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100845Z TF CATAMOUNT Clear NAI 28

To understand what you are seeing here, please see the Afghan War Diary Reading Guide and the Field Structure Description

Afghan War Diary - Reading guide

The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.

Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.

The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.

The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.

The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.

An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm

The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.

Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).

Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/

Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.

Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.

David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial


Understanding the structure of the report
  • The message starts with a unique ReportKey; it may be used to find messages and also to reference them.
  • The next field is DateOccurred; this provides the date and time of the event or message. See Time and Date formats for details on the used formats.
  • Type contains typically a broad classification of the type of event, like Friendly Action, Enemy Action, Non-Combat Event. It can be used to filter for messages of a certain type.
  • Category further describes what kind of event the message is about. There are a lot of categories, from propaganda, weapons cache finds to various types of combat activities.
  • TrackingNumber Is an internal tracking number.
  • Title contains the title of the message.
  • Summary is the actual description of the event. Usually it contains the bulk of the message content.
  • Region contains the broader region of the event.
  • AttackOn contains the information who was attacked during an event.
  • ComplexAttack is a flag that signifies that an attack was a larger operation that required more planning, coordination and preparation. This is used as a quick filter criterion to detect events that were out of the ordinary in terms of enemy capabilities.
  • ReportingUnit, UnitName, TypeOfUnit contains the information on the military unit that authored the report.
  • Wounded and death are listed as numeric values, sorted by affiliation. WIA is the abbreviation for Wounded In Action. KIA is the abbreviation for Killed In Action. The numbers are recorded in the fields FriendlyWIA,FriendlyKIA,HostNationWIA,HostNationKIA,CivilianWIA,CivilianKIA,EnemyWIA,EnemyKIA
  • Captured enemies are numbered in the field EnemyDetained.
  • The location of events are recorded in the fields MGRS (Military Grid Reference System), Latitude, Longitude.
  • The next group of fields contains information on the overall military unit, like ISAF Headquarter, that a message originated from or was updated by. Updates frequently occur when an analysis group, like one that investigated an incident or looked into the makeup of an Improvised Explosive Device added its results to a message.
  • OriginatorGroup, UpdatedByGroup
  • CCIR Commander's Critical Information Requirements
  • If an activity that is reported is deemed "significant", this is noted in the field Sigact. Significant activities are analyzed and evaluated by a special group in the command structure.
  • Affiliation describes if the event was of friendly or enemy nature.
  • DColor controls the display color of the message in the messaging system and map views. Messages relating to enemy activity have the color Red, those relating to friendly activity are colored Blue.
  • Classification contains the classification level of the message, e.g. Secret
Help us extend and defend this work
Reference ID Region Latitude Longitude
AFG20070310n608 RC EAST 32.88719177 69.20526886
Date Type Category Affiliation Detained
2007-03-10 08:08 Other Planned Event NEUTRAL 0
Enemy Friend Civilian Host nation
Killed in action 0 0 0 0
Wounded in action 0 0 0 0
Size and Composition of Patrol:  38 x US, 2 x CAT 1 TERPs, 30 x ANA (8 x HMMWVs and 4 x Ford Rangers)

A.	Type of patrol:     Mounted	Dismounted	Both	

B.	Task and Purpose of Patrol: 3/C/2-87 IN establishes blocking positions in the vicinity of NAI 28 in order to deny enemy freedom of maneuver, and facilitate the main effort in the capture/destruction of an enemy rocket cell.  (Change of mission  3/C clears NAI 28 in order to deny enemy rocket cells freedom of movement and disrupt their operations in the vicinity of NAI 28)

C.	Time of Return: 1345z 

D.	Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
			 	       		     
From Grid/FOB	              To Grid/FOB	Route	                                Travel
FOB OE	                              NAI 27, WB154 381	RTE Honda	                (20mins), 10-15 km/h
NAI 27, WB 154 381	              NAI 28, WB 192 388	RTE S. Rodeo	                (60mins) 3-5 km/h
NAI 28, WB 192 388	              FOB OE	                RTE S Rodeo and Honda	(80mins) 3-15km/h
			


E.	Disposition of routes used: RTE Honda remains trafficable with some improvement immediately outside of the FOB access road (approximately 100m of improvement).  The river crossing and movement through the river in the vicinity of Orgun-E Kalan, grid squares WB 14 39 and WB 14 38, were passable with levels ranging from 1 to 1.5 feet in depth.  RTE South Rodeo was considerably more degraded since yesterdays travel, with greater degradation and erosion along a majority of the route along the wadi/creek bed, and several significant obstacles that were barely passable.  The snow melt from the Gur Khan Gar mountains has eroded the creek bed further, exposing significantly-sized boulders that are consistently shearing mending plates and tall enough to graze the cross-members of HMMWVs.  ANA vehicles were able to make the trek due to side routes more easily trafficable by smaller vehicles, and experienced driving.  Assessment for the route at this time is RED, nearing BLACK with impending further erosion from the snow melt.  NFTR.
 	     
F.	Enemy encountered: NSTR.
   
G.	Actions on Contact: N/A

H.	Casualties: N/A

I.	Enemy BDA: N/A

J.	BOS systems employed: 60mm mortar system employed for H and I fires on NAI 28 prior to the order to return to the FOB.

K.	Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: Nothing significant to report on disposition of friendly forces.  No enemy forces encountered.

L.	Equipment status: 1 x M1151 sustained a flat left-rear tire due to the shale along the route.

M.	
N.	Local Nationals encountered:   
Name: None
Position: 
Location: 
General Information:
	 
O.	Disposition of local security: An ANA element consisting of 30 pax from the 3-2 KDK escorted our patrol.  They were equipped with 4 x Rangers, AK-47s, chest racks, some body armor, some helmets, woodland BDUs  1 x Ranger was equipped with a PKM machine gun, mounted.  Commander and 1SG for the ANA company were very cooperative and anxious to assist our patrol.  They were on time, reacted to the notification of the mission with professionalism and rapidity, and understood the intent of the operation in a short period of time.  ANA soldiers established the outer cordon security at NAI 27, and quickly cleared the area of LNs, and occupied the high ground with several OPs.  Overall assessment, the ANA company was professional and motivated, despite the difficult climb along RTE S. Rodeo to NAI 28.

P.	HCA Products Distributed: No HCA distributed.

Q.	PSYOP Products Distributed: No TPT material distributed.

R.	Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc): No atmospherics could be assessed due to limited contact with local populace.

S.	Reconstruction Projects QA/QC:
	1. Project: No projects assessed.

T.	Afghan Conservation Corps nominations/Status:
	1. Project:  No projects assessed.
	 
U.	Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): (Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.) 

Mission not accomplished  intent was to establish blocking position opposite of TM Cs clearing element.  Due to the non-trafficability of the route through Pir Khowti, TM C was unable to complete the movement to NAI 28 from the East.  TM D was then given the change of mission to clear NAI 28 with fires.  TM D, with ANA, moved to NAI 28, clearing the visually clearing the terrain, and searching for any signs of enemy activity.  The patrol reached NAI 28 with little time to spare before sundown.  The immediate vicinity of WB 192 388 was cleared, vehicle were turned around, and the patrol departed down S. Rodeo to return to the FOB in order to traverse the terrain with daylight remaining.  The ANA experienced some difficulty moving along the route.  The patrol returned to the FOB with nothing significant or further to report.
Report key: BC775FAF-3711-47A1-9976-B15DAB4D5A8F
Tracking number: 2007-162-062006-0413
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: Global
Unit name: Global
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB1920038800
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN