SAUDI ARABIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 RIYADH 004048 DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT FOR REAP E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER SA SUBJECT: SAUDI ARABIA: 1998 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: (A) STATE 202128; (B) CAIRO 03962 ¶1. THE FOLLOWING RESTATES AND RESPONDS TO EACH OF THE QUESTIONS SET FORTH IN REFTEL. ¶A. DESCRIBE THE RESPONSE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF EACH COUNTRY TO ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND/OR SIGNIFICANT ACTS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM DURING 1998, INCLUDING ANY HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION RELATING TO TERRORISM. PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT ACTIONS REGARDING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST OR AFFECTING U. S. CITIZENS OR FACILITIES. RESPONSE: THE SAG IS CONTINUING ITS INVESTIGATION OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK OF JUNE 1996 WHICH KILLED 19 U. S. MILITARY PERSONNEL. ALTHOUGH THE SAG REPORTEDLY HAS DETAINED AND INTERROGATED SAUDI CITIZENS IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMBING, IT HAS NOT YET BEGUN PROSECUTION OR TAKEN ANY OTHER PUBLIC LEGAL ACTION REGARDING ANY SUCH PERSONS. THERE WERE NO OTHER KNOWN TERRORIST CASES OR ACTIONS THAT CAME BEFORE THE JUDICIARY IN 1998. ¶B. DID THE HOST GOVERNMENT EXTRADITE OR REQUEST THE EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS FOR PROSECUTION DURING THE YEAR? PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO ¶U. S. REQUESTS FOR EXTRADITION OR ASSISTANCE IN TERRORIST CASES. RESPONSE: THE SAG REQUESTED THAT CANADA DEPORT SAUDI CITIZEN HANI AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA IN 1997. CANADIAN OFFICIALS DETAINED AL- SAYEGH IN MARCH 1997 ON CHARGES OF DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN THE JUNE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMB ATTACK. CANADA DEPORTED AL-SAYEGH TO THE UNITED STATES AFTER DOCUMENTS LINKING HIM TO SAUDI HIZBALLAH WERE PRESENTED TO THE COURT. THE SAG THEN REQUESTED THAT THE USG DEPORT AL-SAYEGH TO SAUDI ARABIA TO QUESTION AND PERHAPS PROSECUTE HIM FOR HIS ALLEGED ROLE IN THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. THE EXTRADITION CASE IS STILL PENDING FINAL DECISION WITH THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (INS). THERE HAVE BEEN MEDIA REPORTS THAT THE SAG HAS REQUESTED THAT THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN EXTRADITE SAUDI-BORN TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER USAMA BIN LADIN. BIN LADIN, WHO WAS STRIPPED OF HIS SAUDI CITIZENSHIP IN 1994, WAS INDICTED ON NOVEMBER 5, 1998 BY A U. S. FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN NEW YORK, WHICH ALLEGED THAT HE AND OTHERS ENGAGED IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONSPIRACY TO ATTACK U. S. FACILITIES AND TO KILL ¶U. S. CITIZENS INCLUDING IN NAIROBI, KENYA AND DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA ON AUGUST 7, 1998. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN REPORTS THAT SAUDI AUTHORITIES REQUESTED JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES TO EXTRADITE MUHAMMAD AL-MAQDISI, WHO IS SERVING A 15 YEAR SENTENCE IN JORDAN AND HAS BEEN LINKED TO THE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OF USAMA BIN LADIN. ¶C. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT IMPEDIMENTS TO HOST GOVERNMENT PROSECUTION AND/OR EXTRADITION OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS. RESPONSE: NO LEGAL OR POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS EXIST TO THE SAG'S PROSECUTION OF PERSONS ALLEGED TO HAVE COMMITTED TERRORIST ACTS WITHIN SAUDI ARABIA. HOWEVER, THE SAG HAS NOT ENTERED INTO EXTRADITION TREATIES WITH MOST OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES. (NOTE: EXTRADITION TREATIES EXIST WITH YEMEN AND EGYPT AND THE ARAB LEAGUE ANTI-TERRORIST AGREEMENT (REFTEL B) HAS EXTRADITION ARTICLES.) ¶D. DISCUSS HOST GOVERNMENT RESPONSES OTHER THAN PROSECUTION. THIS WOULD INCLUDE, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, PUBLIC