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041120z TF Catamount Conducts Leader''s Engagement and VCP IVO Baqir Khel (mod)

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070404n379 RC EAST 32.80475998 69.35888672
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-04-04 11:11 Non-Combat Event Meeting NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Size and Composition of Patrol:  20x US, 1x Cat 1 TERP

A.	Type of patrol:Both	

B.	Task and Purpose of Patrol:  Conduct Vehicle Check Point vic RT Maida North; IOT Interdict enemy movement across the Pakistani Border.  Conduct combat patrol and leader engagement Baqir Khel IOT collect on enemy operations and consolidate IROA governance. 

C.	Time of Return: 1120z

D.	Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
			 	       		     
From Grid/FOB	To Grid/FOB	Route	Travel
Margawh COP	FOB Bermel	Axis Rebels	15-20 km/h
FOB Bermel	Margah COP	RT Excel	15-20km/h
			
			


E.	Disposition of routes used:  All routes used through out the patrol were highly trafficable and supported movement of large convoy.
 	     

F.	Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: US forces maintained freedom of movement, within the AO; enemy infiltrations denied along RT Maida North


G.	Intelligence: We discovered some old fighting positions that were built to protect the individuals home from his enemy (family dispute). There was no sign of recent usage. The fighting positions provide good over watch on RTE Volkswagon and all avenues of approach leading to the quest house. We marked the two positions at WB 3361 2978 and 3369 2968. We checked out the guest house owners story with others in the village and it check out ok. The man showed no signs of fear and was very calm when talking with us. Nothing further


H.	Local Nationals encountered:  

A. 
Name: Quasha Khan
Fathers name: Shai Jan
Village: Baqir Khel
Tribe: Papoli
Subitribe: Azghar Khel
Position: Owns the village guest house
Location: Baqir Khel (WB 336 297)
General Information:
	     D16 talked with Quasha Khan outside of the village guest house (WB 3369 2970). Quasha Khan owns the guest house. He was quick to come out of the compound to meet us. When we asked about some of the structures that were around the quest house, he explained to us that they were fighting positions and a bunker (WB 3361 2978, WB 3369 2968). He stated that he had some family disputes with other families in the area. He stated that he didnt have any weapons and that the ANA out of Shkin had taken the one RPG and AK 47 that he had about a year ago. There was no sign of him being nervous while we searched the positions. He told us to search his house if we still were not confident that he was telling the truth. They were old positions and had no signs of being used in a while. His story checks out with other villagers that had not seen us talking with him. It is true that he has family disputes with other families in the village. 
B. 
Name: Shaief Khan
Fathers Name: 
Village: Baqir Khel
Tribe: Papoli 
Subtribe: Azghar Khel
Position: Elder 
Location: Baqir Khel (WB 336 297)
General Information:
	Shaief Khan was very supportive of us and wanted to show us around his village. We met up with him IVO the quest house. He brought us to the village madrassa and introduced us to Mullah Shir Mohammed, who is a teacher in the madrassa. Shaief Khan wanted to help us as much as possible. He helped us hand out HCA to the children and the poor of the village. 

C. Name: Mullah Shir Mohammed
           Fathers name: Hajam Khan
           Village: Ghunday Kay
           Tribe: Papoli
	Subtribe: Mundar Khel
	Location: Baqir Khel (WB 3360 2997)
	General Information:
	D16 spoke with Mullah Shir Mohammed about the Madrassa and his teachings at the madrassa. He was a bit timid at first but after five minutes or so he warmed up to us. He asked us if we would be able to supply the Madrassa with Korans for the children. Most of the children were from the ages of 6 to 12. There were 30 children attending class at the Madrassa when we arrived. He was very willing to bring his students to talk with us. He assisted the elders in handing out the HCA. 
      Disposition of local security: There are no ANP operating in the Margah area.

I.	HCA Products Distributed: 30 School bags, 10 bags of rice, 10 radios, 10 bags of flour, 10 bags of beans.
J.	PSYOP Products Distributed: None.

Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc):  People at the VCP were corporative and did not seem to mind the inconvenience caused by the searching. People in the village of Baqir Khel (WB 336 297) were receptive to our presence, they greeted us with smiles, waves, and laughed at my accented Pashtu. Though they were receptive to our presence but were still wary about talking to us and showing us around their village. When asked why they were scared to show us around, they stated that they were afraid that the people in the next village over (Ghunday Kay) would see them talking with the Americans. After the villagers seen Scorpion drive towards Ghunday Kay, they wanted to show us around. The elders brought us to the Madrassa (WB 336 299) where we met the Mullah. At first he was a little hesitant to talk with us but after the elders assured him that we were there to talk and hand out HCA he was more than happy to talk with us and to bring all his students out to our trucks to receive HCA. .  This village is Amber I think most of the people want to support CF and the IROA but are afraid to because of some form of intimidation or outside influence.  .  

	 
K.	Conclusion and Recommendation 
Mission accomplished, Patrol maintained VCP operations for about 10 hours and maintained overwatch and the ability to interdict any traffic along RT Maida North for about 24 hours, we observed one jingle truck moving east bound around 0530z. At 1130z we stopped and searched 3 Hilux with about 26 people total. All Pax questioned were on there way home from Miram Sha, Pakistan. They were in Miram Sha picking up supplies (rice, flour, oil, ect) or seeking Medical attention. The last of the three hiluxs we searched had four students on their way home from a school that they attended in Peshawar. Nothing really suspicious they were all cooperative with us. No one reported or was willing to report on enemy activities in that area.  Patrol observed no traffic during hours of limited visibility or during mid-day assumption is that people want to avoid driving at night and that people leave early and arrive in the early evening.  Recommend conducting rolling VCPs in order to prevent VCPs from being targeted by suicide bombers and being able to interdict enemy movement within the AO.  Leader engagement in Baqir Khel(WB 336 297) had a slow start See Atmospherics section. Recommendation for this village is continued visits and pamphlet drops to demonstrate the resolve of CF to protect villagers from intimidation from outside influences.
Report key: 6EE66280-2C04-4D67-BC9A-69C7B565D0B2
Tracking number: 2007-095-015604-0516
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3360029700
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN