SAUDI ARABIA: 1999 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 003810 DEPT FOR S/CT FOR REAP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER SA SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1999 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 204472 ¶1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS SET FORTH IN REFTEL. ¶A. DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1999, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONS RELATING TO TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST COUNTRY ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST OR AFFECTING U.S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. RESPONSE: THE SAG CONTINUES ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. THE SAG HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT IT IS STILL LOOKING FOR THREE SAUDI SUSPECTS LINKED TO THE BOMBING. THE THREE ARE WANTED FOR QUESTIONING AND ARE BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE OF THE KINGDOM. THE SAG IS STILL HOLDING A NUMBER OF SAUDI CITIZENS IN DETENTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING. NO PROSECUTION OR ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION BEGAN IN 1999 REGARDING ANY SUSPECTS INVOLVED IN THE BOMBING. THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1999. ¶B. DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO U.S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997. CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL- SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK. CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBOLLAH WERE PRESENTED TO THE COURT. THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THE EXTRADITION OF AL-SAYEGH FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. FOLLOWING A LENGTHY PERIOD OF REVIEW, HEARINGS BEFORE AN IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION (INS) JUDGE, AND SEVERAL APPEALS TO FEDERAL COURTS IN 1999, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE FINALIZED THE EXTRADITION CASE IN LATE SEPTEMBER AND THE U.S. DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA ON OCTOBER 11, 1999. THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN EXTRADITE SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN LADEN. BIN LADEN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, WAS INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U.S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN NEW YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U.S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL U.S. CITIZENS INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON AUGUST 7, 1998. SAG OFFICIALS HAVE DENIED THE REPORTS OF THE EXTRADITION REQUEST. ¶C. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS FEW EXTRADITION TREATIES OUTSIDE OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE ARAB LEAGUE AND THE LEAGUE'S ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT, WHICH CONTAINS EXTRADITION ARTICLES. ¶D. DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. THESE WOULD INCLUDE, BUT ARE NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. RESPONSE: THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY REFUTING IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM. IN A NOVEMBER 1999 INTERVIEW THE CROWN PRINCE AGAIN STATED THAT TERRORIST ACTIONS ARE UN-ISLAMIC AND CALLED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONCERTED EFFORT TO WIPE OUT THE PHENOMENON OF TERRORISM. THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING AND HAS CONTINUED TO COOPERATE WITH THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING. ¶E. DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1999 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN THE INTERNATIONAL FORA. RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN PROTECTION OF U.S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN EAST AFRICA, A THREAT AGAINST U.S. FACILITIES IN OCTOBER 1998, AND AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF DESERT FOX IN DECEMBER 1998. ADDITIONALLY, IN JANUARY 1998, THE SAG JOINED THE ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR MINISTERS IN THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION ACCORD. THE AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF INTERIOR MINISTERS IN RIYADH IN SEPTEMBER 1998. AT A NOVEMBER 1999 MEETING OF THE GULF COOPERATION STATES (GCC),THE INTERIOR MINISTERS OF MEMBER STATES, INCLUDING SAUDI ARABIA, DECIDED TO FORM A COMMITTEE TO WORK OUT A STRATEGY TO FIGHT TERRORISM. THE COMMITTEE IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE COOPERATION AND SECURITY COORDINATION AMONGST MEMBER STATES AND SHOULD ENABLE MORE COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF THREAT INFORMATION. PRINCE SULTAN, MINISTER OF DEFENSE, STATED DURING HIS NOVEMBER 1999 VISIT TO WASHINGTON THAT SAUDI ARABIA WAS COMMITTED TO WORKING WITH THE UNITED STATES TO DEFEAT TERRORISM. ¶F. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR THE PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT POLITICALLY OR FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES. HOWEVER, IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THESE REGULATIONS ARE CONSISTENTLY ENFORCED. THERE CONTINUE TO BE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAG LEADERSHIP CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM AND TERRORIST ACTS AS BEING CONTRARY TO ISLAM. ¶G. HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND SUDAN.) RESPONSE: THE SAG MADE NO PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE. ¶H. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1998, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS CONTINUED TO HAVE A HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF THE TERRORIST THREAT AFTER THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBINGS OF U.S. EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA. IN RESPONSE TO THE EAST AFRICA ATTACKS, AS WELL AS THE ATTACKS ON SAUDI SOIL IN 1995 AND 1996 AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS AND PERSONNEL, SAG OFFICIALS WORLDWIDE HAVE STATED THEIR DETERMINATION TO FIGHT TERRORISM. THE SAG, AT THE DIRECT INSTRUCTIONS OF THE CROWN PRINCE, HAS WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE U.S. TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAG, IN CONCERT WITH OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GCC, HAS FORMED AN ANTI- TERRORISM COMMITTEE, CALLED THE SECURITY STRATEGY COMMITTEE, AIMED AT COORDINATING INFORMATION AND COOPERATION AMONG MEMBER STATES. THE SAG IS FULLY COMPLYING WITH THE SANCTIONS IMPOSED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL AGAINST THE TALEBAN REGIME IN AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING THE TERMINATION OF ARIANA AIRLINE FLIGHTS TO JEDDAH. THE SAUDIS HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED ON THE TALEBAN TO EXPEL USAMA BIN LADEN FROM AFGHAN TERRITORY SO THAT HE MAY BE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. ¶I. DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR SPECIFIC COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS. RESPONSE: BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED, COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES. THIS INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT ¶1999. THE USG AND SAG CONTINUE TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED. U.S. AND SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE MET IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE TRANS-NATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY AND INDIRECTLY. COOPERATION BETWEEN THE USG AND SAG INCREASED FURTHER AFTER THE 1998 EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. THE FBI COORDINATES ITS INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR AND MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U.S. EMBASSY. ¶J. IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: (I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT; AND (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS. IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL 22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING THE OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995. THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31, ¶1996. THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLY COOPERATION WAS NOT AT THE LEVEL EXPECTED BY USG OFFICIALS. SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI CONTINUE TO WORK CLOSELY ON MANY INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONSULT CLOSELY WITH EACH OTHER ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR BOMBING INVESTIGATION. SAUDI OFFICIALS HAVE ALSO WORKED CLOSELY WITH THE USG, ESPECIALLY THE FBI, IN COORDINATING THE OCTOBER EXTRADITION OF HANI AL-SAYEGH IN ORDER TO ASSIST IN THE INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. (II) THE SAG CONTINUES TO DEVOTE CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS, AND A SPECIFIC THREAT TO THE U.S. EMBASSY IN OCTOBER 1998. IT MADE AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST U.S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO ENHANCE SECURITY. THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U.S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN. USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. ¶K. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF TERRORISM AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS DIRECTED AT U.S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM. REPORTED THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE DETERRENTS. FOWLER