STATEMENTS BY GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCIES FOLLOWING A TERRORIST INCIDENT (IN OR OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY) AND EFFORTS BY HOST GOVERNMENT TO INVESTIGATE TERRORIST INCIDENTS OR TO ASSIST WITH INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS. RESPONSE: THE SAG AT ALL LEVELS, INCLUDING THE KING, CROWN PRINCE, MINISTER OF INTERIOR, MINISTER OF INFORMATION, ISLAMIC ULAMA, AND OFFICIAL NEWS MEDIA PUBLICLY AND CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM IN UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS, INCLUDING BY MAKING ATTEMPTS TO ERADICATE IDEOLOGICAL/RELIGIOUS JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TERRORISM. THE CROWN PRINCE IN HIS OCTOBER WORLD TOUR MADE A POINT TO CONDEMN TERRORISM IN ALL ITS FORMS AND TO DENY THAT TERRORISM HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH ISLAM. THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING AND HAS SHOWN INCREASED COOPERATION IN ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE USG IN ITS OWN INVESTIGATION OF THE BOMBING. ¶E. DESCRIBE MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN IN 1998 BY THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING STEPS TAKEN IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. RESPONSE: INTERNALLY, THE SAG CONTINUES TO INVESTIGATE THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING. IT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN NUMEROUS MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN SECURITY PROTECTION OF U. S. MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE AUGUST BOMBINGS OF U. S. EMBASSIES IN EAST AFRICA AND A THREAT AGAINST U. S. FACILITIES IN OCTOBER. INTERNATIONALLY, AT THE TUNIS MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF ARAB LEAGUE INTERIOR MINISTERS IN JANUARY, THE SAG JOINED IN THE UNANIMOUS ADOPTION OF AN ANTI-TERRORIST COOPERATION ACCORD WHICH HAD BEEN UNDER DISCUSSION FOR FOUR YEARS. THE ACCORD AIMS TO ENHANCE INTER-ARAB COOPERATION REGARDING EXTRADITION OF CONVICTED TERRORISTS, IMPROVE INFORMATION EXCHANGES ABOUT TERRORISTS' WHEREABOUTS, FINANCES AND SUPPORT NETWORKS, AND STRENGTHEN CONTROLS ON TRAVEL AND INFILTRATION OF TERROR SUSPECTS THROUGH ARAB COUNTRIES. THE ACCORD (SEE REFTEL B),SIGNED IN CAIRO ON APRIL 22, CONTAINS A PLEDGE NOT TO ORDER, FINANCE, OR COMMIT TERRORIST ACTS, TO PREVENT TERRORIST CRIMES AND TO FIGHT AGAINST THEM. THIS AGREEMENT WAS RATIFIED BY THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IN RIYADH ON SEPTEMBER 28. AT THE 66TH SESSION OF THE GCC MINISTERIAL COUNCIL HELD IN RIYADH IN MARCH, THE GCC MINISTERS REJECTED "ALL FORMS OF VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM WHEREVER THEY COME FROM." AT A DOHA MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) MINISTERS, ALSO IN MARCH, THE MEMBERS URGED ISLAMIC COUNTRIES TO CONDEMN TERRORISM IN ALL OF ITS ASPECTS, NOT TO PROVIDE SANCTUARY FOR TERRORISTS, AND TO HELP BRING TERRORISTS TO JUSTICE. THE MINISTER OF INTERIOR CALLED ON MUSLIM COUNTRIES AND U. N. MEMBER STATES TO REACH AN ANTI-TERRORISM ACCORD SIMILAR TO THE ONE SIGNED BY ARAB LEAGUE NATIONS IN APRIL. FINALLY, AT THE UNGA 53RD SESSION IN SEPTEMBER, THE SAUDI ASSISTANT FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTED ANY LINK BETWEEN THE RELIGION OF ISLAM AND TERRORISM, AND STATED THAT "THE KINGDOM REJECTS VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM IN ANY FORM OR SHAPE." HE CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS THROUGH THE U. N. TO BRING ABOUT THE TERMINATION OF TERRORISM AND CALLED FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO FIGHT THE SHELTERING OF TERRORISTS. ¶F. