The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070422n151 | RC EAST | 32.70684052 | 69.16004944 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-04-22 04:04 | Non-Combat Event | OTHER | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Size and Composition of Patrol: 24 x US, and 1 TERP
A. Type of patrol: Both
B. Task and Purpose of Patrol: 3/B/2-87 IN conducts HCA distro in order to disrupt enemy forces, assess traffic ability of routes, win support of the people of Afghanistan and assess effectiveness of IROA leadership.
C. Time of Return: 220400zAPR 07
D. Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
From Grid/FOB To Grid/FOB Route Travel
FOB Bermel WB 220 098 Bermel Road 10-15 km/h
WB 220 098 FOB Bermel Bermel Road 15-20 km/h
FOB Bermel WB 150 188 Engineer Road 10-15 km/h
Disposition of routes used: Route from FOB Bermel to Shade Khan Kowt were GREEN ATT time and fully trafficable. The Engineer road to the crash site was also GREEN ATT and should not pose a problem while driving.
E. Equipment status: All equipment is FMC ATT.
F. Summary: NSTR
G. Local Nationals encountered: 11 Farmers
H. Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc): We did not assess any villiages during this operation.
I. Conclusion and Recommendation
Mission accomplished- On or about 220430APR07 3/B/2-87IN SPed from FOB Bermel heading to Shade Khan Kwot to conduct HCA distro and conduct leader engagement. We talked to the elders and gave out sundry packs and boots to the children and adults as well as rice and beans. During HCA distro 3/B got the call that a sling load by a Chinook had been cut and crashed north of Rabat. 3/B returned to FOB Bermel to conduct link up with a Wrecker and LMTV for recovery operations in Rabat. 3/B SPed from FOB Bermel with the Wrecker and LMTV taking the Engineer Road to the crash site and to link up with D06 and 3/C/2-87IN. Once at the site 3/B secured the crash site and gathered all local nationals in the area together for tactical questioning. Upon further search of the surrounding area of the crash site numerous pieces from the sling load were found in a pile beside the road. After further tactical questioning of local nationals seen in the area, none reported having any other parts or components of the destroyed sling load. The elder in the group then told us that two other local nationals had gone back to their houses with a few parts of the sling load. 3/B took the elder and a terp and dismounted to find the kalats where the two locals left too. Realizing that the elders estimation of distance was off, 3/B conducted link up with our Humvees to continue movement to the kalats. The kalat was owned by a Rabat ANP officer and complied when asked to return a piece of the sling load to CF. We then continued movement to the second kalat although nothing was discovered that was stolen or missing from the crash site. 3/B then moved back down the waddi to continue recovery operations and secure HLZ for 3/C/2-87IN. Two Chinooks then arrived to extract 3/C back to Orgun-E. 3/B policed up all loose and broken components. Once all parts were loaded up and secure 3/B began movement back to FOB Bermel taking the Engineer Road leaving the rest of the wreckage at the crash site. 3/B was RTB to FOB Bermel on 21210APR07.
Report key: 5B5A759D-47F0-4CE4-A488-F48DD0416DBB
Tracking number: 2007-113-010955-0295
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB1500018799
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN