Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
99DAMASCUS4200
1999-08-09 11:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Damascus
Cable title:  

BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST?

Tags:  PREL PGOV SY 
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P 091155Z AUG 99
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7588
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004200 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/09
TAGS: PREL PGOV SY
SUBJECT: BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST?
U.S. VIEW OF BASHAR IMPORTANT TO ASAD

REF: A) DAMASCUS 4043, B) DAMASCUS 0997

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASON 1.5 (B)
AND (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DAMASCUS 004200 E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/09 TAGS: PREL PGOV SY SUBJECT: BASHAR'S INTRO TO THE WEST? U.S. VIEW OF BASHAR IMPORTANT TO ASAD REF: A) DAMASCUS 4043, B) DAMASCUS 0997 CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASON 1.5 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A SOURCE CLOSE TO BASHAR AL-ASAD TOLD US AUGUST 5 THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD APPROVED A MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT MAGAZINE INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR, SCHEDULED TO BE PUBLISHED IN SEPTEMBER. THE SAME SOURCE, A BASHAR LOYALIST, PROBED US ON HOW THE U.S. VIEWED THE HEIR- APPARENT AND SEEMED INTENT ON HEARING ABOUT HOW TO IMPROVE BASHAR'S IMAGE WITH THE U.S. IF THE INTERVIEW COMES OFF, IT MAY SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A SARG- ORCHESTRATED "SELL JOB" OF BASHAR TO THE WEST, AND TO THE U.S. IN PARTICULAR. MEANWHILE, RUMORS INDICATE THAT BASHAR STILL FACES SOME INTERNAL OBSTACLES, POSSIBLY AMONG ALAWIS. WE SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR POSTURE ON BASHAR IN THE MONTHS TO COME. END SUMMARY. MEI INTERVIEW WITH BASHAR? -------------- ¶2. (C) AN AMERICAN-BASED, SYRIAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO BASHAR AL-ASAD TOLD US AUGUST 5 THAT PRESIDENT ASAD HAD GIVEN HIS APPROVAL FOR BASHAR TO BE INTERVIEWED BY MIDDLE EAST INSIGHT (MEI) MAGAZINE, FOR THE SEPTEMBER ISSUE. THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST INTERVIEW GRANTED BY BASHAR TO A WESTERN PUBLICATION, ALTHOUGH A LENGTHY INTERVIEW WITH THE LEBANESE NEWSPAPER AL-KIFAH AL-'ARABI APPEARED IN FEBRUARY (REF B). ACCORDING TO THIS BUSINESS CONTACT, WHO STATED CREDIBLY THAT HE HAD MET WITH BASHAR DURING THE PRECEEDING WEEK, IT HAD BEEN AGREED WITH MEI THAT THE QUESTIONS WOULD BE SUBMITTED IN ADVANCE AND THAT THE INTERVIEW WOULD BE APPROVED BY THE SARG BEFORE ITS PUBLICATION. ¶3. (C) THIS CONTACT, A BASHAR LOYALIST WHO SAYS HE WOULD RETURN TO WORK FOR THE SARG UNDER BASHAR'S DIRECTION, SAID THAT ASAD IS LOOKING FOR "CERTAIN CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENTS" IN WHICH TO INCREASE HIS SON'S EXPOSURE AND STATURE. WHILE THIS CONTACT REMAINS CONCERNED THAT SYRIA LACKS THE FORWARD-THINKING TECHNO-AND BUREAUCRATS NEEDED TO EFFECT CHANGE HERE (REF A),HE SEEMS CONVINCED THAT BASHAR PERSONALLY WOULD LIKE TO MOVE TOWARDS A MORE OPEN AND EFFICIENT SYSTEM. BASHAR NEEDS U.S. BLESSING -------------- ¶4. (C) DURING OUR EXCHANGE, THIS CONTACT ASKED AS BLATANTLY AS WE HAVE HEARD THUS FAR HOW THE U.S. VIEWED BASHAR, AND ASKED FOR OUR ADVICE ON WAYS BASHAR'S IMAGE COULD BE PROMOTED IN THE U.S. WE ANSWERED THAT A CONSIDERED OPINION WAS IMPOSS
IBLE SINCE FEW AMERICANS HAD EVER MET HIM, MUCH LESS EVALUATED HIM AS A FUTURE PRESIDENT. HE ASKED FOR OUR OPINION ON THE UPCOMING MEI INTERVIEW, WHICH WE SAID WOULD BE USEFUL (AS WALID MU'ALLIM'S HAD BEEN) IF IT PROVIDED "REAL QUESTIONS AND REAL ANSWERS," AND NOT OBVIOUSLY PRE-PACKAGED STATEMENTS. A LEGITIMACY "VACUUM" -------------- ¶5. (C) SEVERAL PRO-BASHAR AND/OR U.S-LEANING INTERLOCUTORS HAVE INQUIRED MORE SUBTLY THAN THIS ARTICULATE BUSINESS CONTACT ABOUT U.S. VIEWS TOWARD THE HEIR APPARENT, APPARENTLY LOOKING FOR POSITIVE SIGNALS FROM US ABOUT OUR FUTURE RELATIONSHIP WITH HIM. A FORMER MP WHO MAINTAINS REGULAR CONTACT WITH US AND THE BRITISH EMBASSY EXPANDED ON THE THEME IN A RECENT CONVERSATION. HE SAID THE REGIME IS CLEARLY WORRIED ABOUT A "VACUUM IN LEGITIMACY" AFTER