN THE MAJORITY OF VILLAGES IN THE WAZIR BELT AS GIRLS AND WOMEN ALL CAME TO THE MEDCAP AND EVEN THE GIRLS WERE PRACTICING THEIR ENGLISH WITH US TROOPS.  EDUCATION SEEMS TO BE A FOCUS FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS VILLAGE.  THEY DO NOT SEEM TO HAVE THE SAME ATTITUDE OF THE POPOLI IN THE VILLAGES TO THE EAST.  I WOULD ASSESS THIS VILLAGE AS GREEN, VERY SUPPORTIVE.

S.	Reconstruction Projects QA/QC:  N/A

T.	Afghan Conservation Corps nominations/Status:
	1. Flood Wall NE of Town: THIS VILLAGE DRAWS THE MAJORITY OF ITS WATER FROM SURFACE WATER WHICH IS POOR.  THERE ARE THREE WELLS ALTHOUGH ON OF THEM HAS RUN DRY.  THIS VILLAGE IS ALSO RIGHT ON THE TOWAH WREY RIVER AND COULD BE OF BENEFIT BUILDING A FLOOD WALL OR IRRIGATION IMPROVEMENT IN THE AREA.  CA WILL ASSESS ON NEXT PATROL
	 
U.	Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): (Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.) 

MEDCAP WAS ACCOMPLISHED.  155 TOTAL VILLAGERS WERE TREATED, 80 MALE ADULTS AND MALE CHILDREN AND 75 FEMALE ADULTS AND CHILDREN.  IT IS A CREDIT TO THIS VILLAGE THAT FULLY HALF OF THOSE TREATED WERE FEMALE.  CONTINUE TO EXECUTE PATROLS TO THIS AREA AS IT RESIDES IN THE CONFLUANCE OF THE TOCHI RIVER VALEY, TOWAH WREY RIVER VALLEY, AND PIR KOWTI VALLEY.  CONTINUE TO DISTRIBUTE HCA AND ASSESS FOR ACC PROJECTS AS WELL AS LONG TERM PROJECTS IN THE AREA.
Report key: B0C51C61-D3BB-49B9-BB58-50555E215C4B
Tracking number: 2007-112-140753-0921
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB2810030000
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN