The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070401n364 | RC EAST | 32.92554855 | 69.38291168 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-04-01 09:09 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting - Development | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Size and Composition of Patrol: 26 X US, 2 X CAT I TERP, 1 CAT II TERP, 6 X HMMWV, 4 X M2, 2 X MK19, 16 ANA PAX, 2 ANA RANGERS
A. Type of patrol: Mounted Dismounted Both
B. Task and Purpose of Patrol: 3/A/2-87 IN conducts a leader engagement/identification along Route Yukon (42SWB358431 to 42SWB355485/Walawas to Gayan PROPER) while also conducting a Mosque Refurbishment in the vicinity of Gayan (42SWB3475649044) and HCA Distributions along Route Yukon from 01-03April2007 IOT better identify and distinguish between local villages, tribes, and religious leaders in AO Apache and increasing support for Coalition Forces and IROA.
C. Time of Return: 031100ZAPRIL2007
D. Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
From Grid/FOB To Grid/FOB Route Travel
42SWB42614380/Tillman 42SWB358431/Walawas RTE BMW/Ferrari 10-15km/h
42SWB358431/Walawas 42SWB350431/Walawas Patrol Base RTE Ferrari
42SWB350431/Walawas Patrol Base 42SWB355485/Gayan FB RTE Yukon 2-5km/h
42SWB355485/Gayan FB 42SWB42614380/Tillman RTE Yukon/Ferrari/BMW 2-15km/h*
*RTE Yukon is classified as Amber, but because of the abundance of rocks (washed up from recent rains and snow/rain from the mountains) it breaks HMMWVs easily and should be driven extremely cautiously and with experienced drivers and a mechanic (with tools and extra parts).
E. Disposition of routes used: RTE BMW is classified as Green. HMMWVs should drive no faster than 15km/h because of the wadi/wash terrain IOT prevent equipment damage. RTE BMW is classified as Green to Amber. There is a stream (2meters wide X 5 inches deep) running through the entire RTE. There are random places where sides of road are beginning to fall into the water and should be watched and ground guided if needed. RTE Yukon is classified as Amber, but because of the abundance of rocks (washed up from recent rains and snow/rain from the mountains) it breaks HMMWVs easily and should be driven extremely cautiously and with experienced drivers and a mechanic (with tools and extra parts). As with RTE Ferrari, sides of the road are falling into the stream if too much weight is put on them or driven too closely. There is one part of the route, 42SWB351470, where the stream becomes canalized and has washed away all dirt. At this point the bottoms of the HMMWVs are exposed to all rocks and begin to tear away at all exposed parts of the HMMWV. A mechanic should be there to make sure to TI all vehicles when halted (if time available). One should not drive over this route unless it is absolutely necessary. It is passable (with caution) but will tear away on all vehicles regardless of driver/TC experience.
F. Enemy encountered: One Gayan ASG Platoon Leader was detained by the ANA, because of intelligence gathered by both ANA and THT elements at the Gayan ASG FOB/42SWB355485 on or about 021600ZAPRIL2007. His name is Deenma of the Gayankheyl tribe/subtribe is Shamshikheyl. All other intelligence concerning this individual was collected by THT and ANA forces.
G. Actions on Contact: Deenma was detained by his own will. He put up no fight and went willingly into a separate part of the Gayan FOB while all other ASG Soldiers were sleeping. Squad Leaders and Platoon Leaders of the ASG were infirmed of his detention the next morning.
H. Casualties: None
I. Enemy BDA: Deenma was detained and brought to FOB Tillman/42SWB42614380 by ANA forces on 030800ZAPRIL2007. He was then flown to FOB Orgun-E. Nothing further is known of his detainment.
J. BOS systems employed: None
K. Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: N/A
L. Equipment status: During this patrol one ANCYZ lost its fill during a COMSEC changeover. Two radios were filled before this happened and were then put into separate HMMWVs and placed on Apache Company FREQ to ensure one HMMWV would have communication with the Apache Company TOC. ANCYZ was refilled and fully functional when we arrived at FOB Tillman. Three HMMWVs were damaged during this mission. Two broke at the same spot, 42SWB351470 at 030430ZAPRIL2007. On one HMMWV, the power steering boxs bolts snapped and needed to be replaced. The other HMMWV suffered a leak in the transmission. The transmission could not be fixed or replaced at this area because of time required for seals to dry. The power steering box was fixed. This took until 030900ZAPRIL2007. Nothing further was damaged.
M. Intelligence: (HUMINT/PROPHET/OBSERVATION): In the village of Walawas on 01 APRIL2007, 42SWB358431, we discovered the true make up of the Gayankheyl tribe. It is divided into three subtribes, Mirgulkheyl, Bughdadkheyl, and Achar. Further more, these three subtribes are each divided three times: Mirgulkheyl-Yargulkheyl, Shamshikheyl, and Mirgulkheyl; Bughdadkheyl-Remekhil, Rowot, and Bughdadkheyl; Achar-Samalkhil, Beleekhil, and Parizai. We also discovered that Walawas is split into six separate villages. They are as follows: Mirgulkalai (elder: Gul Akhtar / mullah : none), Lastoor (elder: Sadat Khan / mullah: none), Inzarkai (elder: Gul Mohammed / mullah: Deena Gul), Manykalai (elder: Sobat Khan / mullah: Awaldr), Kamalkalai (elder: Mir Shalam / mullah: Ahmad), and Maeenkalai (elder: Hakim / mullah: Abdul Rahman). We also discovered that the Headmaster of the school in Walawas is Saeed Dullah (Mirgulkheyl) and the principal is Zafar Jhan (Mirgulkheyl). They have 14 teachers that teach at the school. We were going to further investigate the makeup of Walawas on our return to FOB Tillman on 03APRIL2007 but had to RTB because of mechanical problems with the HMMWVs. In Gayan, 42SWB355485, on 02-03APRIL2007, we visited Gayan and stayed at the Gayan FOB. We met with the Shura and were able to identify all tribal leaders in the nine sub-sub-tribes. They are as follows: (Mirgulkheyl: Janat Khan; Yargulkheyl: Mir Wali Khan; Shamshikheyl: Raghim; Remekhil: Mohammed Amin; Bughdakhil: Nadergul; Rowot: Sarbiland; Samalkhil: Taj Ali Khan; Beleekhil: Asangai; Parizai: Zahir Jhan). We also discovered that there are three main Mullahs/Malawis in Gayan. They are as follows: (Malawi Mohammed Afzil, Mullah Abdul Shakur, and Malawi Abdul Malik). There are also two main madrassas in Gayan. They are run by Mullah Zabar and Noor Ulhuk (aka Khan Tasil). This is the only information that was given to us by the Shura members. We were going to further investigate into more detail but had to RTB to FOB Tillman because of the ANA detainee. A complete tribal/village/religious tree will be made complete with pictures of the Gayan/Walawas area by myself and A5 and will be sent to CAT6 via A6.
Also, I was approached by a THT member on or about 021500ZAPRIL2007 concerning a Gayan ASG Platoon Leader, Deenma. The THT told me that he had three reliable sources that said this individual had been seen visiting a known ACM insurgent in Gayan during hours
Report key: 56E6D1DA-99DF-47A5-837C-EA837FABC6C2
Tracking number: 2007-093-141215-0910
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB3580043098
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN