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020900Z TF Catamount Conducts Route Assessment (mod)

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070402n168 RC EAST 32.73157883 69.3948822
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-04-02 09:09 Non-Combat Event Other NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Size and Composition of Patrol:  1 Rifle Platoon, 1 Scout Platoon, 1 Assault Platoon, 3 Co, 1-2 Kandak

Type of patrol: Both	

Task and Purpose of Patrol: Conduct clearance of RTEs Toyota, Miata, and Miata North, search all vehicles and personnel IOT disrupt HQ/TB operations in Paktika province

Time of Return: 0900z 2 APR 2007

Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
			 	       		     
From Grid/FOB	To Grid/FOB	Route	Travel
FOB Bermel		RTE Toyota	5-15 km/h, impassable at WB39151825
Axis Rebels		RTE Miata South	10-15 km/h, impassable to UA at WB34852212
Axis Rebels		RTE Miata 	10-15 km/h impassable at WB 34852212
Axis Rebels		RTE Miata North	10-15 km/h


Disposition of routes used:  RTE Toyota was restricted for mounted traffic limiting the element to trail formation at 5-15 km/h, the route had an average amount of water running through it with large rocks and boulders.  It became impassable for mounted traffic at WB 39151825.  RTE Miata South was restricited for up-armored traffic limiting the element to trail formation at 5-15 km/h due to erosion from snow melt and rain fall.  The route continued through to the PK border however due to recent erosion the route became impassable at WB 37352135.  RTE Miata was restricted for mounted traffic limiting the element to trail formation at 5-15 km/h.  This route became impassable for mounted traffic at WB 34852212.  The RTE Miata North was unresritcted for the majority of the route allowing staggered column movment at 15-30 km/h.  The route was generally smooth.  At grid WB 35212345 the route becomes restricted for mounted traffic limited to one direction of traffic but continues through the border into PK.
 	     

Enemy BDA: IVO WB 370216 11 Bunkers were destroyed.  On OBJ Gazelle WB385215 15 bunkers were destroyed.

BOS systems employed: AH-64s Butcher element, Predator, SOT-A, Mortar Systems (60mm, 81mm, 120mm) 

Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: Scouts/2-87 conducting VCPs vicinity unnamed route north of RTE Miata with 3 Co, 1-2 Kandak; 2/C/2-87 occupying Margah COP, 1/D/2-87 IN and 3/D/2-87 IN returned to FOB Bermel and conducting recovery and maintenance in preparation for continuation of operations

Equipment status:  Two M1114s undergoing minor maintenance

Intelligence: (HUMINT/PROPHET/OBSERVATION):  At WB 370216 a small sheet of paper with names and phone numbers written in Arabic was located, two notebooks discussing financial transactions from 2005, a series of medical records and x-rays were located.  SOT-A reported an intercept that detailed the increased coalition presence in the area on the 29th.  On the 30th while in a RON position SOT-A and local scanners intercepted an element that had eyes on the CF RON position.  They counted vehicles and observed a mortar.  On the 31st while all elements were withdrawing to FOB Bermel a intercept was sent up (LOB 300 degrees) that detailed insurgent elements attempted to detonated an IED on coalition forces but it did not activate (probably because of ECM).  This appears to be on RTE Volkswagen and was probably directed against TM C while withdrawing to FOB Bermel.  On OBJ Gazelle two individuals were observed on the PK border (approximately 800m away) acting suspicious, when ANA attempted to move closer to question them they ran back across into PK.  There was very limited traffic along RTE Toyota, RTE Miata South and Main.  Local interaction stated that RTE Miata North is the main route to Mirum Shah, PK.  While conducting VCPs along RTE Miata North some contextual information was collected about Mirim Shah, insurgents were fighting with Uzbeks present in Mirim Shah that were supposed to be there to train them.  All individuals were inputed into the HIDE system.

HCA Products Distributed: 5 Radios, 8 Bags of Rice, 10 Blankets, 2 cases of baby formula , pens and pencils that individual Soldiers brought with them at small village named Zawarkaril WB36581827.

Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc):  
The village of Zawarkaril was very receptive to Coalition forces and ANSF and were accommodating to the search of the village.  They are extremely isolated from all other routes except the route west along RTE Toyota.  The village is Peopoli however do not appear to hold the same attitudes (probably due to their isolation).  They were very receptive to the HCA.  They stated that they listened to Shkin radio and only see CF/ANSF once or twice a year.  On RTE Miata South we encountered one individual living in a small compound, he was receptive to ANSF presence and was accommodating of the search of his compound and the surrounding area.  On RTE Miata main there is a small series of compounds were searched by 3/D on the 30th and TM HH on the 1st.  The series of compounds were also Peopoli and were also accommodating to CF/ANSF searches.  This series of compounds were very small and were mainly oriented toward farming wheat and a few cattle.  On RTE Miata North all individuals that were searched over a period of two days were very accommodating to ANSF/CF searches of the vehicles.  The vehicles were completely unloaded and all contents were searched.

 
Conclusion and Recommendation: 

RTE Miata North is the primary LOC between Margah and PK in that area.  The route is easily trafficable by hilux and jinga trucks and appeared to remain open throughout the winter months.  The limited amount of SIGINT collected indicates that there are only a few enemy elements or facilitators in the area.  Due to their lack of operational security and unwillingness to engage CF/ANSF indicate a lack of experience and training.  We will continue to orient VCPs along RTE Miata north and interdict traffic traveling East-West along that route to force changes in enemy infiltration techniques.  Also we will assess trafficability of the Tochi River Valley and Towah Wrey River Valley IOT begin exploiting those areas to isolate enemy elements from the population.  We will also use HCA and CA team to facilitate the consolidation of IROA governance in the area.  We have identified four locations for MEDCAPs and two Madrassas suitable for school in a box and possible refurbishment.
Report key: 5F3B8EEE-0704-4D4E-86F6-07D65BD2CA10
Tracking number: 2007-093-013518-0628
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3699921600
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN