The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070409n653 | RC EAST | 32.7461319 | 69.35652161 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-04-09 03:03 | Friendly Action | Vehicle Interdiction | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Size and Composition of Patrol: 29x US, 1x Cat 1 TERP
A. Type of patrol: Mounted Dismounted Both
B. Task and Purpose of Patrol: 2/C/2-87 IN conducts VCP vic RTE MIATA (WB334232) on 09APR07 IOT interdict enemy infiltration. 2/C/2-87 IN conducts combat patrol / leaders engagement vic Showkikheyl (WB331292) IOT increase support for IROA and collect intel on enemy operations.
C. Time of Return: 100415APR2007z
D. Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
From Grid/FOB To Grid/FOB Route Travel
FOB BERMEL RTE MIATA (WB334232) RTE EXCEL 60 min
RTE MIATA (WB334232) Showkikheyl (WB331292) BERMEL ROD 25 min
Showkikheyl (WB331292) FOB BERMEL AXIS REBELS 75 min
E. Disposition of routes used: Bermel Rod is amber, all other routes are green.
Summary: Patrol conducted VCP on RTE MIATA from 0530-1300z. During that time, we stopped and searched the following vehicles and personnel:
1. 0600z: 2 jingle trucks; 7M; from Margah to mountains (cut wood)
2. 0615z: 2 donkeys; 2M; from mountains to compound (wood)
3. 0730z: 1 Hilux; 2M; from PK to Margah w/ auto parts
4. 1000z: 1 Hilux; 8M, 2F, 3 children; from Miram Shah to Bermel area
5. 1020z: 1 Hilux; 4M, 1F, 2 children; from Carachi to Bermel area
6. 1030z: 1 jingle truck; 5M; from mountains to Margah w/ load of wood
7. 1050z: 1 Hilux; 2M, 1F, 1 child; from Peshawar to Bermel
8. 1150z: 2 jingle trucks; 7M; from mountains to Margah w/ load of wood
Two people on the 1000z Hilux had unusual stories. One man said he had taken 5000 rupees to a shopkeeper in Miram Shah, as a loan for medical expenses. Another passenger was Pakistani, and claimed to own a mechanics shop in Margah. Questioned both men further, but nothing significant was discovered. The shopkeeper was escorted the to Margah to retrieve his ID. The ID was issued by the Bermel mayor, and appeared valid. The ABP inspected the shop, and stated that they believed it was legitimate and did not locate anything incriminating. At this point, both men were cleared to leave, because their stories checked out. Nothing else of significance was discovered during vehicle searches.
At 0545z, just after the VCP was emplaced, Mortars at the Margah COP fired H&I at a nearby target however no reaction to the H&I was received.
Patrol RONed at WB323236. Between 1400 and 1500, we were informed of a conversation. One party was complaining to the other that he hadnt received supplies (rockets, RPGs, ICOMs) from him in five months, that he had had to borrow supplies from other groups, and that he needed to be supplied in order to fight. He later said that he had had a meeting in the village earlier in the day to make plans, but that his friend wasnt taling good (i.e., his plans were bad plans). He went on to say that he didnt want to meet in the village anymore, because the wadi was a better place to meet.
At Showkikheyl, Comanche 26 conducted an engagement with Wal Jan, the brother of elder Amar Jan. Wal Jan seemed scared didnt want to talk with us. When asked where his brother was, he first said he was at his shura meeting, but later, after talking with a young male villager, said his brother had gone to sell sheep. When asked why he had given a different answer at first, he said that he didnt know where his brother had gone, so he made something up, but was then corrected by the other villager. It was unclear whether he was mentally unfirm, deliberately lying, or being mistranslated, so Comanche 26 dropped the issue. Wal Jan simply stated that he had never seen any Taliban.
M. Village Assessments: no change to previous assessment
N. Local Nationals encountered:
A.
Name: Wal Jan
Position: Elders brother
Location: Showkikheyl
Father: Dari Khan
Tribe/Subtribe: Showkikheyl / Mirakhel
General Information: Wal Jan spoke to us because his brother, the elder, was absent. He seemed nervous, and shared no information. He is old, and appears to be in poor physical and possibly poor mental health.
O. Disposition of local security: NA
P. HCA Products Distributed: 2 bags beans, 1 bag flour, 6 bags rice, 10 school backpacks, 1 bag toothpaste/toothbrushes
Q. PSYOP Products Distributed: none
R. Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc): The villagers did not come out to meet us today, and none of the people wanted to talk with us. Previously, the village was rated as Category I, due to a positive engagement with Badar, a tribal elder from Margah. In the absence of Badar, the village seemed much less friendly, and is therefore downgraded to Category II. Comanche 26 suspects Taliban intimidation.
S. Reconstruction Projects QA/QC: NA
T. Afghan Conservation Corps nominations/Status: No new nominations. No progress on previously nominated dam and well.
U. Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): (Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.)
VCP was successful in denying the enemy the use of RTE Miata, and we believe that at least one enemy operative tried to use the route that day and was unable to due to CF presence.
Report key: 0390109A-BC4E-443E-98F1-88225FC82DE1
Tracking number: 2007-100-120114-0158
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3340023200
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE