SAUDI ARABIA: 1999 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003810

DEPT FOR S/CT FOR REAP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1999 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

REF: STATE 204472


1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS
SET FORTH IN REFTEL.


A. DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY
TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF
DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1999, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE
GIVEN TO HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST
OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL.
THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE
SAUDI SUSPECTS LINKED TO THE BOMBING. THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR
QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE KINGDOM. THE SAG
IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN
CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING. NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC
LEGAL ACTION BEGAN IN 1999 REGARDING ANY SUSPECTS INVOLVED IN THE
BOMBING. THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS THAT
CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1999.


B. DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION
OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR?
PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES.

RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI
AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997. CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL-
SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE
1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK. CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE
UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBOLLAH WERE
PRESENTED TO THE COURT. THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF
AL-SAYEGH FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. FOLLOWING A LENGTHY
PERIOD OF REVIEW, HEARINGS BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
(INS) JUDGE, AND SEVERAL APPEALS TO FEDERAL COURTS IN 1999, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINALIZED THE EXTRADITION CASE IN LATE
SEPTEMBER AND THE U.S. DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA ON
OCTOBER 11, 1999. THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS
REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN EXTRADITE
SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN LADEN. BIN
LADEN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, WAS
INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U.S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN NEW
YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL
CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U.S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL U.S. CITIZENS
INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON AUGUST
7, 1998. SAG OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THE REPORTS OF THE EXTRADITION
REQUEST.


C. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT
PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS.

RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S
PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS
WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES
OUTSIDE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE LEAGUE'S
ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES.


D. DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION.
THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A
TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST
GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.

RESPONSE: THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE,
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION,
ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY
CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING
IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM. IN A NOVEMBER
1999 INTERVIEW THE CROWN PRINCE AGAIN STATED THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS
ARE UN-ISLAMIC AND CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERTED EFFORT TO
WIPE OUT THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM. THE SAG CONTINUES TO
INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING AND HAS CONTINUED TO
COOPERATE WITH THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING.


E. DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1999 BY
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL
FORA.

RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR
TOWERS BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO
STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL,
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN
EAST AFRICA, A THREAT AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES IN OCTOBER 1998, AND
AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF DESERT FOX IN DECEMBER 1998.
ADDITIONALLY, IN JANUARY 1998, THE SAG JOINED THE ARAB LEAGUE
INTERIOR MINISTERS IN THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST
COOPERATION ACCORD. THE AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF
INTERIOR MINISTERS IN RIYADH IN SEPTEMBER 1998. AT A NOVEMBER 1999
MEETING OF THE GULF COOPERATION STATES (GCC),THE INTERIOR
MINISTERS OF MEMBER STATES, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, DECIDED TO FORM
A COMMITTEE TO WORK OUT A STRATEGY TO FIGHT TERRORISM. THE
COMMITTEE IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AND SECURITY
COORDINATION AMONGST MEMBER STATES AND SHOULD ENABLE MORE
COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREAT INFORMATION. PRINCE SULTAN,
MINISTER OF DEFENSE, STATED DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1999 VISIT TO
WASHINGTON THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE
UNITED STATES TO DEFEAT TERRORISM.


F. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING
(BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS
AND THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC
RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC
PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE
PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR
TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON
TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA.

RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY SUPPORT
INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. ITS
REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE
VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT
CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. HOWEVER, IT IS
NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED. THERE
CONTINUE TO BE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN
SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAG LEADERSHIP CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM
AND TERRORIST ACTS AS BEING CONTRARY TO ISLAM.


G. HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT
OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN
GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF
TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND
SUDAN.)

RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE
SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST
ISSUE.


H. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1998, POSITIVE OR
NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM,
INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE?

RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS CONTINUED TO HAVE A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF
THE TERRORIST THREAT AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S.
EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA. IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST AFRICA
ATTACKS, AS WELL AS THE ATTACKS ON SAUDI SOIL IN 1995 AND 1996
AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS AND PERSONNEL, SAG OFFICIALS WORLDWIDE HAVE
STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM. THE SAG, AT THE
DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CROWN PRINCE, HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH
THE U.S. TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE
SAG, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GCC, HAS FORMED AN ANTI-
TERRORISM COMMITTEE, CALLED THE SECURITY STRATEGY COMMITTEE, AIMED
AT COORDINATING INFORMATION AND COOPERATION AMONG MEMBER STATES.
THE SAG IS FULLY COMPLYING WITH THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST THE TALEBAN REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN,
INCLUDING THE TERMINATION OF ARIANA AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO JEDDAH. THE
SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN
LADEN FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN
ANOTHER COUNTRY.


I. DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH
THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE
HOST GOVERNMENT FOR SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED
STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION
WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH
THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS.

RESPONSE: BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG
INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG
BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED,
COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND
SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE
PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES. THIS INTEREST AND
PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT

1999. THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI
INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI
COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO
OCCURRED. U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE MET IN THE CONTEXT OF
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT
TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. COOPERATION BETWEEN
THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE 1998 EAST AFRICA
BOMBINGS. THE FBI COORDINATES ITS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL
ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY.


J. IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN
ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CITIZENS
OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON:

(I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS
COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND
PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT;
AND
(II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS
COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE
UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH
THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS. IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL
22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING THE
OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995. THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31,

1996. THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLY
COOPERATION WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS. SAUDI
OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY
INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONSULT CLOSELY
WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION.
SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG, ESPECIALLY
THE FBI, IN COORDINATING THE OCTOBER EXTRADITION OF HANI AL-SAYEGH
IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS
BOMBING.

(II) THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND
FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS
FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND A
SPECIFIC THREAT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN OCTOBER 1998. IT MADE
AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL
KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED,
AND A RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH
FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF
DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE
SECURITY. THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO
ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI
ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES
GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN. USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE
HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY
OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA.


K. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING
THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF TERRORISM
AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO
WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN
PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE
HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY.

RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS
DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE
CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST
AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM. REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO
THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT
OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE
DETERRENTS.


FOWLER