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT HOST GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, TERRORISTS, OR TERRORIST GROUPS, INCLUDING (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS OR THEIR ACTIVITIES; DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT THROUGH DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION; MISUSE OF THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES TO SUPPORT TERRORISM; PROVISION OF SANCTUARY AND/OR PRESENCE OF OFFICES OF TERRORIST GROUPS; PROVISION OF TRAINING OR TRAINING SITES; PROVISION OF WEAPONS; AND POSITIONS TAKEN ON TERRORISM ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. RESPONSE: THE SAG DOES NOT FINANCIALLY SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS OR ACTIVITIES. ITS REGULATIONS REQUIRE THAT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE VOLUNTARY AGENCIES OBTAIN GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL CAUSES, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT CLEAR THAT THIS IS ENFORCED CONSISTENTLY. NONETHELESS, THERE CONTINUE TO BE ALLEGATIONS THAT SOME INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ORGANIZATION REPRESENTATIVES SOLICIT AND COLLECT PRIVATE FUNDS IN SAUDI ARABIA. THE SAG CONSISTENTLY CONDEMNS TERRORISM. HOWEVER, SHEIKH AHMAD YASIN, THE FOUNDER OF HAMAS, VISITED SAUDI ARABIA FOR HAJJ AND MEDICAL TREATMENT, AND MET CROWN PRINCE ABDULLAH IN APRIL. ¶G. HAS THE HOST GOVERNMENT MADE ANY PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF A TERRORIST-SUPPORTING COUNTRY ON A TERRORISM ISSUE? (THE SEVEN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY AS STATE SPONSORS OF TERRORISM ARE CUBA, IRAN, IRAQ, LIBYA, NORTH KOREA, SYRIA, AND SUDAN.) RESPONSE: THE SAG DID NOT MAKE ANY OFFICIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS SUPPORTING ANY OF THE SEVEN COUNTRIES ON THE USG'S TERRORISM LIST REGARDING A TERRORIST ISSUE. HOWEVER, THE SAG ALLOWED A LIBYAN AIRCRAFT CARRYING 105 HAJJ PILGRIMS TO LAND AT JEDDAH'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ON MARCH 29 AND TO DEPART THE SAME DAY, IN VIOLATION OF UNSC SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON LIBYA. ¶H. DESCRIBE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGE SINCE 1997, POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM, INTERNATIONAL OR DOMESTIC. WHAT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS CHANGE? RESPONSE: THE AUGUST 1998 BOMBING OF U. S. EMBASSIES IN DAR ES SALAAM AND NAIROBI FURTHER HEIGHTENED AWARENESS AND CONCERN ABOUT ATTEMPTS THAT MIGHT OCCUR IN SAUDI ARABIA, FOLLOWING THE 1995 AND 1996 ATTACKS AGAINST U. S. TARGETS. ALL OF THESE ATTACKS MET WITH OFFICIAL CONDEMNATION, AND HAVE SPURRED GREATER COOPERATION AMONG SAUDI SECURITY ORGANS IN ADDRESSING INTERNAL SECURITY ISSUES. THE SAG HAS SUBSTANTIALLY INTENSIFIED ITS DIALOGUE WITH GCC AND OTHER ARAB AND ISLAMIC COUNTRIES ON COMBATING TERRORISM. THE SAUDI ANTI- TERRORISM STANCE WAS GIVEN A WORLD-WIDE STAGE DURING THE CROWN PRINCE'S MONTH-LONG VISIT TO EUROPE, THE U. S., AND ASIA. THE SAUDI GOVERNMENT REMAINS CONCERNED WITH A CONTINUED TERRORIST PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, ESPECIALLY THOSE UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF USAMA BIN LADIN, A TERRORIST FINANCIER AND ORGANIZER OF SAUDI ORIGIN, AND DOWNGRADED ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TALEBAN GOVERNMENT IN SEPTEMBER. BIN LADIN WAS INDICTED IN NEW YORK IN NOVEMBER FOR PROMOTING TERRORISM. ¶I. DESCRIBE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES WITH RESPECT TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, SPECIFIC U.S. REQUESTS TO THE HOST GOVERNMENT FOR COOPERATION AND EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE HOST COUNTRY TO ELIMINATE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT PROVIDED TO TERRORIST GROUPS DIRECTLY OR IN SUPPORT OF THEIR ACTIVITIES. DESCRIBE THE EXTENT OF THE HOST COUNTRY'S COOPERATION WITH THOSE EFFORTS AND INITIATIVES, INCLUDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT HAS SATISFIED THE SPECIFIC REQUESTS. RESPONSE: BEGINNING WITH THE 1996 VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA OF A USG INTERAGENCY COUNTERTERRORISM TEAM FOLLOWING THE 1995 OPM/SANG BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG ENTERED INTO UNPRECEDENTED, COORDINATED, INTERAGENCY CONSULTATIONS ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES WHICH ENGENDERED HIGH-LEVEL SAG INTEREST AND THE PARTICIPATION OF MULTIPLE SAG MINISTRIES. THIS INTEREST AND PARTICIPATION HAS CONTINUED AND SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASED