The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20061201n484 | RC EAST | 34.7609787 | 70.14582825 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2006-12-01 00:12 | Non-Combat Event | Meeting - Security | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Meeting with Governor Mangal to Discuss upcoming operation and security situation.
Discussion Items
1. Lack of progress/availability of ANAP, ASP, and heavy weapons for ANP. Need for ANA support to achieve a sustainable presence.
2. Need for governor and other officials to participate in shuras and to make recorded messages and radio broadcasts during operation urging cooperation with government.
3. Identifying who the individuals are in the northern Alishang and Mayl Valleys that we want to bolster, due to some concerns expressed by the governor over some elders who have recently visited both his office and the PRT.
Media Comments: None for this meeting, but CA leader, CPT Christian brought up the issue of media reporters visiting the area during the operations to report on the good work the government and coalition are doing.
PRT Assessment: Today the Mehtar Lam PRT commander met with Governor Mangal and the ANA Kandak XO regarding security, Operation WEST HAMMER, and GoA follow-on plans. This meeting lasted approximately 2 hours and 45
minutes. Meeting was centered around three main issues:
1. Lack of progress/availability of ANAP, ASP, and heavy weapons for ANP. Need for ANA support to achieve a sustainable presence.
2. Need for governor and other officials to participate in shuras and to make recorded messages and radio broadcasts during operation urging cooperation with government.
3. Identifying who the individuals are in the northern Alishang and Mayl Valleys that we want to bolster, due to some concerns expressed by the governor over some elders who have recently visited both his office and the PRT.
On issue 1, the Governor and Kandak XO agreed and the Governor is going to address the idea of keeping ANA mortars and heavy weapons at the new patrol base with the Corps and MOD. PRT commander stressed the point that the ANP will be sitting ducks and unable to defend their fortified position from enemy mortar fire without the ANA support.
On issue 2, the Governor does not like the idea of giving speeches and doing a bunch of PRT CA work while we are conducting offensive operations 3 km away. He believes that this will create mistrust of the PRT and that no one will come to see us while there is fighting going on close by. He would rather see the kinetic force just go in and pound the bad guys. That said, he agreed to make radio announcements and have other government officials do the same, and to see about holding some shuras to encourage cooperation and stress that peaceful people will get reconstruction aid and the GoA and CF forces will only fight if attacked. He also agreed to contact MRRD regarding the possibility of new projects for the AO, funded by GoA.
One problem with this is that we are out of the GoA budget cycle right now, which does not start again for about 4 months.
On issue 3, PRT reviewed a list of members of the unofficial Alishang district council that was received earlier in the week from Mullah Nabi Jan Gamkhoor (from Shamyar in Mayl valley but lives in Ali Kheyl, just outside the FOB). The governor noted that a couple of the men were good men. He considers Gamkhoor a senior HiG member and not to be trusted. He considers Zabet Mohammed Ashraf of Gonapal to be better, but still an enemy. Gov. reports that both of these men have sons who work and fight with Pashtoon. On a scale of 1-10 with one the worst, he gave Gamkhoor a 1 and Ashraf a 4. The Governor took the rest of the names and said he is going to ask his people for information about them. Regarding the 40 day workers required for the VPB construction, the Governor is going to contact 2-3 key elders in the Gonapal and Mayl valleys, and the village of Qal-eh Najil on the morning of the first movements to Dumlam and have them round up 12-14 workers each and have them bring them to the VPB area. The intent is to get the elders there to meet with the PRT commander while the other men begin to work. Hopefully the meeting will result in the elders spreading the word to cooperate with the PRT and ANSF visits to hold peaceful shuras that will result in some immediate reconstruction aid if security guarantees can be obtained in writing. Regarding the Governors lack of trust for just about everyone up in the WEST HAMMER AO, we discussed the strategy of identifying those elders with influence who we might be able to swing to the side of supporting the government by initiating projects through them in order to bolster their prestige in their villages. The intent is to hopefully gain initial cooperation with the government that will result in tangible benefit to the local people, who will in turn encourage the leader to stop fighting and work more closely with the government to get more development. The governor liked the idea, but is still wary of trusting anyone up north.
Both men stated that there are enemies up there who will fight us no matter what we do for them simply because we are Americans, infidels, and dont belong here. When asked what would happen if the ANA were to go up there by themselves with a big bag of money to provide reconstruction, the XO said that they would get attacked also, because they represent the government and the government is seen by many as evil and corrupt because they cooperate with non-muslims. After the Governor departed the Kandak XO and I spoke about the enemy situation. The XO is a relative of Ahmad Shah Massoud and is from Panjshir, where he fought under Massoud against the Soviets and the Taliban. He asked if I was familiar with Panjshir and if I knew why things were peaceful there. I replied that it was because the people there had taken charge of their valley and did not allow enemies to come in and get a foothold to cause trouble. He said that was correct so I asked him If 80-90% of the people are good and want a better life, why dont they take charge of their valley and drive out the people who are causing trouble? The XO replied Because in that area, it is the other way, 90% of the people are enemies. Both the XO and the Governor were in agreement that there are too many enemy forces up there to succeed, and that they will likely retreat up the valleys in the face of strength and mass to attack where they can, most likely from the Mayl while the main force is in the Gonapal.
ODA operations were not discussed. Operations north of the Gonapal up into Dowlat Shah were not discussed.
Report key: B0982C60-F1EA-4320-B632-D67BBCF9760F
Tracking number: 2007-033-010449-0834
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: -
Unit name: -
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SXD0486447135
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN