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110642Z TF PROFESSIONAL REPORTS DRUG DISCOVERY BY ANP (mod)

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070311n593 RC EAST 33.34056854 69.9179306
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-03-11 06:06 Criminal Event Drug Vehicle ENEMY 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
On 110642ZMAR07 TF Professional reports ANP discovered two coalition forces containers (42S WB 8542 8942) on 10 MAR 07.  They suspected the connexes were involved in criminal activity.  ANP confiscated the connexes and escorted them to the Khost ANP HQ (42S WB 8343 8972).

ANP then contacted Khost PCC to develop a plan for opening and securing these containers on the morning of 11 MAR 07.  ANP was asking for assistance in the form of MWD and EOD team from CF to safely open the containers.  Professionals suggested bringing the connexes to FOB Salerno so that MWD, EOD and the scanning device could inspect the connexes in the Northern truck holding yard.

ANP contacted the PCC and requested permission from CF to open the connex to further their criminal investigation.  Upon opening container number 1, ANP discovered drugs and alcohol which they set as a value of $5,000,000.  Delta 16 was sent with PAO to document still and video coverage of the findings.

The patrol documented the contents of container number 1 (Orange 20'' MILVAN S/N WLNU99 00802).  ANP removed and stored the drugs and alcohol at their location.  The empty connex was then turned over to Delta 16 for escort back to SAL.

COL Mohammad Noor from the narcotics division of the Department of the Interior, was on site when the evidence was collected by ANP.

The second MILVAN, maroon in color S/N: 84581602210) has not been opened.  The milvan was oriented on the back of the truck so that the doors could not be opened without first removing the milvan from the bed of the truck.  ANP turned milvan number two over to Delta 16 as coalition property.

Delta 16 and the Khost ANP will escort milvan number two back to SAL to remain in the Nothern truck holding yard for twenty four hours.  ANP will detain the driver of the truck.  

The truck will be scanned and opened by EOD/MWD team NET 12 MAR 07.  If the milvan contains illegal substances the contents will be turned over to ANP in order to further their investigation.

KBR confirmed that S/N: 84581602210 was a KBR shipment from BAF to SAL.  Vehicle license number 2593.  Driver name: Rahimullah.

ANP received information prior to confiscating milvans from a tipster.  The information lead ANP to the milvans.  One driver escaped before the ANP confiscated the milvans.  The second driver is being held by ANP pending results of opening of milvan.

Delta 16 patrol report text follows...
SP north gate 0800.  Linked up with ANP escort outside north gate and moved to Khost Police HQ.  Met with Khost police chief and his deputy operations officer, Col Gul Kabir.  They informed me that they had captured two jingle trucks with hashish and were holding them at the Department of Drugs.  I asked if they would take me there and they said yes.

Moved from the ANP HQ with ANP escort.  Moved west through Khost City, past the PCC, and stopped at a compound vic WB 8343 8972.  The ANP Identified this compound as the Department of Drugs.  I asked to speak to the guy in charge, and was introduced to Col Mohhamud Noor, who said that he worked for the Department of the Interior division of Narcotics, and that he was the OIC of the Khost District.  I asked if I could look in the containers on the jingle trucks and found that the 1st truck had already been downloaded.  I asked where the contents were and Col Noor said that it was in the evidence area of the compound.  He led us to the basement into a caged in area.  While moving down the stairs to the basement I was struck by the overwhelming smell of hashish.  There were approximately 50 50 lb bags full of processed hashish inside the cage.  I had my PAO and combat camera element photograph the evidence with the ANP narcotics personnel and with US soldiers.  Mr. Kazmerick estimated that the drugs had a US street value of 5 million dollars.  The driver of the first jingle truck was being held at the ANP HQ in Khost.

I went to look in the other container and found that it could not be opened because the door was blocked by the cab of the jingle truck.  I gave the serial numbers and descriptions of the containers to PRO 71.  The opened container was a 25 foot mil van, maroon in color, and was marked WLNV 9900802 in several places.  The unopened container was a 25 foot mil van, orange in color, and marked 84581602210.  The Narc police were able to produce documents for the unopened container from KBR. They were numbered 30063933 and showed that the container contained food service items.

I received guidance from PRO 71 to escort the unopened container\jingle truck to FOB Salerno.  I escorted the truck to Salerno.  The truck was driven by the original driver.  The ANP Narcotics police followed my convoy to Salerno and took the driver into custody following the trip.  I parked the jingle in the jingle truck parking lot along the north wall.  The ANP exited Salerno with the driver and took him back to the Narcotics Compound for further questioning.  They asked me to have PRO 71 call the PCC and notify them of the contents of the container so that they could determine the final disposition of the detainee."  Report Ends.
Report key: 8E90441D-51EA-4304-900A-C8D122E6BF41
Tracking number: 2007-070-074252-0868
Attack on: ENEMY
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF PROFESSIONAL (2-321)
Unit name: 2-321 AFAR / SALERNO
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB8542089420
CCIR: (FFIR 5) WHICH ELECTED PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVES ARE ADEQUATELY REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE OF THEIR PROVINCE? (DP 2, 6, 8)
Sigact: CJTF-82
DColor: RED