The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20070309n610 | RC EAST | 32.72917938 | 69.2828064 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2007-03-09 04:04 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Size and Composition of Patrol: 24x US, 1x Cat 2 TERP
A. Type of patrol: Mounted Dismounted Both
B. Task and Purpose of Patrol: Scouts conduct R&S patrol and leader engagement vic Kulkunday to collect on enemy activity. Follow on mission: secure IED Site vic Akbardin khala to allow fow CEXE exportation.
C. Time of Return: 1030z 13 Mar 2007
D. Routes used and Approximate times from point A to B:
From Grid/FOB To Grid/FOB Route Travel
FOB Bermel Margawh COP RT Death 10-15 km/h
E. Disposition of routes used: RT Bermel was slightly flooded due to rain and snow throughout duration of patrol, vehicular traffic was observed on both rt bermel and rt death during the day.
F. Enemy encountered: NONE
G. Actions on Contact: NONE REQUIRED
H. Casualties: none.
I. Enemy BDA: N/A
J. BOS systems employed: NONE
K. Final Disposition of friendly/enemy forces: Suspected IED site secured by scouts until relieved by 3/D/2-87
L. Equipment status: All equipment mission capable
M. Summaty: While enroute back to bermel from leader engagement a source walked into the fob to report an IED vic Godikhel (WB 269 215). 2/B/2-87 escorted source to link up with scouts and whole element moved to possible IED site, site was marked by a circle of rocks with noticeably disturbed dirt in the center.
N. Local Nationals encountered:
A.
Name:
Position: ANSF
Location: Kulkunday village (WB 271 203)
General Information:
ANSF soldier spoke to us while conducting a H/A disto vic kulkunday he was younger and told us that most of the men were at the mosque for prayer, he said that the primary tribe in the village was the Badikhel tribe, and that they had no problems with Taliban and enjoyed the support of coalition forces.
B.
Name:
Position: village elder
Location: Akbardin Khala
General Information:
Coalition forces approached Elder while conducting security on the IED site on bermel rd between Akbardin khala and Godikhel (WB 261 213) he is the village elder of Akbardin khala village, he told sct6 that on the night of 9 Mar the IED was emplaced by an unknown person, villagers discovered it around 1000L on 10 mar and the village elders from Kulkunday, Godikhel, Akbardin khala, and Sabey khala decided to go to FOB Bermel to report the IED because they heard on Radio Shkin not to touch IEDs. several other locals from the surrounding villages all told us the same story. Elder and the other villagers were very pro- coalition, they would come out and talk to us everyday while we were out and constantly offered to help us in anyway they could.
Disposition of local security: There were no ANSF observed during the patrol.
O. HCA Products Distributed: During the initial Leader engagement we distributed about 30 notebooks, 40 afghan pitchers, 40 boxes of tea, and 15 cans of infant formula. We also gave 8 radios, 5 bags of rice, and 9 blankets to the people of Akbardin khala because they had been so helpful to us while securing the IED site.
P. PSYOP Products Distributed: None.
Q. Atmospherics: (reception of HCA, reactions to ANSF and Coalition forces, etc): The people of Kulkunday were hesitant to come to us at first until we told a local boy to go tell his friends we had some stuff to give them and we wanted to speak to the elder about 30 children came running over but very few men came out to greet us, a young man told us that all the men were in the mosque for prayer. While securing the IED in Akbardin Khala, the villagers were very willing to come out and talk to us, and brought us Tea and offered us food. On 12 Mar the elders from Akbardin Khala, Sabey Khala, Godikhel, and Kulkunday all came over and said how glad they were that we were there making their villages safer.
R. Reconstruction Projects QA/QC: None
S. Afghan Conservation Corps nominations/Status: None
T. Conclusion and Recommendation (Patrol Leader): (Include to what extent the mission was accomplished and recommendations as to patrol equipment and tactics.)
Mission accomplished. Patrol conducted successful leader engagement in Kulkunday and then conducted overwatch on IED site as a follow on mission. Based off of 4 days of interaction with the villagers of Kulkunday, Godikehl, Akbardin Khala, and Sabey Kala these villages are very pro- coalition forces, recommend forther H/A distros and pushing CA projects to the area (there is one school in Kulkunday) such as a clinic would definably show the people of theses villages the commitment of Coalition and Afghan forces to there security.
Report key: C9AAF555-DB9B-4289-B3EF-021302599E26
Tracking number: 2007-072-135454-0592
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: TF CATAMOUNT (2-87)
Unit name: 2-87 IR /ORGUN-E
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWB2649921300
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN