The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070419n629 | RC EAST | 33.44612885 | 69.9955368 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-04-19 03:03 | Friendly Action | Escalation of Force | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 |
At 0345Z, RCP 7 WAS SITTING AT A UXO SITE, SENT UP THE 9LINE UXO REPORT AT 0238Z, HAD THE SITE CORDONNED OFF AND WERE WORKING TO REMOVE THE UXO. A WHOLE LINE OF VEHICLES LINED UP BEHIND THE CORDONNED AREA SHOWN BY ORANGE CONES. THEN, A VEHICLE BYPASSED ALL THE STOPPED VEHICLES, HIT THE ORANGE CONES, THE GUNNER FIRED A WARNING SHOT JUST ABOVE THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE KEPT COMING, THE GUNNER FIRED MORE WARNING SHOTS. GUNNER THEN ENGAGED THE VEHICLE WITH HIS M4. AS A RESULT, A REAR PASSENGER LN RECEIVED GRAZING SHOT TO THE HEAD. RCP7 SECURED THE AREA, SECURED THE CASUALTY, PROVIDED FIRST AID AND ASSESSED THE CASUALTY AS NOT LOSING A LARGE AMOUNT OF BLOOD, STABLE, BUT NEEDING IMMEDIATE MEDEVAC. THE PATROL SIMULTANEOUSLY CALLED IN THE 9 LINE AT 0333Z. IT WAS A 15 MIN WAIT, TF PROFESSIONAL DID NOT HAVE AN ESTIMATED STATUS OF THE ARRIVAL OF THE MEDEVAC BIRD, THE LN''S GATHERED AROUND, AND EVENTUALLY THE LN''S GROUND EVAC''D THE CASUALTY TO FOB SALERNO. CURRENTLY, RCP7 JUST DESTROYED THE UXO AND DETERMINED IT WAS ACTUALLY AN IED. IN THE PROCESS, ANOTHER MINE WAS UNEARTHED. THEY ARE CURRENTLY ON SITE (CURRENT TIME IS 0446Z) AND THEY JUST REMOVED IT. RCP7 IS AWAITING THE ARRIVAL OF HURRICANE TO ASSIST IN SECURITY. RCP7 IS CURRENTLY FINISHING THE COLLECTION OF EVIDENCE (PICTURES, STATEMENTS FROM LNS). THE LN (14 YEAR OLD FEMALE0 THAT SET OF VIA GROUND CONVOY WAS DETERMINED TO BE DOA AT FOB SALERNO. FURTHERMORE, A 2 YEAR OLD GIRL THAT WAS IN THE LN VEHICLE ALSO HAD GLASS IN ONE EYE. THE MEDEVAC ARRIVED AND TOOK HER TO FOB SALERNO WHERE SHE IS UNDERGOING SURGERY. ISAF 04-362
Follow-up:
A patrol moved to the scene and assisted Rock with the investigation. Our BN LEP was on scene and took statements from local nationals that stated escalation of force was plainly evident and the individual in the vehicle was wrong for attempting to circumvent the control measures emplaced for safety and standoff. The vehicle in question was searched and found to have no explosives.
The BN S5 submitted Solatia paperwork for 100,000 afghani for the death, 20,000 afghani for the injury and 10,000 afghani for the vehicle.
The battalion commander has crafted a letter of condolence.
Understand that 70th Engineers will conduct their 15-6.
The battalion chaplain has talked to the soldier that fired the shots. He will reengage the company commander about address the group as a whole.
Battalion key leaders were briefed on the event and the importance of EOF procedures.
The family has requested payment be made at Salerno not at the point of the injury.
HHB 2/321 CDR (battle space manager) will conduct a shura with the elders from the area, discuss the event, and present the information as we know it.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 19 0637 APR 07:
1 - Did the soldier''s leader direct the warning shots / any of the engagement shots? No; he was dismounted and not in a position to do so.
2 - Did the unit complete EOF training? Yes
3 - Did the unit have other EOF items? Yes; C-wire and lasers, but the lasers were the smaller type and not suitable for daytime use.
4 - Did anyone speak with the driver? Yes, and his response was "he had a lot of things going on and wasn''t paying attention." Furthermore, the driver thought the warning shots were "test fire" shots.
Report key: E3DA68B0-2820-47B8-B37B-DDE66F8F2657
Tracking number: 2007-109-082319-0027
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF RUGGED (36 TH ENG BDE}
Unit name: TF RUGGED
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC9253001190
CCIR: (SIR IMMEDIATE 7) Injury/Death of local national due to coalition actions
Sigact: CJTF-82
DColor: BLUE