AN ANTICIPATED PEACE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL, SINCE SO MUCH OF ASAD'S INTERNAL AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL STANDING STEMS FROM THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL. IN THE ABSENCE OF THIS CRUTCH, ASAD IS INTENT ON SECURING FOR BASHAR THE KIND OF SUPPORT THAT JORDANIAN KING ABDULLAH RECEIVED FROM THE U.S. AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER. SUCH SUPPORT WOULD WIN FINANCIAL GAINS, AND MORE IMPORTANTLY, INTERNATIONAL LEGITIMACY FOR THE NEW BASHAR REGIME, AMELIORATING BOTH INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL THREATS. STILL LACKING SOME CREDENTIALS -------------- ¶6. (C) MEANWHILE, CONTACTS INDICATE WITHOUT ELABORATING THAT BASHAR STILL FACES SOME RESISTANCE AMONG THE ALAWI ELITE, SOME OF WHOM DOUBT THAT BASHAR IS CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING THE SYSTEM THAT HAS LONG BENEFITED THIS RULING MINORITY. (INTERESTINGLY, CHRISTIANS AND MOST OTHER RELIGIOUS MINORITIES HAVE EXPRESSED OPEN SUPPORT FOR BASHAR IN THE FERVENT HOPE THAT HE WILL MAINTAIN ASAD'S "LIVE AND LET LIVE" APPROACH TOWARDS MINORITY RELIGIOUS GROUPS.) WHILE IT IS NO LONGER TABOO TO SPEAK OPENLY ABOUT BASHAR AS A SUCCESSOR TO HIS FATHER, EVEN SUPPORTERS FRET THAT HE STILL LACKS A TITLE AND AN OFFICIAL PLACE IN THE GOVERNMENT/PARTY STRUCTURE. THE COMMON WISDOM IS THAT A REGIONAL COMMAND MEETING SOMETIME IN THE FALL WILL FINALLY ELECT BASHAR INTO THE BA'TH PARTY LEADERSHIP, BUT PREPARATIONS FOR SUCH A MEETING ARE STILL NOTICEABLY ABSENT. WE NOTE AS WELL THE PERSISTENT RUMORS THAT BASHAR HAS NOT LIVED UP TO EXPECTATIONS WITH HIS HANDLING OF THE LEBANON FILE, AND THAT VP KHADDAM IS STILL PERFORMING HIS TRADITIONAL ROLE AS ARBITER AMONG THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP. FINALLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT BASHAR CONTINUES TO BE EXCLUDED FROM PEACE PROCESS RELATED ACTIVITY, WHICH REMAINS AN ASAD-SHARA AFFAIR. ¶5. (C) OTHER RESISTANCE MAY COME FROM BA'TH PARTY STALWARTS GENERALLY UNHAPPY WITH SIGNS OF CHANGE IN SYRIA AND ASAD'S DECISION TO PURSUE PEACE. A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY POLITBURO CLAIMED THAT IN A RECENT MEETING WITH THE NATIONAL PROGRESSIVE FRONT, WHICH HE ATTENDED, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE BA'TH PARTY REGIONAL COMMAND DR. SULAYMAN QADDAH MADE OPENLY CRITICAL REMARKS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS AND EVEN SPOKE RHETORICALLY ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION OF ISRAEL. WHILE THIS FORMER MP AGREED THAT THIS SENTIMENT WOULD NEVER STAND IN THE WAY OF ASAD'S DESIRE TO CONCLUDE A PEACE WITH ISRAEL, HE SAID SUCH COMMENTS REFLECTED A CERTAIN ELEMENT OF "OLD THINK" THAT WAS RELUCTANT TO EMBRACE FORWARD MOVEMENT, EVEN WITH BASHAR. ¶6. (C) COMMENT. IF THE MEI INTERVIEW COMES OFF, IT WILL MARK BASHAR'S MEDIA INTRODUCTION TO THE WEST, A SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENT IN ITSELF SINCE FEW OFFICIAL SYRIANS ARE ALLOWED SUCH ENTREE. WHILE IT MAY SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A SARG-ORCHESTRATED EFFORT TO "SELL" BASHAR TO THE WEST, AND THE UNITED STATES IN PARTICULAR, IT IS LIKELY TO BE A HIGHLY STRUCTURED AND CONTROLLED EFFORT. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SPECULATED THAT IF THE U.S. GIVES BASHAR (AND A NEW MINORITY ALAWI REGIME) ITS BLESSING, "ASAD WILL SIGN WITH ISRAEL TOMORROW." WHILE THIS LINKAGE IS TOO BOLD, WE SHOULD NOT UNDERESTIMATE HOW IMPORTANT OUR POSTURE TOWARDS BASHAR IS LIKELY TO BE, IN INCREASING MEASURE, IN THE MONTHS TO COME. ¶7. (C) THUS FAR, THE BASHAR CAMPAIGN DOES NOT INCLUDE ACTUAL CONTACT WITH AMERICAN OFFICIALS; THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE TO REQUESTS BY THE AMBASSADOR AND A NUMBER OF CODELS FOR MEETINGS. OUR WESTERN DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES HAVE HAD THE SAME EXPERIENCE, PRESUMABLY BECAUSE ASAD DOES NOT WANT POSSIBLY LESS-THAN-EFFUSIVE ASSESSMENTS TO REACH WORLD CAPITALS. FOR NOW, THEREFORE, THE ANSWER TO PROBES ABOUT OUR VIEW IS SIMPLE: --THE USG HAS HAD NO CONTACT WITH BASHAR AL-ASAD. --DECISIONS ON LEADERSHIP IN SYRIA ARE FOR SYRIANS TO MAKE, NOT AMERICANS. CROCKER

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