THROUGHOUT ¶1998. THE USG AND SAG EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING AMERICAN AND SAUDI INTERESTS IN THE REGION. CONSULTATIONS AND TRAINING FOR SAUDI COUNTERTERRORISM AND SECURITY OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED STATES ALSO OCCURRED. FOLLOWING THE 1996 KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING, THE USG AND THE SAG FURTHER INCREASED COOPERATION. FBI DIRECTOR LOUIS FREEH VISITED SAUDI ARABIA TWICE IN 1996 TO COORDINATE INVESTIGATIVE EFFORTS WITH SAUDI INTERIOR MINISTER PRINCE NAIF. THE FBI MAINTAINS A PERMANENTLY STAFFED LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICE IN THE U. S. EMBASSY. WHILE COOPERATION THROUGHOUT 1998 ON THE KHOBAR TOWERS INVESTIGATION WAS STRONG, FOLLOWING THE EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS IN AUGUST IT WAS INCREASED FURTHER. ¶J. IN ADDITION TO THIS GENERAL INFORMATION, IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION FROM THE HOST GOVERNMENT DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE INVESTIGATION OR PROSECUTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE PROVIDE INFORMATION ON: (I) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN APPREHENDING, CONVICTING, AND PUNISHING THE INDIVIDUAL OR INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ACT; AND (II) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. RESPONSE: (I) THE SAG HAS SOUGHT TO APPREHEND, CONVICT, AND PUNISH THE INDIVIDUALS RESPONSIBLE FOR BOTH THE OPM/SANG AND KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBINGS AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS. IN THIS REGARD, ON APRIL 22, 1996 FOUR SAUDI NATIONALS PUBLICLY CONFESSED TO COMMITTING THE OPM/SANG BOMBING OF NOVEMBER 1995 AND THEY WERE EXECUTED ON MAY 31. THE SAG HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USG, ALTHOUGH EARLIER STAGES OF THE RELATIONSHIP DID NOT ALWAYS MEET THE EXPECTATIONS OF USG OFFICIALS. SAUDI OFFICIALS AND THE FBI HAVE WORKED CLOSELY ON MANY INVESTIGATION ISSUES RELATED TO BOTH BOMBINGS AND CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY ON THE STATUS OF THE KHOBAR TOWERS BOMBING INVESTIGATION. (II) THE SAG HAS DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE HUMAN AND FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO PROTECT USG PERSONNEL AND INTERESTS FOLLOWING THE OPM/SANG, KHOBAR TOWERS, AND EAST AFRICA BOMBINGS. IT MADE AVAILABLE TO COALITION FORCES THE PRINCE SULTAN AIRBASE AT AL KHARJ, WHERE MOST U. S. SERVICEMEN IN SAUDI ARABIA ARE NOW LOCATED, AND A VERY LARGE RESIDENTIAL COMPOUND, KNOWN AS ESKAN VILLAGE, SOUTH OF RIYADH FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN DOD PERSONNEL. THE SAG SPENT MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN FACILITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS. THE SAG ALSO WORKED WITH AMERICAN SECURITY PERSONNEL TO ENHANCE PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT ALL OTHER USG FACILITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA, INCLUDING THE U. S. EMBASSY IN RIYADH AND THE CONSULATES GENERAL IN JEDDAH AND DHAHRAN. USG AND SAG OFFICIALS FROM THE HIGHEST LEVELS DOWN CONTINUE TO MEET REGULARLY TO REVIEW THE SAFETY OF AMERICANS IN SAUDI ARABIA. ¶K. IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT COOPERATION DURING THE PREVIOUS FIVE YEARS IN THE PREVENTION OF AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AGAINST U. S. CITIZENS OR INTERESTS, PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HOST GOVERNMENT COOPERATED OR IS COOPERATING IN PREVENTING ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST UNITED STATES CITIZENS IN THE HOST GOVERNMENT'S TERRITORY. RESPONSE: THE SAG HAS PROVIDED TO THE USG INFORMATION ON THREATS DIRECTED AT U. S. INTERESTS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND CONTINUES TO LIAISE CLOSELY WITH USG AGENCIES TO PREVENT TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICANS IN THE KINGDOM. THREATS HAVE REGULARLY LED TO THE RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF EXTRA SECURITY PERSONNEL AND THE PLACEMENT OF PERMANENT PHYSICAL BARRIERS, CHECKPOINTS, AND OTHER VISIBLE DETERRENTS. FOWLER