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131300Z TF CATAMOUNT CONDUCTS PATROL TO PIR KOWTI (mod)

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070313n650 RC EAST 32.9030304 69.27266693
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-03-13 13:01 Non-Combat Event Meeting - Security NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Size and Composition of Patrol:  65x US, 3x Cat 1 TERPS, 31x ANA
A.Type of patrol:   Mounted        	
B.Task and Purpose of Patrol:  Conduct mounted patrol to Pir Kowti and Saykhan IOT engage local leaders concerning recent rocket attacks, detainee release and current projects.  Additionally, attempt to locate and destroy compounds used by rocketeers in their recent attack on OE.
C.Time of Return: 131300ZMAR2007
D.Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
From Grid/FOB	To Grid/FOB	Route	Travel
FOB OE	WB 1508 4181	RTE Honda	25 km/h
WB 1508 4181	WB 2550 4057	RTE Nissan	15 km/h
			
E.Disposition of routes used:  RTE Honda was dry and trafficable.  The only mitigating factor to speed is the numerous pot-holes in the road.  RTE Nissan was trafficable even with recent road construction and rain.  Where the road crossed low-lying terrain, there were no areas where the water was too deep to cross.  

N.Local Nationals encountered:
Name:  Ahmed Jan
Position:  Shura Member
Location:  Saykhan
General Information:
Ahmed Jan is the appointed head-elder of Saykhan village.  He led a group of about 10 elders in a discussion of several issues in the village.  He has organized a system of villagers to guard the road in front of the village (the entrance to the MK pass) in order to prevent IEDs from being placed in the road.  They have approximately 60 villagers who serve as Arbukai when needed.  The elders were very upset about the recent operation conducted vic. OBJ Provo and claimed that the two individuals still in custody are innocent citizens.  They requested that they be released, or at least that information be given them as to what their status and location are.  The two individuals in custody, Saifula Jan and Abdul Hakim, had both already paid for visas to travel to Saudi Arabia in order to seek out employment, and the elders are concerned that they will not be able to travel, and thus have spent a large amount of money on visas, which cannot be returned.
Ahmed Jan was planning on attending the OE Shura meeting on 14 March 2007, and was planning on stopping by FOB OE afterwards.  He was going to continue the meeting after we met to determine nominations for ACC projects and to prioritize villagers who should receive HCA items.

Name:  Sher Khan
Position:  Elder
Location:  Pir Kowti
General Information:
The head elder, Doctor Emil, was not in town as he was in Kabul.  Sher Khan is a close friend of the doctor (and the father of a Cat-1 interpreter).  He led a meeting of elders in Pir Kowti and they discussed the security issues facing the village.  Recently, security has been very good in the village, and they have not had an ACM presence for quite some time.  An indication of this was that relatives of government officials freely discussed their relatives jobs among other villagers.  An important issue raised was that when the contractor building the OE-Lawara road expanded the road through the Pir Kowti village, he did so on private land.  The owners of that land were never asked nor reimbursed for the land they lost.  The elders agreed to continue to discuss possible projects for the village, and recommend them through Dr. Emil, once he returned to OE.
	 
O.Disposition of local security:  Pir Kowti valley is largely unpatrolled by ANSF.  Security is kept by a loosely organized Arbukai consisting of about 60 villagers.  
P.HCA Products Distributed: none.
Q.PSYOP Products Distributed:  15 x AFG-B1-3664, 15 x AFC005

R.Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc):  All villagers in both Pir Kowti and Saykhan were highly pleased to see both CF and the ANA.  In each village, close to fifty men and children came out to greet the convoy.  The elders in both villages provided tea during the leader engagement.  All encountered expressed sincere support for the IRoA and CF.

S.Reconstruction Projects QA/QC:
Pir Kowti Solar Lights  The contractors were installing a few in the center of the village.  The lights were given to the contractor to be placed at his discretion.  Once lights are installed, grids to their locations will be collected.
Pir Kowti School  Not assessed on this patrol as construction is still halted due to winter weather.
Saykhan Solar Lights  Contractor was given solar lights to install at his discretion.  No progress on installation at this point.
Saykhan School  Not assessed on this patrol as construction is still halted due to winter weather.
Saykhan Cobblestone  Leveling complete in the center of the village.

T.Afghan Conservation Corps nominations/Status:  none
	 
U.Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): (Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.)  Support for the IRoA and CF is obviously very high at the mouth of the Pir Kowti Valley and decreases as you travel further away from OE and towards the MK pass.  The people in Pir Kowti village are very wealthy and very well educated.  They have already benefited by their support for coalition forces and most of the villagers have some relation to a government official.  Their support can be harnessed and continued as long as ANSF and CF continue to keep them informed about operations targeting rocketeers, IED-emplacers and suicide bombers in the area.  The most beneficial CA project for the people of Pir Kowti would be to accelerate the construction of a gravel/hard-ball road to the village.  Additionally, Afghan leadership in OE needs to make more of an effort to include the Pir Kowti people in government affairs.  When asked if the mayor of OE had ever visited, the people answered with a resounding no.  Bringing the people of Pir Kowti closer into the fold of the OE district would definitely help to extend the reach of the IRoA closer to the MK pass and the border.
Saykhan is a far more difficult village to assess.  There are certainly some elders in the village who are adamantly pro-IRoA.  Unfortunately, there are also certainly others who still support Taliban/ACM factions.  An increase in ANSF presence is the most important first step towards securing the mouth of the MK pass.  Additionally, using the local elders to aid in future kill/capture operations would most likely cause less tensions among the people of the village  they are willing to help, and would probably bring any member of their village to coalition forces.  Those fence-sitters in the village would be lured by an aggressive HCA program consisting of distributions, projects and MEDCAPS.  There are approximately 500 families living in the village who are extremely poor and would benefit from anything we can provide.  In the immediate future, we owe the villagers information about where the remaining two detainees are in the Afghan Justice System.  After that, we should plan a large HCA distro/MEDCAP as soon as possible
Report key: 745A7B2B-6B3A-4BEF-8C47-AFE97793C302
Tracking number: 2007-073-012124-0063
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB2550040570
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN