The Afghan War Diary (AWD for short) consists of messages from several important US military communications systems. The messaging systems have changed over time; as such reporting standards and message format have changed as well. This reading guide tries to provide some helpful hints on interpretation and understanding of the messages contained in the AWD.
Most of the messages follow a pre-set structure that is designed to make automated processing of the contents easier. It is best to think of the messages in the terms of an overall collective logbook of the Afghan war. The AWD contains the relevant events, occurrences and intelligence experiences of the military, shared among many recipients. The basic idea is that all the messages taken together should provide a full picture of a days important events, intelligence, warnings, and other statistics. Each unit, outpost, convoy, or other military action generates report about relevant daily events. The range of topics is rather wide: Improvised Explosives Devices encountered, offensive operations, taking enemy fire, engagement with possible hostile forces, talking with village elders, numbers of wounded, dead, and detained, kidnappings, broader intelligence information and explicit threat warnings from intercepted radio communications, local informers or the afghan police. It also includes day to day complaints about lack of equipment and supplies.
The description of events in the messages is often rather short and terse. To grasp the reporting style, it is helpful to understand the conditions under which the messages are composed and sent. Often they come from field units who have been under fire or under other stressful conditions all day and see the report-writing as nasty paperwork, that needs to be completed with little apparent benefit to expect. So the reporting is kept to the necessary minimum, with as little type-work as possible. The field units also need to expect questions from higher up or disciplinary measures for events recorded in the messages, so they will tend to gloss over violations of rules of engagement and other problematic behavior; the reports are often detailed when discussing actions or interactions by enemy forces. Once it is in the AWD messages, it is officially part of the record - it is subject to analysis and scrutiny. The truthfulness and completeness especially of descriptions of events must always be carefully considered. Circumstances that completely change the meaning of an reported event may have been omitted.
The reports need to answer the critical questions: Who, When, Where, What, With whom, by what Means and Why. The AWD messages are not addressed to individuals but to groups of recipients that are fulfilling certain functions, such as duty officers in a certain region. The systems where the messages originate perform distribution based on criteria like region, classification level and other information. The goal of distribution is to provide those with access and the need to know, all of the information that relevant to their duties. In practice, this seems to be working imperfectly. The messages contain geo-location information in the forms of latitude-longitude, military grid coordinates and region.
The messages contain a large number of abbreviations that are essential to understanding its contents. When browsing through the messages, underlined abbreviations pop up an little explanation, when the mouse is hovering over it. The meanings and use of some shorthands have changed over time, others are sometimes ambiguous or have several meanings that are used depending on context, region or reporting unit. If you discover the meaning of a so far unresolved acronym or abbreviations, or if you have corrections, please submit them to wl-editors@sunshinepress.org.
An especially helpful reference to names of military units and task-forces and their respective responsibilities can be found at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/enduring-freedom.htm
The site also contains a list of bases, airfields http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/afghanistan.htm Location names are also often shortened to three-character acronyms.
Messages may contain date and time information. Dates are mostly presented in either US numeric form (Year-Month-Day, e.g. 2009-09-04) or various Euro-style shorthands (Day-Month-Year, e.g. 2 Jan 04 or 02-Jan-04 or 2jan04 etc.).
Times are frequently noted with a time-zone identifier behind the time, e.g. "09:32Z". Most common are Z (Zulu Time, aka. UTC time zone), D (Delta Time, aka. UTC + 4 hours) and B (Bravo Time, aka UTC + 2 hours). A full list off time zones can be found here: http://www.timeanddate.com/library/abbreviations/timezones/military/
Other times are noted without any time zone identifier at all. The Afghanistan time zone is AFT (UTC + 4:30), which may complicate things further if you are looking up messages based on local time.
Finding messages relating to known events may be complicated by date and time zone shifting; if the event is in the night or early morning, it may cause a report to appear to be be misfiled. It is advisable to always look through messages before and on the proceeding day for any event.
David Leigh, the Guardian's investigations editor, explains the online tools they have created to help you understand the secret US military files on the war in Afghanistan: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/datablog/video/2010/jul/25/afghanistan-war-logs-video-tutorial
Reference ID | Region | Latitude | Longitude |
---|---|---|---|
AFG20040110n8 | RC EAST | 33.54693985 | 69.08389282 |
Date | Type | Category | Affiliation | Detained |
---|---|---|---|---|
2004-01-10 00:12 | Friendly Action | Cache Found/Cleared | FRIEND | 0 |
Enemy | Friend | Civilian | Host nation | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Killed in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Wounded in action | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
USSF RECOVERS CACHE IVO SAHAK (GARDEZ) ON 07 JAN 04 USSF SEARCHED 2 COMPOUNDS FOR A SUSPECTED AMMUNITION CACHE SITE IVO THE VILLAGE OF SAHAK. COMPOUND 1 IS LOCATED AT 333248.61N 0690502.43E AND COMPOUND 2 IS LOCATED AT N 333218.58N 0690445.31E.
(S//REL TO USA AND GCTF) IN COMPOUND #1 THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE RECOVERED: 1 X RCIED (TRANSMITTER, RECEIVER W/ BLASTING CAP, EXPLOSIVE DEVICE), POMZ STICK MINE BODY, 1 X .303 ENFIELD RIFLE, 1 X AK47, 4 X AK47 MAGAZINES, 1 X BOX & 1 X BAG OF 7.62 AMMUNITION, 1 X BOX OF .303 AMMUNITION AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS, DOCUMENTS AND PICTURES. INITIAL REVIEW OF DOCUMENT EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE ROOM OF NAZAR KHAN AND SAID MOHAMMAD SHOWS LETTER TO/FROM SAMOOT AND NAZAR KHAN AS WELL AS TB RECEIPTS FOR WEAPONS. (A FULL REPORT IS EXPECTED).
(S//REL TO USA AND GCTF) THE RCIED WAS FOUND BURIED APPROXIMATELY 6" UNDERGROUND, WRAPPED IN A PLASTIC BAG. COMPONENTS WERE A WIRELESS DOORBELL TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER. THE ACTUAL EXPLOSIVE WAS CONTAINED INSIDE A METAL PIPE. BOTH THE TRANSMITTER AND RECEIVER HAD BEEN MODIFIED (TRANSISTORS AND CAPACITORS SOLDERED TO CIRCUIT BOARDS) TO INCREASE THE RANGE OF THE DEVICE. THE BUZZER/SPEAKER HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM THE RECEIVER AND REPLACED WITH A NON-ELECTRIC DETONATOR (MODIFIED WITH AN ELECTRIC SQUIB AND WIRE LEADS). THE PUSH BUTTON ON THE TRANSMITTER CASE WAS REMOVED TO EXPOSE A RECESSED MICRO-SWITCH TO PREVENT ACCIDENTAL INITIATION OF DEVICE. THERE IS NO BRAND NAME ON THE UNIT, BUT IT STATES CHANNEL 301 ON BOTH PIECES. A 9-VOLT BATTERY POWERED THE TRANSMITTER AND 2 AA BATTERIES POWERED THE RECEIVER. THE PIPE BOMB IS 200MM IN LENGTH AND 50MM IN DIAMETER. EOD ASSESSMENT IS THAT THIS IED WAS FULLY FUNCTIONAL AND THE PIPE WAS POSSIBLY DESIGNED AS A BOOSTER TO BE USED IN THE FUSE WELL OF A LARGE MUNITION. SMALL PIECES OF CLOTH WERE TIED INTO THE BRANCHES OF A TREE ABOVE THE BURIED IED. THIS IS BELIEVED TO BE A FLAG/LOAD SIGNAL FOR HELP IN LOCATING THE DEVICE.
(S//REL TO USA AND GCTF) I
Report key: 74DF2C92-A6D1-41C5-98FB-902149F1B59E
Tracking number: 2007-033-004738-0998
Attack on: FRIEND
Complex atack: FALSE
Reporting unit: OTHER
Unit name: OTHER
Type of unit: Coalition
Originator group: UNKNOWN
Updated by group: UNKNOWN
MGRS: 42SWC0778811927
CCIR:
Sigact:
DColor: BLUE