The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20061110n451 | RC EAST | 32.477108 | 68.74184418 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2006-11-10 00:12 | Non-Combat Event | ANP Training | NEUTRAL | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
On 7 Nov 2006 the MPs arrived at the Mota Khan to conduct three days of ANP training. The MPs spoke to the CoP and assistant CoP they voiced many concerns. 1st the Mota Khan ANP only have one Hilux truck. They are called on for many escort missions, and the one vehicle makes those missions hard to accomplish. Also, while they are escorting the governor to Gardez and Kabul, the remaining ANP have no vehicle to patrol. The second issue that the CoP voiced was fuel. The CoP said because of the escort missions they run for the government they use up their fuel allotment, and end up buying fuel with their own money. The CoP has two new ANP, and sent them to Sharan to receive pistols. The ANP were told that the government has no more pistols to issue out. The MPs know that there are more pistols in the connex in Sharan, and would like to see the government start issuing and tracking their own weapons. The last issue the CoP brought to our attentions dealt with the pistols. They were told that two ANP that lost their pistols were just sentenced to one year in jail and fined 23,000 Afghanis, and now his ANP are scared to carry their pistols. The MPs told them that they need to carry their pistols, and keep track of them at all times. They were also worried that they would be arrested if the Taliban stole their pistols. The MPs told them that it would be judged on a case by case basis. The ANP agreed to start carrying their pistols again. There were only 10 ANP present for the three days of training. The rest of the ANP were either on vacation or escorting the sub governor. The station was clean and well kept, and the ANPs weapons were also clean. All the ANP were in uniform, and all were ready to patrol. These ANP seemed motivated to work and fight. They had one DISHKA that was inoperable. The MPs
were unable to assess the problem with the weapon, but the next time they train Mota Khan, they will attempt to repair the weapon. The local populace seemed to like the ANP. While performing a short joint patrol the shop owners came out to talk to the ANP, and it seemed like they have a good relationship with the local populace. While conducting a joint vehicle check point with the ANP, the MPs were impressed by the abilities of the Mota Khan ANP. The ANP set up a defile and their security with no help from the MPs. Also, they conducted vehicle and personnel searches with little help from the MP. When asked about how often they perform checkpoint, the ANP stated that they perform them often. Overall the Mota Khan ANP are some of the most professional ANP in Paktika Province. The ANP were trained on the following classes: Weapons Safety (AK-47, 9MM, Shotgun); Weapons Maintenance (AK-47, 9MM, Shotgun); Levels of force/Use of Force; Movement under direct contact/ Fire control; Vehicle search; Personnel search; Check point operations; Cordon/Search (knock)
MOUT operations; React to contact (mounted/dismounted); Employment of weapons systems; Unarmed self defense
Community policing/ PIO. The ANP understood the classes, and were able to perform the tasks with minimal assistance from the MPs. One student, Gul Aziz, knew all the material before the MPs taught the classes. He has been with the Mota Khan police for three years. Aziz helped other students learn the classes, and seemed be a natural leader. In one example we had the ANP set up a vehicle checkpoint, and with no guidance from the MPs they set up a defile and their own security. The ANP were able to perform a well executed checkpoint. Gul Aziz will make an excellent leader. He should be given a promotion and pay raise to ensure he continued service with the Mota Khan ANP
Report key: 6E691803-7261-40D2-8395-7DA9055D9AF2
Tracking number: 2007-033-010911-0903
Attack on: NEUTRAL
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: -
Unit name: -
Type of unit: None Selected
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SVA7574393351
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: GREEN